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Abstract 
Psychological concepts are mental representations that represent, refer to, or are 
about properties and categories.  In the philosophy of mind/cognitive science, there are 
various theories of what kinds of knowledge, or information carrying mental states, 
constitute our concepts.  In other words, such theories provide views on what concepts 
are.  The knowledge stored in concepts is thought to be used in the higher cognitive 
competences such as in categorization, induction, deduction, and analogical reasoning 
when we think or reason about the extension of the concept.  While most concept theories 
have primarily focused on concrete concepts such as CHAIR, TABLE and DOG, I take such 
modern theories and apply them to abstract moral concepts such as VIRTUE, RIGHT 
ACTION, and JUSTICE.  I argue for a new overall theory of moral concepts that combines 
and includes four theories of concepts.  This dissertation addresses the question of what 
the nature of moral concepts is and what further implications this may have in ethics.  I 
contend that our moral concepts may be constituted by prototype, exemplar, theory, 
and/or emotion-based kinds of knowledge.  This tetrad view differs from, for example, 
certain Humean-based theories that contend that our moral concepts are only constituted 
by emotions and desires.  Finally, I draw further philosophical implications my 
conclusion may have for applied ethics, normative ethical theory, political philosophy, 
and meta-ethics. 
Examining the nature of concepts is an area in the philosophy of mind/language 
and cognitive science, but it dates back to at least Early Modern Philosophy.  Descartes, 
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Locke, Berkeley, and Hume called concepts ideas that are the building blocks of thought 
and the human understanding.  Such ideas are mental representations that generally refer 
to properties, categories, and things in the world.  Furthermore, they are largely causally 
responsible for how we think and reason about the extension of our ideas.  For example, 
for Hume, concepts are ideas that are derived from impressions or immediate sense data 
and are the basis of the human understanding.  Hume claims that, “By ideas I mean the 
faint images of these [impressions] in thinking and reasoning… ”  For Hume, concepts 
play a functional role in thinking and reasoning.  A similar story can be told for Locke in 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  Locke writes, “Every man being 
conscious to himself, that he thinks, and that which his mind is employed about whilst 
thinking being the ideas, that are there…”  Locke, for instance, explicitly believes that 
our idea of PERSONAL IDENTITY, is responsible for how we reason about what the 
conditions are for being the same person across time.  Berkeley claims that our general 
concept TRIANGLE is constituted by (prototype) knowledge related to such things as 
having three angles that equal 180 degrees.  Such knowledge is acquired based on our 
personal experiences with particular triangles (that in contemporary terms are mentally 
represented by exemplars).  Berkeley maintains that TRIANGLE itself is constituted by 
images of particular triangles (exemplars).   
My overall dissertation project can be viewed as following in the footsteps of 
Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature:  Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental 
Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.  For Hume, just as the three books that 
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constitute the Treatise synchronically are of the understanding, emotions, and morals, I 
likewise examine concepts, emotions, then moral concepts.  As Hume unifies the books 
of the Treatise by drawing from his first two books to conclude in his final book that 
moral concepts are constituted by emotions, I likewise engage the contemporary concepts 
and philosophy of emotions literature in my dissertation to provide a new overall theory 
on the nature of moral concepts.  Moreover, influenced by Newtonian philosophy, Hume 
attempted to use empirical-based methods in his examination of ethics.  In the same 
general spirit, I in part rely on experimental data to help inform my overall theory of 
moral concepts.   
The first chapter distinguishes psychological concepts from other notions of 
concepts in philosophy.  For example, mental concepts are distinguished from Platonic 
concepts that are abstract objects.  Rather, concepts as understood here are mental states 
that are responsible for how we cognitively function in the world around us.  As we can 
see from their functional definition, moral concepts are the very heart of moral cognition, 
but very few moral psychologists have explored the nature of moral concepts even 
though, unbeknownst to them, they may have run experiments that in some cases can lead 
to constitution claims on moral concepts.  Furthermore, in Lockean terms, concepts are 
the building blocks or constituents of thought and how the mind is furnished.  Concepts 
are also mental representations that represent things in the world. 
Later in this chapter, I discuss the overall views of concrete concepts held by 
Edouard Machery and Daniel Weiskopf.  They argue that there may be various kinds of 
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knowledge we have that constitute our concrete concepts, where several theories of 
concepts may be at play.  Here, different kinds of knowledge for a concept can be at work 
in different situations.  Discussing Machery and Weiskopf provides a partial outline for 
the tetrad view of concepts I adopt for moral concepts, where the four different kinds of 
knowledge that may constitute a moral concept may be used conjointly or separately in 
cognition depending on the circumstances.  
The second chapter examines the contemporary literature concerning the basis of 
the human understanding and explains the various theories in the literature for concrete 
concepts.  I then take these theories and convert or alter them so they can account for 
moral features and be applicable to the moral domain and moral concepts. With this 
conversion, the classical view claims that moral concepts are constituted by bodies of 
knowledge that represent the necessary and sufficient conditions of a moral category.  For 
example, ‘right action’ may be constituted by ‘an act must maximize the best 
consequences.’  Influenced by Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance for concepts, 
the prototype view states that moral concepts are constituted by prototypes or mental 
representations of the statistically frequent virtues, rules, reasons for action, and features 
of moral situations found in one’s experiences of virtuous individuals and moral acts.  
For example, my GOOD PERSON concept may be constituted in part by the concepts:  
JUST, BRAVE, HONEST, and KIND.  This cluster of conceptual constituents is not taken to 
refer to necessary and sufficient conditions.  For instance, I may meet a person who is 
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just, honest, and kind, but not brave.  Nevertheless, since she matches most of the 
features I think good people have, I still classify her as a good person.   
The exemplar theory states that concepts are exemplars or bodies of knowledge 
that refer to particular moral actions or particular exemplary individuals.  Like the 
prototype theory, this view is not understood to claim that exemplars represent necessary 
and sufficient conditions.  For example, my GOOD PERSON concept in part may be made 
up of the mental representations:  MY MOTHER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, and MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR.  The theory-theory claims that concepts are constituted by mental 
representations of normative ethical theories.  Such mental representations occupy 
defeasible placeholder positions, where such knowledge is consciously or subconsciously 
taken to be defeasible based on potential further moral learning.  Thus, theory knowledge 
is not considered to be about necessary and sufficient conditions.   For instance, my 
GOOD PERSON concept may be constituted by the particular virtue theory knowledge:  
ONE WHO HAS AND EXERCISES THE VIRUTES, WHERE THE VIRTUES LEAD ONE TO LIVE A 
GOOD LIFE. 
I also discuss what I call the emotion theory, where moral concepts are sentiments 
and emotions.  This view has its roots in Hume and is currently espoused in various 
forms by philosophers such as Simon Blackburn and Jesse Prinz.  For example, Prinz 
maintains a neo-empiricist view of moral concepts.  Neo-empiricist views are modern 
versions of traditional empiricist theories of concepts held by the likes of Hume, Locke, 
and Berkeley, where in varying degrees, these three philosophers held that concepts are 
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pictorial images.  Prinz espouses the James/Lange view that emotions are in part 
perceptions of bodily changes.  For instance, fear is the felt perception of trembling and 
having an elevated heart rate.  If moral concepts are emotions, then emotions being 
perceptions provides a framework for an empiricist or perceptual-based theory of moral 
concepts.   
In the third chapter, I assess the classical, prototype, and exemplar theories of 
moral concepts.  I contend that the classical view is not viable for moral concepts.  One 
argument amongst others against this view is that there are typicality effects found in 
experimental studies of moral concepts, where some members of a class are considered 
by subjects to be more typical than other members.  However, the classical view 
implicitly claims that each member should be considered as an equal member since all 
members equally satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership.  Given 
that experimental findings do not bear out the predictions of the classical view and that 
there is no experimental evidence for this theory, classical structure for moral concepts is 
not psychologically real.     
Later, I criticize Mark Johnson, Paul Churchland, Andy Clark, David Wong, 
Stephen Stich, and Alvin Goldman’s claims that individuals actually have prototype 
structure to their moral concepts.  My criticism is made based on the fact that they do not 
provide the required empirical evidence for these claims that utilize studies particularly 
on moral concepts.  I then justify that many people do have prototype structure by relying 
on experimental studies specifically on moral concepts such as GOOD PERSON, JUST 
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PERSON, and MORAL.  I also examine successful prototype studies on concepts such as 
CRIME and LIE; concepts that may not initially appear to be moral concepts because they 
may not have a normative component to them.  By engaging the thin/thick concepts 
debate with Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Blackburn, and Allan Gibbard, I argue 
that such concepts are thick moral concepts in that they have both a normative and 
descriptive component.  Thus, they do provide evidence for the prototype theory for 
moral concepts. 
In this chapter I also argue that many individuals do have exemplar knowledge for 
their moral concepts.  Since it has already been proven that many people have moral 
prototypes and prototypes are a summary representation of features, such summary 
representations must have been derived from representations of particular acts and 
individuals that were morally noteworthy.  Therefore, individuals must have had 
exemplar knowledge stored in their concepts before forming prototype knowledge.   
The fourth chapter attempts to establish that many people at times utilize theory 
and emotion theory kinds of knowledge.  Now, since concepts are functionally defined as 
playing a causal role in higher acts of cognition, concepts just are those mental states that 
realize the causal role.  This is just like how hearts are functionally defined as pumping 
blood.  Since my heart realizes the causal role of pumping blood, my heart is a heart.  
This method of functionally identifying concepts to their constituents may be used to 
prove the viability of the theory and emotion views.  I first lay down several 
qualifications and constraints concerning the use of this functionalist metaphysics of 
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moral conceptual mental states, where I propound a positive theory on when mental 
representation influences can be said to actually constitute the concept at hand and when 
they cannot.  I then freshly use this functionalist method in the moral domain to claim the 
viability of the theory and emotion theories for moral concepts.  Several studies show that 
emotions and representations of normative ethical theories causally influence judgments 
in the appropriate specified way at various times.  Since the moral concepts in the 
judgment are functionally defined as playing a causal role in categorization inter alia, and 
emotions and representations of ethical theories at various times appropriately realize the 
causal role, such moral concepts are in part constituted by emotions and theory 
knowledge, respectively, via the functionalist metaphysics of moral conceptual mental 
states.   
One of the main topics discussed in the fifth chapter is concept combination.  
Concept combination is concerned with how concepts can combine with each other to 
form complex thoughts.  This chapter addresses several objections from Jerry Fodor that 
the prototype view cannot account for combination.  By relying on my overall tetrad view 
of moral concepts, where moral concepts can be constituted by different kinds of 
knowledge that can be used conjointly in various circumstances, I rely on the virtues of 
the exemplar and theory views.  The exemplar and theory views generally can handle 
concept combination.  Hence, insofar as exemplar and theory knowledge simultaneously 
may also be at work at times alongside prototypes, they can help to address Fodor’s 
contentions against the prototype view.   
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The final chapter explores the further philosophical implications the previous 
chapters may have in ethics.  As one implication amongst others, I argue that the demise 
of the classical view shows that many normative ethical theories and debates in 
normative ethics – such as Hursthouse’s virtue ethics, Bentham’s utilitarianism, and 
particular debates in applied ethics and political philosophy – that presuppose that our 
moral mental representations can have classical structure, must be altered in order to 
construct a view or conclusion that is psychologically real.  I also provide a positive 
account of how philosophers must change their methodology in deliberating about 
normative ethics and political philosophy given how we live in a world in which our 
concepts do not have classical structure.  I also criticize the use of conceptual analysis for 
the motivational judgment internalism/externalism and motivational Humeanism debates.
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1.  Groundwork for Theories of Moral Concepts 
While the abstract has provided the overall summary of the dissertation as well as 
its philosophical import, this first chapter will establish some of the proper groundwork in 
order to argue for (1) which theories of concepts apply to or are viable for moral concepts 
and; (2) strong moral concept pluralism.  By stating that a theory is viable, I mean that a 
concept view and its concomitant structure is experimentally supported, and it can be 
used to successfully describe a structure of a moral concept that a number of individuals 
actually do have.  In this chapter, important distinctions will be made, the definition of 
concepts will be drawn, projects will be outlined, and the desiderata for theories of 
concepts will be laid down.   
 
1.1  The Concept/Category & the Concept/Conception Distinctions 
An important distinction will be made between concepts and categories.  
Categories are usually thought to be abstracta that do not exist in our minds; whereas 
concepts are mental representations of categories.1  Mental representations are mental 
states that represent, or, in other words, are of or about things in the world.  For 
example, there is the class of gold objects with atomic number 79, out there in the world 
where particular objects like gold nuggets and various gold jewelries fall within this 
class.  Since I have knowledge about gold, in my mind I have the concept GOLD which in 
                                                     
1 Even categories of things such as dreams and memories are abstract objects, although a 
particular dream or memory is in the mind. 
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turn is about the category gold.  Thus, to mark this distinction between concepts and 
categories, when specific concepts are discussed they will be marked in capital letters 
such as the concepts MORAL and IMMORAL.  However, when categories are at issue, they 
will be italicized.    
Another important and common distinction made is the concept/conception 
distinction.  One way to understand this distinction is that the purpose for theories of 
concepts is to attempt to determine how such mental representations correctly refer to 
properties or categories as well as to determine the meaning of concepts.
 2
  Thus, concept 
theorists will try to provide a theory of reference and meaning for concepts.  As an 
example of a concept theory, Fodor’s informational atomism holds that most lexical 
concepts, or one word concepts, are primitive atoms that do not have any conceptual 
structure to them.
3
  These symbols have no semantically interpretable component parts 
and are not decomposable.  For example, on this view, LION is not constituted by FOUR-
LEGGED, MANE, LARGE, CARNIVORE, and YELLOW.  Rather, such information is 
considered to be merely collateral data.  Fodor attaches an informational theory of 
content or reference to his atomism where one has the concept C of the property P so 
                                                     
2 As examples of those who explain this particular take on the distinction, see James 
Higginbotham, “Conceptual Competence,” in Philosophical Issues, Vol. 9, Concepts (1998), pp. 149-
162.  Maite Ezcurdia, “The Concept-Conception Distinction,” in Philosophical Issues, Vol. 9, 
Concepts (1998), pp. 187-192.   
3 Jerry Fodor, “Information and Representation,” Information, Language, and Cognition.  Ed. P. 
Hanson, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1991).  Jerry Fodor, Concepts:  Where Cognitive Science 
Went Wrong, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998).  Jerry Fodor, LOT2, (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2008).   
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long as one stands in the proper reliable causal relationship with P.
 4
   In other words, just 
as the numbers of rings in a tree carry information on the tree’s age, a concept carries 
information about P if the concept is under the nomological control of P.  Here, a 
concept’s reference and meaning is determined by reliable causal relations.  For example, 
the concept LION expresses the real-world property of being a lion because lions are the 
reliable cause of LION-tokenings.  Contrary to a Cartesian first-person perspective, one 
need not believe anything in particular about lions so long as one’s tokening of the 
concept stands in the proper mind-world relation to the property of being a lion.  Thus, 
this theory is non-cognitivist or non-epistemic regarding concept possession.
5
   
There also are variations on what are understood to be concept theories.  Concept 
theories may be thought to be concerned with immutable correct concepts that explain 
                                                     
4 For more on the informational view, see Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 
(Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1981). 
5 One important problem for informational atomism known as the Disjunction Problem is that 
erroneous applications of a concept may still be reliable.  For example, when hunting in a dense 
forest I may mistake a man in the distance for a bear and token the concept BEAR.  Such a 
mistake is natural and is often made by others in similar circumstances.  Thus, BEAR has two 
reliable causes and carries information about bears and men.  Here, the dilemma for an 
informational account arises in the question of why BEAR expresses the property of being a bear 
and not the disjunctive property being a bear-or-man.  Fodor responds to this issue with his 
asymmetric dependence theory, where the possible ancillary lawful relations a concept may have, 
such as the relation between BEAR and being a man, are asymmetrically dependent on the 
nomological relation between the concept and the actual property it expresses.  Returning to the 
example, there is a lawful relation between BEAR and the property of being a man, but this 
relation holds only because of the existence of the more fundamental nomological relation 
between BEAR and the property of being a bear, but not vice versa.  This asymmetry is Fodor’s 
explanation for why BEAR expresses the property of being a bear rather than of being a man.  If this 
adequately addresses the Disjunction Problem, then informational atomism may successfully 
explain intentionality or reference through its mind-world reliable relations. 
 4 
metaphysical facts such as what actually makes something a chair.  Here, concepts are 
not presupposed to be mental representations and can themselves be abstract objects.  
Correct concept theories attempt to give the specifications of the metaphysical conditions 
for something to actually be categorized under the concept.  Examples of such concept 
theories arise from Christopher Peacocke and Georges Rey who believes that concepts 
are abstract objects and have necessary and sufficient conditions for determining whether 
an entity may be classified under the concept.
6
   
Some theories that are generally understood to fall on the conception side of this 
distinction are the prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory.
7
  These, on the other hand, are 
epistemic theories about how we, for example, judge something to be a chair.  Thus, 
having a conception of a concept is for a subject to be in the epistemic state of having 
beliefs about the extension of a concept.  We may think of conceptions as pertaining to 
mental representations that, depending on the person, may change over time and may 
even be incorrect.   
Let us turn to an example to better illustrate the distinction between concept views 
that provide a theory of reference and conception theories.  Some small children refuse to 
call tined utensils “forks” if such utensils are not part of their own household’s set of 
                                                     
6 Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1992).  Georges 
Rey, “Concepts and Stereotypes,” Cognition 19, 1983. 
7 There are exceptions where some conception theorists such as Susan Carey take their views to 
also provide a theory of reference.   Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press), 2009. 
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silverware.
8
  Thus, other family’s tined utensils are thought to be pseudo-forks while 
one’s own family’s tined utensils are forks.  Hence, such children’s conception of FORK 
is in one way or another related to tined utensils that belong only to one’s own house.  
However, though we may think this conception to be wrong, it still may be the case that 
they possess the concept FORK if we assume something like Fodor’s informational 
atomism, and the children in question stand in the proper reliable mind-world relation to 
forks.  Thus, one can possess the concept of a fork, but one can at the same time have an 
inaccurate conception of forks.  Through further evidence gathering, misapplication, and 
improvement-making of one’s conception, one can form a more appropriate conception.9    
                                                     
8 Higginbotham, ibid. 
9 It must be noted that the concept/conception distinction may be controversial.  For example, 
Jesse Prinz and Andy Clark have argued that there is no strict divide between concept theories 
that provide theories of reference and epistemic conception theories.  There may be an overall 
theory that encompasses both sides and will be more powerful than those views that do not if the 
overall theory can accomplish this dualistic aim.  On the other hand, Fodor adheres to this 
distinction by arguing that concepts are for representing or having the ability to think about the 
concept’s extension, where any constitutive links between thinking and epistemic capacities such 
as categorization are severed.  For Fodor, in order to possess a concept of x, one must have the 
ability to think about x, where concept possession occurs independently of any epistemic 
capacities.  As discussed, for Fodor, in order to think about x, one must stand in the proper causal 
relation with x.  Machery can be read as adhering to this distinction as well in that he talks about 
different goals philosophers and psychologists have.  Philosophers have the goal of providing 
theories of reference for concepts and to explain what makes it the case that we can have 
propositional attitudes about the object of our attitudes.  Meanwhile, the goal for psychologists 
deals with epistemic capacities and is to characterize the bodies of knowledge that are used by 
default in the processes underlying the higher cognitive competences (this goal for psychologists 
will be explained in the next section of this chapter).  However, we shall bypass this debate due 
to the reason that this distinction will be presupposed here mostly as a matter of specifying and 
limiting the scope of this dissertation.  Even if a view should provide a theory of reference as well 
as account for our epistemic cognitive capacities, this dissertation is strictly limited to the so 
called conception aspect.  Jesse Prinz and Andy Clark, “Putting Concepts to Work:  Some 
Thoughts for the Twenty-first Century,” Mind & Language 19:  (2004), 57-69.  Fodor, Where 
 6 
Due to the amount of space the dissertation will take if concept and conception 
theories are discussed, this essay is primarily focused on conception theories only, and 
from here forward, we may understand the term “concept” to be about conceptions unless 
otherwise noted.
10
 
 
1.2  Concepts Defined 
Locke understands concepts as being the bare materials or constituents of thought.  
For example, the principles KILLING IS WRONG and DO NOT STEAL are each constructed 
of three concepts.  Each of the individual concepts is the building block required in order 
to have these thoughts.  However, Machery offers an alternate understanding that is 
consistent with Locke’s and is one which he believes plays a useful role in the practice of 
psychology.  He gathers this definition by putting puzzle pieces together from the works 
of several psychologists such as Lawrence Barsalou, Karen Solomon, and Douglas 
Medin.
11
  His definition of a concept is: 
                                                     
 
Cognitive Science.  Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 
2009.  Jesse Prinz, “The Return of Concept Empiricism,” in Categorization and Cognitive Science, ed. 
H. Cohen and C. Leferbvre, (Elsevier).  Jerry Fodor, “Having Concepts:  a Brief Refutation of the 
Twentieth Century,” Mind & Language 19: (2004), 29-47. 
10 In the philosophical literature, using the term “concept” in place of “conception” may be 
considered to be an irregular substitution.  However, it is a regular substitution for those 
philosophers working primarily on conceptions. 
11 L. Barsalou, K. Solomon, L. Wu., “Abstraction in Perceptual Symbol Systems,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London:  Biological Sciences 358 (2003): 1177-1187.  K. Solomon, D. 
Medin, E. Lynch.  “Concepts Do More Than Categorize.”  Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1999), 99-
 7 
A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long term 
 memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, 
 higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgments about x.     
 
Here, “knowledge” is used by Machery in the psychological sense where it means 
any contentful
12
 or information-bearing mental state that may be used in such higher 
cognitive competences as categorization and induction.  It is not to be confused with the 
traditional philosophical definition of true justified belief.  This psychological 
understanding of “knowledge” will also be adopted throughout this dissertation unless 
otherwise specified.  Long term memory is memory that can last for days or decades 
while working memory refers to the relatively small amount of information one can 
attend to or maintain in a rapidly accessible state at one time.
13
  The higher cognitive 
competences in psychology are controversially distinguished from the lower 
competences, where both kinds of competences are defined functionally.  Examples of 
lower competences are vision and motor planning, while instances of higher competences 
are categorization and induction.  Machery differentiates them by stating that the lower 
deal largely with perceptual and motor competences while the higher competences do not 
usually take perceptual stimuli such as the activation of rods and cones as direct inputs 
                                                     
 
105.  Lloyd Komatsu.  “Recent views of Conceptual Structure.”  Psychological Bulletin 112 (1992), 
500-526. 
12 A contentful mental state is a mental state that has content or represents features of the world. 
13 Barsalou notably diverges from Machery’s definition in that he believes concepts are in short 
term memory.  While it is presupposed here that concepts are stored in long term memory, see 
Machery, ibid. for a rebuttal of Barsalou. 
 8 
nor do they produce direct motor outputs.
14
  Moreover, the higher cognitive competences 
are to a certain extent under intentional control and their products can be conscious.  The 
higher competences also are slower than the lower competences.  By “default,” Machery 
means that concepts preferentially and presumptively are used in most of the higher 
competences such as deduction, induction, planning, categorization, and analogy-making.  
In other words, bodies of knowledge stored in a concept of x are preferentially used and 
readily available when thinking or reasoning about x rather than being knowledge that is 
less available and that does not come spontaneously to mind when cognizing about x.  
Since working memory, where concepts are recruited and organized into complete 
thoughts, is understood to be a limited capacity, only default knowledge about x is stored 
in the concept of x.  This has the added benefit of allowing us to generally reason and 
perform higher cognitive functions in real time without having to always systematically 
select from all the facts we may know about x.  As Locke and Machery’s definitions of 
concepts are compatible with each other, we shall understand both views to be 
appropriate for the definition of a concept.
15
  
 
 
                                                     
14 An exception is in the last stages of perception when what is perceived is categorized is a 
higher competence. 
15 They are consistent since when a concept of x stored in long term memory is used by default in 
inferring the conclusion that “X is larger than Y,” x is a constituent of this conclusion or thought.  
To note, while Machery acknowledges that both definitions are consistent with each other, he 
argues that his definition plays a more useful role in psychology.  See Machery, ibid. 
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1.3  The Viability of Theories of Moral Concepts 
In order to understand the project of determining which theories are viable for 
moral concepts, we will first need to understand the Principle of Abstract Concepts.  
Much empirical psychological work on concepts has studied such theories in light of 
what are normally thought of as concrete concepts.  Much work has focused on three-
dimensional household objects, artifacts, and biological species.  Less work has been 
done in relation to abstract concepts broadly construed,
16
 and only a handful of studies 
have examined moral concepts.  Importantly, James Hampton, in a unique study, ran tests 
on eight different abstract concepts, such as BELIEF, SCIENCE, and CRIME, in order to 
determine whether they had prototype structure similar to the successful results of finding 
prototype structure in concrete concepts.
17
  To note here, the explanation of the various 
theories of concepts will be conducted in the second chapter, and a full understanding of 
the content of these views will not be necessary or important in this first chapter.  Now, 
in Hampton’s study, the results were a mixed bag where some abstract concepts did show 
prototype structure, but others did not.  For example, SCIENCE and CRIME showed 
prototype structure while abstract concepts such as A BELIEF and AN INSTINCT, that may 
                                                     
16 Of note, George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez explore the cognitive foundations of mathematical 
concepts.  However, their approach is based on a cognitive metaphor analysis more so than from 
the vantage point of what are considered the standard theories of concepts such as prototype, 
exemplar, and theory-theory.  George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, Where Mathematics Comes From:  
How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being, (New York:  Basic Books), 2000. 
17 An explanation of Hampton’s feature listing task used in this abstract concept study will be 
explained in chapter 2, section II.  James A. Hampton, “An Investigation of the Nature of Abstract 
Concepts,” Memory & Cognition Vol. 9 (2), 1981, pp. 149-156. 
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intuitively be thought to have prototype structure, as a matter of fact do not have such 
structure.  Thus, the upshot from Hampton’s experiments is that we cannot safely 
presuppose that abstract concepts will have the same theoretical concept structure and 
cognitive processing as those for concrete concepts.  As a matter of caution, we cannot 
draw conclusions about moral concepts solely based on the findings of concrete concepts.  
Therefore, further work is required in order to ascertain the structure of moral concepts.   
A new principle that I derive from Hampton’s study, which is a principle he in no 
way mentions, is what we may call The Principle of Abstract Concepts (PAC). 
The Principle of Abstract Concepts (PAC):  Any proposed concept structure for 
 an abstract concept AC cannot be based only on non-AC or concrete concept 
 empirical findings.  They must at least in part be based on experimental data for 
 AC. 
 
PAC is motivated not only based on Hampton’s study but also based on the 
generally understood demise of the classical theory in the literature in regards to non-
mathematical and non-logical concepts.
18
   Hampton’s study shows that we cannot be 
quick to jump to conclusions that since, for example, it may be thought that KNOWLEDGE 
or PERSONHOOD does not have classical structure that it therefore must have some 
specific concept structure that is predominantly found in studies for concrete concepts.  
For instance, we cannot directly conclude that KNOWLEDGE or PERSONHOOD has a 
prototype structure.  Rather, for all abstract concepts, further premises are required to 
make arguments that a particular abstract concept has such and such a concept structure. 
                                                     
18 A clarification of the demise of the classical view will be discussed in the third chapter. 
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What are further required by PAC in order to make conclusions about an abstract 
concept’s structure may be experimental studies on the particular type of abstract 
concept, or they may be such studies coupled with philosophical arguments.  As stated, it 
is also important to note that PAC does not necessarily deny that the empirical findings 
on concrete concepts can be used to draw conclusions concerning abstract concepts.  
Such empirical findings may be used to make inferences only in conjunction with 
specific experimental work that is focused on the type of abstract concept in question.  
However, PAC does deny that concrete concept empirical work can by itself be sufficient 
to establish a concept structural conclusion for abstract concepts.   
For the most part, when philosophers or psychologists offer or support a theory or 
theories of concepts, they are usually only concerned with views that pertain to concrete 
concepts.
19
  Based on PAC, these studies do not lead to moral concept structural 
conclusions.  In fact, the handful of explicit moral concepts studies or, in other words, 
psychology experiments specifically designed to reach concepts-based conclusions has 
only been for the prototype view, and even some of these tests on their own lack the rigor 
and systematicity to make a complete case that ethical concepts are prototypes.
20
  With 
the numerous extant theories of concepts out there, there is unquestionably a sizable 
lacuna in the concepts literature for moral concepts.  However, it is my intention to help 
                                                     
19 A Notable exception is Jesse Prinz who offers a neo-empiricist account of moral concepts based 
on philosophical argument and experiments in moral psychology that are not explicit concept 
studies.  Furnishing the Mind, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 2002) and The Emotional 
Construction of Morals, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008). 
20 An examination of these prototype studies will be conduction in chapter 2. 
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fill in this ethics gap.  Elizabeth Anscombe has stated that there can be no Ethics that is 
not grounded in a proper Philosophy of Mind.
21
  This dissertation attempts to make a 
significant contribution to this endeavor.   
The third and fourth chapters will be devoted to first establishing which theories 
of concepts are viable for moral concepts.  As a qualification, while the extant theories of 
concepts may not be able to account for all the evidence that may exist for the nature of 
moral concepts and it may be the case that many new moral concept theories must be 
constructed due to this fact, the focus of this essay will be limited to the examination of 
moral concepts in light of the extant concept theories.  Given PAC, there generally has 
not been sufficient support or an adequate examination of which psychological theories 
of concepts apply to ethical concepts.  Many moral philosophers engage in analysis of 
moral concepts, but few have addressed which possible theories are viable for such 
concepts in a manner consistent with PAC.  Here, one of the main aims of a concept 
theory is to provide an account of the structure of concepts, where different theories 
provide different views of a concept’s structure.22  A concept structure explains what 
constitutes a concept, where a concept generally is thought to be constituted by other 
more basic concepts and mental representations.  Instances of those few who have used 
such experimental data to examine the nature of ethical concepts are Mark Johnson, 
Jennifer Frei, and Philip Shaver for prototype structure and Jesse Prinz, using studies that 
                                                     
21 Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, 33:  1958, 1-19. 
22 A list of desiderata for concept theories is given in section 1.5 of this chapter. 
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are not explicitly concept experiments, for an emotion-based structure, where concepts 
are constituted by sentiments and emotions.
23
  However, to my knowledge, no one has 
attempted an actual comprehensive examination of our moral concepts by taking into 
account all the potential theories of concepts.  For example, to my knowledge no one has 
given evidence consistent with PAC for the exemplar view for moral concepts.  No 
thinker has even explained what the theory-theory for concepts will look like in the moral 
domain, let alone has anyone explicitly stated that such theories are viable for moral 
concepts.  The first aim of this dissertation is to provide this comprehensive analysis of 
which concept theories are viable for moral concepts by examining each extant 
psychological theory of concepts in turn.  By using 1) the existent moral prototype 
concept studies; 2) philosophical arguments along with 1) for the viability of the 
prototype and exemplar theories; and 3) studies in moral psychology on folk moral 
judgments that are not explicitly designed to draw conclusions in the domain of concepts 
but do in fact lead to viability concept conclusions for the theory-theory and the newly 
devised emotion theory; the prototype, exemplar, theory-theory, and emotion views will 
be posited as the viable theories for moral concepts in a manner that remains true to PAC.   
Moreover, at times, new analysis will be given for the viable theories of moral concepts 
as to what the relevant moral rather than concrete concept components of the concept will 
even look like.  As we can see, this dissertation is in part philosophically interesting in 
                                                     
23 More precisely, Johnson argues for a fusion prototype and theory-theory structure for moral 
concepts.  Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination, (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press), 1993. 
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that it will fall at the intersection of concepts and ethics.  As Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
can be read in varying degrees as believing that our concepts are generally picture-like 
images, the nature and structure of our concepts too will be explored here.  However, the 
ethics dimension enters the equation as our focus will be on ethical concepts.   
Only explicit experimental data for the prototype theory for moral concepts exists.  
Therefore, in assessing which theories are viable for ethical concepts, initial and 
additional work is necessary in demonstrating that there is an experimental and, at times, 
philosophical grounding for all the viable non-prototype theories of ethical concepts, a 
basic grounding that is readily available to those philosophers working in the concrete 
concepts domain.  As stated, the empirical evidence for specifically moral concepts is 
rather thin.  However, interestingly enough, some studies in empirical moral psychology, 
while not built specifically for the study of moral concepts, can be used to draw 
conclusions in the area.  The insight that many non-concepts-based studies in moral 
psychology can be related and used to draw conclusions on moral concepts will be crucial 
and essential for determining which theories of concepts are viable for moral concepts.  
Thus, the first aim of the dissertation is to determine which theories of concepts are 
viable for moral concepts in a manner that is consistent with PAC.   
 
1.4  Moral Concept Pluralism  
The second aim of this dissertation, which is related to the first aim, is to establish 
moral concept pluralism.  Moral concept pluralism states that we do not have one 
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universal structure for all moral concepts that mentally represent the various moral 
categories, where there is only one concept for a category.24  Rather, one may have 
several individuated concepts of a moral category, where concepts are mental 
representations of categories and where each concept contains a different structure 
from the others.  Here, what structure or concept that functions or plays a causal 
role in, inter alia, categorization, concept combination, and induction depends on 
the situation.  In order to arrive upon moral concept pluralism, one must first establish 
that there is more than one viable structure for a possible concept(s) of a category that is 
actually used in various facets of cognition such as categorization, concept combination, 
and induction.  Only after this may one then show that there is a pluralism rather than 
hybridism between the viable structures.  One difference between pluralism and 
hybridism is that for pluralism, the viable structures each constitute disparate 
individuated concepts of a category.  Thus, if the prototype, exemplar, theory-theory, and 
emotion views are the viable fundamental structures of VIRTUOUS for an individual, then 
one has four individuated concepts of VIRTUOUS, where each concept exclusively 
contains one of the structures.  On the other hand, in a hybrid theory, all the fundamental 
structures are parts of the same concept.  Thus, in the example, if VIRTUOUS is a hybrid, 
then there is only one concept VIRTUOUS that contains four parts that correspond to the 
four viable structures.  A further elaboration of this particular issue of intrapersonal 
                                                     
24 There are other different types of pluralism for concepts that will not be the focus here.  See 
Gualtiero Piccinini and Sam Scott, “Splitting Concepts,” Philosophy of Science 73:  (2006), 390-409. 
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concept individuation and the difference between pluralism and hybridism will be 
provided shortly. 
To expand on pluralism further, it is not the case that, for example, all ethical 
concepts such as BAD PERSON and JUST will always have prototype structure for all 
people at all times and places.  Rather, it may be the case that individuals have a different 
conceptual structure for a particular moral concept as compared to other individuals.  
Pluralism also maintains that synchronically at a particular time, an individual may have 
several possible structures or concepts of a category.   Moreover, it may also be the case 
that diachronically across time, individuals may have different conceptual structures or 
concepts of a category as well.  To give examples of pluralism, in our debate of whether a 
given war is just or not, I may have a prototype of JUST while you may have a theory-
theory structure of it.  In this case, we both have different conceptual structures of JUST.  
Furthermore, it could be the case that I have both a prototype and an exemplar conceptual 
structure or two individuated concepts of JUST, but in our discussion, I happen to be only 
relying on my prototype concept.  Also, when I think of this issue by myself a month 
from now, I may have theory-theory and emotion view concept structures or two such 
concepts of JUST in addition to the two individuated prototype and exemplar structured 
concepts of the class.   
 17 
Two philosophers who may be read as arguing for concrete concept pluralism are 
Edouard Machery and Daniel Weiskopf.
25
  Machery believes in what he calls the 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis, which is really a family of views: 
1)  Synchronically or diachronically, individuals have several concepts of a 
category that are used by default in the higher cognitive competences. 
2) Co-referential but structurally different concepts or bodies of knowledge have 
few properties in common. 
3) Prototype, exemplar, and theories are the fundamental conceptual structures. 
4) Concept structures in 3) often are used in distinct cognitive processing. 
5) The notion of “concept” is not a natural kind and ought to be eliminated.26 
 
Although he does not explicitly call himself a “pluralist,” we can read Machery as 
being a proponent of pluralism in that he holds 1).
27
  On the other hand, 2) is provided in 
order to support 5) in that if structurally different co-referential bodies of knowledge have 
few properties in common, then it will be difficult for “concept” to be a natural kind.  
Since our discussion here is of pluralism and not necessarily one of concept 
eliminativism, we shall ignore 2) and 5).  While eliminativism may or may not be a result 
                                                     
25 Edouard Machery, “Concepts are not a Natural Kind,” Philosophy of Science 72, (2005), 444-67.  
Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009.  Daniel 
Weiskopf, “The plurality of concepts,” Synthese (July 2009).  “Atomism, Pluralism, and 
Conceptual Content,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79:  (2009), pp. 130-162.  See also 
D. Medin, E. Lynch, and K. Solomon, “Are There Kinds of Concepts?” Annual Review of 
Psychology 51:  (2000), 121-147.   
26 Machery, Doing, ibid. 
27 Machery understands pluralism differently than as defined here.  He takes pluralism to be “the 
view that a natural kind K divides into several natural kinds, K₁,…, Kn (Doing Without Concepts, 
240).”  It appears that he understands pluralism to maintain that K is a natural kind that should 
not be eliminated.  This runs contrary to his position that the notion of concept ought to be 
eliminated.  Thus, he is not a pluralist in his own sense of the term.  However, pluralism as used 
by Weiskopf and as defined in this dissertation is merely about Machery’s 1) with no further 
statement about whether concept eliminativism does or does not follow from it.  Hence, we may 
read Machery as a pluralist as defined here. 
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of pluralism, these two issues may be separated, and such a separation will be made now.  
3) lists what Machery believes are the viable theories of concepts for concrete concepts.  
Since this essay is concerned with abstract moral concepts rather than concrete concepts, 
3) does not apply here.  Nevertheless, as will be shown, the set of fundamental concepts 
for ethical concepts include the three given by Machery as well as what will be called the 
emotion view.  Since 4) is linked with 3), it too is inapplicable here, although there is 
agreement on 4).  Thus, we may interpret that Machery believes in pluralism since he 
holds 1), which is that individuals have several concepts for a category, synchronically or 
diachronically.   
 Weiskopf holds that pluralism is the view that one may have several concepts of 
a category that are each composed of different fundamental psychological structures 
synchronically or diachronically.
28
  Weiskopf also reads Machery as a pluralist, but 
differs from Machery in that he does not believe concept eliminativism follows from 
pluralism.  Weiskopf states that when used in the higher competences, different structures 
or bodies of knowledge will be at work depending on the situation at hand.  In this sense, 
Weiskopf claims that our overall conceptual system appears to be adaptive.  The general 
outline of his pluralism argument is: 
P1:  Psychological theories of concepts state that concepts play a     
         causal/explanatory role in cognition. 
P2:  Concepts are identified with the structure that best fills those             
         causal/explanatory roles. 
P3:  Several distinct kinds of structure satisfy the causal/explanatory roles. 
                                                     
28 Weiskopf, ibid. 
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C:    Therefore, concepts are constituted by several distinct kinds of psychological 
         structures.
29
   
 
 Moral concept pluralism must be distinguished from a hybrid theory of moral 
concepts.  For, assuming that there are several viable theories of moral concepts, this may 
provide evidence for a hybrid rather than a pluralistic view.  For instance, since there may 
be numerous viable conceptual structures in the moral domain, a hybrid moral concept 
such as RIGHT ACTION may be thought to be simultaneously constituted by all those 
various viable knowledge structures as parts.  The philosophers who have done most to 
outline the distinction between hybrid and pluralistic views of concepts are Machery and 
Weiskopf.
30
   
Machery examines Osherson and Smith’s classic hybrid theory in order to draw 
his distinction.  Osherson and Smith believe concepts are composed of a core and 
identification procedure parts.
31
  The core aspect of a concept has classical structure and 
is composed of a body of knowledge that is about the necessary and sufficient features of 
members of a class.  The identification procedure aspect has prototype structure that is 
made up of a body of knowledge that represents the statistically frequent features of 
members of a class.  The core part of a concept is at work in concept combination and 
categorization when there is no time pressure.  This use of time pressure in this particular 
                                                     
29 Ibid. 
30 Machery, Doing, 63-75.  Weiskopf, Plurality. 
31 Daniel, Osherson and Edward Smith, “On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of 
concepts,” Cognition 9:  (1981), 35-58.  For another classic hybrid theory, see E.Smith, E. Shoben, L. 
Rips, “Structure and process in semantic memory:  A featural model for semantic decisions,” 
Psychological Review 81, (1974), 214-241. 
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hybrid is a characteristic of some but not all hybrid theories.  For example, a hybrid 
theory alternatively may claim that one structure is used for making correct 
categorizations while another body of knowledge is used to judge how typical a member 
is within its category as compared to other members.  For Osherson and Smith, the 
identification procedure part is used when we are asked to categorize items as members 
quickly with little time for thought.  Based on an examination of their hybrid view, 
Machery identifies hybrid theories as claiming to have the following four properties: 
1)  A concept is divided into several parts. 
2) Each part stores a distinct type of knowledge – e.g., knowledge of prototypes, 
knowledge of exemplars, etc. 
3) When one of the parts is used in a higher cognitive competence, then it is 
necessarily the case that the other parts of the concept may be used in other 
cognitive competences. 
4) The parts of a given concept do not produce inconsistent outcomes such as 
inconsistent categorization judgments.
32
 
 
Osherson and Smith’s hybrid is in line with 1) in that a concept is divided into 
two parts:  The core and identification procedure.  With 2), the hybrid has two different 
types of knowledge associated with the two parts:  Knowledge about necessary and 
sufficient features and summary representations features.  Moreover, the parts of a 
concept are linked in that the core is at work in concept combination and necessarily the 
identification procedure may be used in fast categorization tasks.  Thus, 3) is satisfied.  
Machery motivates 3) based on the fact that traditionally, hybrid theories claim that 3) is 
the case for hybrid concepts.  However, Machery states that while the Heterogeneity 
                                                     
32 Machery, ibid. 
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Hypothesis (or more precisely, the first tenet of the Hypothesis) allows for the possibility 
for different bodies of knowledge of x to be used in different competences, such a linkage 
is contingent rather than necessary, and it may not be the case that, for example, a 
prototype of x may be used in a competence when the classical structure of x has been 
used in some other competence.  For 3), we may understand hybrid theorists to be using 
an empirical type of necessity; a necessity where something could have been otherwise, 
but it did not or was not the case.  Finally 4) is met due to the fact that the two parts are 
coordinated and at times do not produce inconsistent categorization judgments.  In this 
arrangement, the core may at times override the identification procedure to produce a 
single categorization output, where such coordination may not allow for two opposing 
final outcomes from the two different parts of the hybrid.  4) is satisfied because the core 
is the criterion of correctness for a concept and at times may supersede the identification 
procedure.  While the identification procedure is considered to be a reliable yet defeasible 
body of knowledge, the criterion of correctness is designated to be used when we must be 
sure to attempt to categorize correctly.  Now, a part is the “criterion of correctness” only 
in the sense that as a psychological matter, it may override the other parts since it is 
considered to be the means to categorize and reason correctly.  However, it still is 
possible that the part that is the criterion of correctness may contain misconceptions.  
While there are different types of hybrid theories that are each set up in different ways,
33
 
                                                     
33 For other hybrid theories see:  L. Rips, E. Shoben, and E. Smith, “Semantic distance and the 
verification of semantic relations,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 12:  (1973), p. 1-20.  
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having a criterion of correctness that may be overridingly used when the potential for 
inconsistencies among the possible bodies of knowledge arises is a general feature of 
traditional hybrid theories.
34
  It is important to keep in mind for Machery that on a hybrid 
view the possibility for conflicting or inconsistent judgments might be eliminated, where 
the criterion of correctness itself is a consistent body of knowledge.  Meanwhile, concept 
pluralism denies that there is a criterion of correctness for the entire particular domain of 
concepts in question.  All in all, we can see that Osherson and Smith’s hybrid view 
satisfies the four properties or claims that characterize hybrid theories, where whether 
moral concepts are hybrids or not will be discussed in the fifth chapter. 
As a clarification and further refinement of hybridism, it appears that even if we 
have a criterion of correctness and have the competence to resolve contradictions but our 
performance is such that we generally do make judgments consistent with the criterion of 
correctness but at times make contradictory judgments because of mental error, a 
hybridist will still claim that the conceptual organization of our minds is that of a 
                                                     
 
E. Smith, E. Shoben, and L. Rips, “Structure and process in semantic memory:  a featural model 
for semantic decisions,” Pscyhological Review 81:  (1974), 214-241.  S. Armstrong, L. Gleitman, and 
H. Gleitman, “What Some Concepts Might Not Be,” Cognition, 13, 1983.  F. Keil, W. smith, D. 
Simons, and D. Levin, “Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism:  Implications for hybrid models 
of the structure of knowledge,” Cognition 65:  (1998), p. 103-135. 
34 To note, some views call themselves hybrids, but do not posit a criterion of correctness.  When 
hybrids are discussed in this dissertation, they will refer only to those certain theories that do put 
forth a criterion of correctness.  For an example of a so-called hybrid that does not have a 
criterion of correctness, see F. Keil, W. Smith, D. Simons, D. Levin, “Two dogmas of conceptual 
empiricism:  implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge,” Cognition 65:  (1998), 
pp. 103-135. 
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hybridism in that we still really do have a criterion of correctness that generally leads us 
to make the corresponding judgments in a variety of circumstances even though at times 
there may be performance errors due to some kind of mental mistake.  We may 
understand a competent person in terms of hybridism to be one who really does have a 
criterion of correctness such that this person’s performance of making actual judgments is 
generally consistent with it, but at times this person may make contradictory judgments 
due to some kind of mental error.  In other words, if one has a criterion of correctness that 
is competently mastered, then one has the ability to make a certain pattern of judgments 
under a variety of circumstances that is in line with and is what we should expect from 
having a criterion of correctness, and one has available plausible explanations of mental 
error when conflicting judgments are made; explanations that are consistent with mastery 
of making judgments that are in league with the criterion of correctness under normal 
circumstances.  From here forward, we shall understand the hybridist’s claim against 
conflicting judgments to be along these lines.
35
  If one has competence in having and 
applying a criterion of correctness, then the various types of structures in question may be 
parts of the same individual concept so long as 3) is satisfied as well.  However, if there 
is no such competence in a given concept realm, then one will have a pluralism and 
several individuated concepts of a category corresponding to the number of viable 
structures. 
                                                     
35 The nature of how contradictory judgments may arise will be discussed in chapter four.  
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Now, mental error may be due to any number of factors such as forgetfulness, 
mental fatigue, drugs, or perhaps certain reasoning biases of the mind such as the 
irrational primacy effect in which subjects give more weight or importance to information 
at the beginning of a series of data even though the order in which the information is 
given is not important.   
Also, there may be a possible intermediate view between pluralism and 
hybridism.  This position may claim that in some sub-domains of a concept realm an 
agent does have a criterion of correctness that is competently mastered by the user, but in 
other related conceptual sub-domains the agent does not have such a criterion.  For 
example, in the realm of concrete concepts, we may have such a criterion for natural kind 
concepts, but we may not have it for artifact kind representations.  For ethical concepts, 
this middle view may state that there is such a criterion for thin concepts such as RIGHT 
ACTION and WRONG ACTION, but there is no such criterion for thick concepts such as 
HONEST and PUSILLANIMOUS.
36
  This position differs from hybridism in that there is no 
criterion of correctness that is competently mastered for an agent in at least one 
subdomain, which is a position that hybridism flatly denies.  However, the issue becomes 
more complicated when comparing it to pluralism.  For, within a domain, pluralism 
merely claims that inconsistencies that are not due to any type of performance errors but 
rather to a lack of a criterion of correctness are possible, and it may be understood as not 
                                                     
36 As will be further elaborated upon in the third chapter, thin concepts are thought to contain 
only a normative component while thick concepts contain both a normative and descriptive 
component. 
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necessarily denying that there may be a criterion of correctness that is competently 
mastered in one subdomain but not in another.  It may be seen as being consistent with 
pluralism in that inconsistencies that are not due to any type of mental error are possible 
on this view in at least one subfield of ethical concepts because there is no criterion of 
correctness that is competently mastered in this subfield.  However, there may be such a 
criterion in another subfield.  Therefore, we shall describe strong pluralism as the view 
that there is no criterion of correctness that is competently mastered at all in a given 
concept realm.  Meanwhile, weak pluralism will be this intermediate view in which there 
may be such a criterion in some subdomains of a given field of concepts, but there still is 
no such criterion in other subdomains.   
Here, we can even further fill up the logical space of possibilities by allowing for 
the option that hybridism or even weak pluralism may allow for different bodies of 
knowledge to be the criterion of correctness based on the subdomain of concepts.  For 
example, I may hold a hybrid view in which my prototypes are the dominant 
representations for natural kind concepts in physics and chemistry, theories are overriding 
for natural kind concepts in biology, and exemplars are the criterion of correctness for 
artifact kind concepts.  Likewise, if I am a weak pluralist, I may have the same bodies of 
knowledge play the dominant roles in their respective subdomains as in the above 
example, except for natural kind concepts in chemistry, where I maintain that there is no 
criterion of correctness.  For this possibility of having several different bodies of 
knowledge rather than one play the overriding role within subdomains of a general 
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domain of concepts, we shall entitle the relevant views as multi-hybridism and multi-
weak pluralism. 
Now, Machery understands 3) and 4) as part of a theory of intrapersonal concept 
individuation in that they are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
two co-referential bodies of knowledge to be parts of the same concept as opposed to 
composing two distinct concepts.  In other words, if 3) and 4) are met, then the two types 
of structure in question are parts of the same individual concept.  However, if 3) or 4) are 
not satisfied, then, for example, Osherson and Smith’s hybrid view is really a pluralism 
view where one will have two individuated concepts of a category, where the first 
concept will have classical structure and the second concept will have prototype 
structure.  Thus, it will not be the case that the core and identification procedure will 
hybridize and be parts of the same concept.   
Similar to Machery’s 1) and 2), Weiskopf states that a hybrid theory of concepts 
claims that there are several parts to a concept, where each part contains a body of 
knowledge that has different types of information and processing from the other parts.  
For hybrids, there is only one concept of a category.  He writes, “[H]ybrids are theories 
on which concepts are identified with single representations that possess two or more 
distinct components that have significantly different characteristics…”37  Weiskopf also 
refers to Osherson and Smith’s theory to account for his understanding of hybridism.  
Weiskopf does not recognize Machery’s 3), but he does mention along the lines of 4) that 
                                                     
37 Weiskopf, “Plurality,” 168.  
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hybrid theories usually posit that one part of the concept is taken to be the criterion of 
correctness.  While it cannot be conclusively stated that Weiskopf adopts Machery’s 
theory of concept individuation since Weiskopf does not discuss 3) at all nor 4) in regards 
to individuation, Weiskopf can be read as accepting the conclusion that hybrid theories 
hold that there is only one concept for a category in which the single concept has several 
disparate parts that each have different types of structure and information.  Meanwhile, a 
pluralistic view contends that each different viable type of structure constitutes a 
disparate individuated concept of the category.  Thus, like Machery, for pluralism one 
may have several concepts of a category that each has different types of knowledge. 
Based on our hybrid versus pluralism discussion of Machery and Weiskopf, we 
will adopt Machery’s criteria for distinguishing between hybrid and pluralistic views.  
Moreover, his theory of concept individuation will also be endorsed.  Their jointly held 
view that hybrids posit only one super-structured concept of a category while pluralism, 
as defined here, contends that there are numerous concepts of a category will also be 
maintained.  In summary, we see that Machery and Weiskopf can be viewed as holding a 
pluralistic account, where synchronically and diachronically one may have several 
individuated concepts of a category and where different concepts of a category may be 
used in the higher cognitive competences depending on the situation.  It is this 
understanding of concrete concept pluralism that will be adopted here for moral concept 
pluralism.   
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Both Machery and Weiskopf argue that many to most thinkers working in the 
concrete concepts field believe that all concepts have a single uniform type of structure.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that our focus is on the realm of abstract ethical 
concepts, not concrete concepts.  Given that our domain of inquiry is ethics-related, some 
philosophers and psychologists who have studied moral concepts have held a prototype 
view.  Several proponents are Linda Coleman, Paul Kay, James Hampton, Mark Johnson, 
and Paul Churchland.
38
  Given PAC, since they have not considered the further requisite 
evidence for other theories of concepts, there are no alternative conceptual structures for 
such thinkers from which a pluralism may even be recommended.  It may be the case that 
such thinkers believe there are several viable moral concepts structures beyond the 
prototype view and that there is a pluralism that exists between the fundamental moral 
structures.  This may be the case even though they have not explicitly stated what the 
other viable structures are or that there is even a moral concept pluralism.  Furthermore, 
this may be the case even though they have not provided arguments as to why there is a 
pluralism rather than hybridization between the structures.  Yet, given PAC, since they 
have not considered the further requisite evidence for other structures, the questions still 
                                                     
38 Paul Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press),  1989.  
James Hampton, “An Investigation of the Nature of Abstract Concepts,” Memory and Cognition, 
Vol. 9 (2), 1981.  Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, “Prototype Semantics:  The English Word Lie,” 
Language 57:1.  (March 1981), 26-44.  Abigail Strichartz and Roger Burton, “Lies and Truth:  A 
Study of the Development of the Concept,” Child Development, 61:1 (Feb., 1990), 211-20.  Johnson, 
ibid.  William Casebeer’s emphasis on the mind in Natural Ethical Facts is on connectionism and 
moral judgment.  He does not discuss the concepts literature in any detail. 
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remain as to what the other viable structures are as well as to what the argument is for 
moral concept pluralism.  Contrastively, such evidence and arguments will be provided 
here.    
While Jesse Prinz may be read as holding two different theories of moral concepts 
– a pluralism and a monism – in reconciliation, it will be argued that Prinz actually holds 
a pluralistic view, where our moral concepts are either composed of exemplars or of 
sentiments and emotions.  However, Prinz does not provide evidence consistent with 
PAC for the exemplar theory and his case that moral concepts are constituted by 
sentiments and emotions will be criticized in chapter four.  Moreover, Prinz does not give 
an argument for pluralism over hybridism.   Nevertheless, the appropriate arguments for 
the exemplar and emotion-constitution views that are true to PAC will be given here.  
Also, the contention for pluralism over hybridism will be provided.   
Some philosophers can be read as having adopted a moral concept pluralism such 
as David Wong, Andy Clark, Alvin Goldman, and Stephen Stich.
39
  They may be read as 
stating that it is plausible that there is a pluralism between prototype and exemplar 
theory.  While I agree with this basic position, this essay provides a justification for this 
conclusion in line with PAC that is absent from their immediate discussions as well as 
                                                     
39 David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 69-71.  A moral 
concept pluralism may implicitly be given by Andy Clark, “Connectionism, Moral Cognition, 
and Collaborative Problem Solving,” Mind and Morals, ed by L. May, M. Friedman, and A. Clark, 
(Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1996), p.114.  Alvin Goldman, “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” 
Ethics Vol. 103 (Jan 1993), 337-360.  Stephen Stich, “Moral Philosophy and Mental 
Representation,” The Origin of Values.  Ed. by Hechter, M., Nadel, L., and Michod, R.  (New York:  
Aldine de Gruyer, 1993), pp. 215-228.  
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augments the purview towards which their pluralism applies by adding the theory-theory 
and the emotion view as viable moral concept theories.  Now, they may not necessarily 
exclude the possibility that there are more viable moral structures, but this dissertation 
will give the evidence consistent with PAC for such structures as well as the actual 
contention for pluralism that is not contained in their writings.  Thus, the evidence 
consistent with PAC for the fundamental moral concepts structures and the actual 
arguments for strong pluralism rather than hybridism will be provided here.  The actual 
establishment of a strong moral concept pluralism in Meta-ethics, Philosophy of Mind, 
Philosophy of Cognitive Science, and Philosophy of Language will uniquely be 
attempted in this dissertation. 
 
1.5   The Desiderata for Theories of Moral Concepts  
Since we have a definition of “concept,” the desiderata on a theory of concepts 
will be explored.  These are the explanatory roles any promising theory of concepts must 
to a certain extent satisfy.  In the third through fifth chapters, it will be argued that my 
pluralistic view of moral concepts best accounts for these criteria.  Now, since pluralism 
will be contended, where there are numerous fundamental theories, each individual 
theory need not wholly satisfy each of the criteria, since other viable theories may 
account for its deficiencies.  Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis, Fodor, Prinz, and Machery 
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have done much to clarify what these criteria for theories of concepts must be.
40
  A look 
at their relevant work will be beneficial to the reader.  As here our purposes are primarily 
focused on conception rather than reference-based concept views, the list of goals 
provided will be tailored to conception theory purposes.  Thus, one may expect 
differences and alterations in the list of criteria compared to some of the above authors, 
whose lists, for some thinkers, conflate the desiderata of concept and conception 
theories.
41
  It is for this reason that providing a refurbished list of criteria is appropriate in 
spite of the detailed work done by the specified group of authors.  To note, while there 
may be other criteria relevant to the ethical domain of concepts such as analogical 
reasoning and planning, due to space concerns, only the standard criteria for theories of 
concrete concepts that also apply to ethical concepts will be examined. 
Before listing the criteria, several common desiderata for theories of concepts will 
now be discussed as to why they are not included in the given list of criteria.  First, a 
possible criterion of theories of concepts is the scope requirement where, as understood 
here, one fundamental concept theory, a single hybrid view, or a pluralistic theory of 
concepts has to be able to account for the different types of concepts that are abstract, 
concrete, and sensory.  For example, a theory of concepts is thought by some to have to 
be able to encompass a diverse array of concepts such as TRUTH, FEAR, TURTLE, 
                                                     
40 Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, “Concepts and Cognitive Science,” Concepts:  Core 
Readings, Ed E. Margolis and S. Laurence, Cambridge:  MA, The MIT Press, 1999, 3-82.  Fodor, 
Concepts.  Prinz, Furnishing the Mind.  Machery, Doing Without Concepts. 
41 For an explanation of the confusion in the concepts literature of conflating both types of 
theories, see Machery’s first two chapters in:  Machery, Doing, 7-51. 
 32 
DOORKNOB, and JUSTICE.  This desideratum is considered to be the bane of the 
traditional empiricism view held by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.  Traditional 
empiricism’s demise is in part brought about due to its failure to account for abstract 
concepts, such as PUSILLANIMITY, MORAL, WRONG, and VIRTUE, within an image-based 
theory.   
For our purposes we will be examining only abstract ethical concepts.  This 
inquiry is about ethical concepts concerning how we should or should not act inter and 
intra-personally, and it is also about virtue trait concepts.  For now, we may understand it 
as not being meant to be about conventional normative concepts that are thought to 
pertain to such actions as not blowing one’s nose at the dinner table or always wearing 
formal clothing when at the clubhouse.  As we will see later in the fourth chapter, it is 
very difficult if not impossible to come up with a principled distinction between the 
moral and the conventional.  However, for now, suffice it to say that this essay concerns 
itself with normative concepts pertaining to those actions that are usually thought to be 
moral; although, this in itself is contentious on some issues, and what is considered to be 
moral may also be likely subject to cultural variance.  We also will not be concerned with 
concepts such as FREE WILL or PERSONAL IDENTITY which are commonly classified as 
concepts in the domain of metaphysics but may also be thought to fall in the area of 
moral responsibility.  Thus, our area of interest is a highly specified set of abstract 
concepts and does not pretend to be about all types of concepts concrete, sensory, and 
abstract.  In this respect, the scope requirement does not necessarily apply here.   
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Based on the concept/conception distinction, conception theories supposedly 
focus on how human beings epistemically and conceptually categorize the particular as 
instances of the general.  This is not to be confused with the question of how concepts 
have intentionality or are about and refer to things.
42
  Assuming the distinction, concept 
rather than conception theories tend to be more interested in providing a theory of 
reference, extension, denotation, or the explanation of in virtue of what concepts may 
refer to what they refer.  The criterion of intentionality generally deals with the issue of 
concepts and how they refer, where the intentional content of a concept is those things to 
which a concept refers.  For example, recall that for Fodor’s concept view, rather than 
conception view, the concept LION refers to the actual property of being a lion based on 
an informational theory.  On the other hand, conception theories are more concerned with 
how we psychologically or epistemically categorize the more particular actions, entities, 
or classes into more general or superordinate categories.  For example, as will be further 
explained in the next chapter, the prototype theory of conceptions claims that conceptions 
are bodies of knowledge that are about the statistically frequent summary representation 
features of members of a class.  Thus, for some individual, LION may be composed of 
YELLOW, MANE, LARGE, FOUR-LEGGED, and ROARS.  However, for most conception 
theorists, this aspect of the prototype theory is not to be understood as pertaining to some 
descriptivist theory of reference but rather, as a psychological explanation of how human 
                                                     
42 See Machery, ibid. 
 34 
beings categorize.
43
  Prototype theorists posit such a structure for our concrete 
conceptions as a way to explain categorization as opposed to intentionality.  Thus, 
prototype theorists are interested in categorization as concerned with how we may 
categorize lions as being subsumed within the larger class of mammals by way of 
matching the features between them.  They are also concerned with whether and how test 
participants categorize particular tokens of large four-legged and yellow predators as 
falling within the category of lion by way of feature matching as well.  Thus, conception 
theories need not be concerned with whether and how LION properly refers to lion, as this 
is an issue for concept rather than conception views.  The criterion of categorization may 
be thought to be similar to but is not to be confused with the criterion of intentionality.  
Although we will assume such things as that our conceptions do refer or purportedly 
refer, since our focus is on conceptions rather than concepts, intentionality or providing a 
theory of reference will not be a desideratum of conception theories, or not at any rate 
one which will concern us.
44
   
The criterion of publicity may be thought to be a desideratum of concepts.
45
  This 
is where concepts must be sharable between human beings in terms of their intentional 
                                                     
43 Even if a conception theorist such as Susan Carey holds that the features of a conception 
determine reference, this intentionality aspect may in principle be separated from the issue of 
categorization.  Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 2009. 
44 Machery especially emphasizes this point.  Machery, Doing, 7-51. 
45 Jerry Fodor, Concepts:  Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1998).  Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1992).  
Georges Rey, “Concepts and Stereotypes,” Cognition 19, 1983.  Jesse Prinz, Furnishing the Mind, 
Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 2002. 
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content and possibly in their sense or cognitive content as well.
46
  It is usually thought 
that concepts play a role in linguistic communication and that people assume that others 
share the same concepts with one another in order that they can understand each other 
and communication is possible.  Thus, publicity asks theories to explain how concepts are 
sharable in light of their intentional content and possibly cognitive content.  For example, 
if we are having a discussion about whether torturing terrorist suspects in order to gather 
vital information is right or wrong, it may be assumed that we share the same concepts 
MORALLY RIGHT and MORALLY WRONG.  If our moral concepts are not the same as each 
other’s and are not sharable in light of intentional content and possibly cognitive content, 
then we have different concepts and are not communicating with each other.    
What may be seen as a precondition for publicity is the issue of interpersonal 
concept individuation, which is concerned with what aspects make a concept the 
particular concept it is such that it may be said to differ from other contrast concepts, 
which are concepts that are similar yet different from the concept in question.  There is 
within-individual individuation and between-individual individuation.
47
  The first kind is 
what we have already discussed in Machery’s criteria 3) and 4) for a hybrid versus a 
                                                     
46 “Cognitive content” will be explained and clarified further below.  In order to have publicity, 
two concepts must share the same extension in order that two individuals are referentially 
talking about the same thing.  However, having differences in conceptual components does not 
necessarily mean that two co-referential concepts are different concepts and that there can be no 
publicity.  For example, one may contend that concepts are solely individuated by reference or 
that if there is enough similarity in the two conceptual components, then both individuals can be 
said to still share the same co-referential concepts, and there can be publicity. 
47 Machery, Doing, 14. 
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pluralistic theory.  Intrapersonal or within-individual individuation is concerned with 
whether two co-referential yet perhaps different bodies of knowledge in the same person 
compose two different concepts.  Between-individual individuation generally deals with 
whether two co-referential yet perhaps different bodies of knowledge possessed by two 
individuals are the same concept.
48
  Here, it is assumed that two concepts can co-refer 
despite the possibility that these concepts may be different concepts.  Now, we can see 
how related this latter individuation is to that of publicity in that if your and my concepts 
of RIGHT ACTION may be individuated from each other, then we both relevantly have 
different concepts.  If we have different moral concepts, then when we discuss whether 
torturing terrorists to attain vital information is right or not, then it may be the case that 
we lack publicity.
49
  For instance, both of our concepts of RIGHT ACTION may refer to the 
same moral category but you describe this concept as being mandated from Zeus while I 
describe it as being the product of human reason.  Depending on one’s theory of between-
individual individuation and assuming that none of us have made any mental errors in our 
concepts RIGHT ACTION, in this circumstance it may be the case that we have different 
concepts.  If this is so, then we may lack publicity and communication.  For our purposes, 
we will not pursue publicity and between-individual individuation.  As a concern for 
limiting the breadth of this essay, the list of criteria for moral concept theories will 
                                                     
48 For between-individual individuation, if the concepts at hand are not co-referential, then they 
are different concepts since the concepts are literally about different things. 
49 Although our concepts will importantly share reference, if our concepts can have enough 
differences from each other in terms of sense or cognitive content, then it may be the case that our 
concepts are still different concepts.  Thus, we may lack publicity.   
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generally be confined to those of the higher cognitive competences and psychological 
issues studied or listed predominantly in cognitive science.  Publicity and between-
individual individuation are not issues that are usually examined or compartmentalized as 
areas of interest or higher cognitive competences in cognitive science.  These topics are 
important, but they will not be discussed in this essay.  
 
Desideratum #1:  Categorization 
A prominent criterion for a theory of concepts is the ability to explain 
categorization.  It is largely the need to satisfy this aim for which new concept views 
have arisen and have been sustained.  As will be shown in the next chapter, the prototype, 
exemplar, and theory-theory views have gained their plausibility in part from this 
criterion.  For natural kinds and three-dimensional artifacts, the criterion of categorization 
assesses how well concept theories can account for how human beings actually subsume 
more particular objects and classes within a more general or superordinate category.  For 
example, psychologists may measure how and whether participants classify bears, 
whales, and monkeys as falling within the mammal category.  For ethical concepts, one 
aspect of categorization will be how particular actions are classified as moral or immoral.  
For instance, a study may measure how and whether subjects classify acts of stealing 
food when one is poor as falling under morally right or morally wrong.   
As we shall see in much more detail in the next chapter, other aspects of 
categorization involve typicality effects, where some members of a category are 
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considered to be more typical than others.  More typical members are usually categorized 
faster than other less typical tokens of a class and are more easily learned.  Another 
matter of categorization is the matching of features between a category and its members.  
Especially for similarity-based views, members that share more features as well as more 
heavily weighted features with its category will be deemed by participants to be a more 
typical token.  The ability for a theory of concepts to address and explain these 
phenomena of categorization add to the usefulness of the theory. 
There is also a basic level of categorization where objects tend to be categorized 
faster and more readily at a particular level of abstraction or inclusiveness rather than at 
other levels.  This is the most natural level where subjects “conceptually carve up the 
world” by which non-identical category members may be treated as equivalent.  Rosch, et 
al., have discovered that the basic level of concrete concepts tend to be at the middle level 
of abstraction on a concept hierarchy.
50
  For example, in the hierarchy: 
  Superordinate:  ANIMAL 
  Basic Level:  BIRD 
  Subordinate:  ROBIN 
 
Our experimenters claim that BIRD is the middle and basic level of abstraction.  
Rosch, et al. have discovered that when shown pictures of objects, subject most readily 
categorize at the middle level as compared to others.  Moreover, when asked what a 
picture of an object is about, participants almost exclusively provide middle level names.  
                                                     
50 E. Rosch, C. Mevis, W. Gray, D. Johnson, and P. Boyes-Braem, “Basic Objects in Natural 
Categories,” Cognitive Psychology 8:  (1976), 382-439.  Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorization. 
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This basic level is also the first level at which children can sort and name objects.  
Moreover, children can learn novel basic level categories before those at other levels.  As 
our experimenters claim, the basic level is generally the preferred level of carving up the 
world.  A desideratum of a theory of concepts is to explain this basic level phenomenon 
of categorization.  However, no tests have been run regarding the basic level for moral 
concepts.  Insofar, as it is unclear as to what the basic level is in the realm of ethical 
concepts, this particular categorization criterion to explain the basic level phenomenon 
will not be a moral concepts criterion. 
 
Desideratum #2:  Cognitive Content  
The cognitive content of a concept can be traced back to Frege’s view on 
semantics.
51
  Frege described cognitive content, or what he called the sense of a term, as 
a mode or way of presenting the putative referent.  For example, although unicorns do not 
refer to anything since they are not real, there is still a cognitive content to unicorns that 
describes the supposed yet non-existent referent.  For example, it perhaps may be HAS 
WINGS, FLIES, and HAS A HORN.  Moreover, Frege claimed that an identity statement 
between two co-referential terms can be informative.  For example, the statement 
“Kierkegaard, who is not the penned author of The Sickness Unto Death, is really Anti-
Climacus, who is the penned author of The Sickness Unto Death,” could be surprising 
                                                     
51 G. Frege, “On Sense and Meaning,” trans. M. Black, ed P. Geach and M. Black, Translations form 
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1953). 
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and educational to many people who lived during Kierkegaard’s time.  Despite the fact 
that both names refer to or denote the same man, the referential aspects of the names do 
not fully exhaust the content of them.  Thus, there must be some additional aspect of 
understanding the terms that is over and above that of reference; namely, the mental state 
descriptions that one is not and the other is the original formally penned author of The 
Sickness Unto Death.  It is this additional understanding that is what we shall call the 
cognitive content of a term.
52
   
Frege also argued that substituting co-referential terms in certain linguistic 
expressions may alter the truth value of the expression.  For instance, “Colleen thinks that 
Anti-Climacus is the penned author of The Sickness Unto Death” differs in truth value 
from “Colleen thinks that Kierkegaard is the penned author of The Sickness Unto Death.”  
For, Colleen thinks or believes that Anti-Climacus is the penned author of the book, but 
she does not know that Anti-Climacus is the same person as Kierkegaard.  She may think 
that Kierkgaard wrote some philosophy books but at the same time think that he did not 
write The Sickness Unto Death.  Thus, both linguistic expressions have different truth 
values where the first sentence is true, but the latter is false.  In spite of the fact that the 
two proper names refer to the same individual, there is an additional cognitive content to 
them that accounts for this change in truth value.    
                                                     
52 Frege viewed the sense of a term as abstracta.  However, since this view is not held here, we 
shall use the term “cognitive content.”  Cognitive content will be understood to be mental states 
in the head. 
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Furthermore, Putnam constructs a thought experiment where there is a Twin Earth 
exactly similar to our own world except in one crucial respect.
53
  The people on Twin 
Earth also have something they call ‘water’ that is a clear and tasteless liquid and appears 
to be exactly like the liquid that we on Earth call ‘water.’  However, the water on Twin 
Earth is composed of XYZ, not H₂O, like the water on our own planet.  Putnam reaches 
the conclusion that the meaning of the two water terms on Twin Earth and Earth are 
different since they both refer to different chemical substances.  Nevertheless, regardless 
of whether Putnam is correct that they have different meanings, there is an important 
respect in which both terms of water are similar.  After all, they are both clear and 
tasteless liquids that fill oceans and rivers.  It is these mental state descriptions of both 
watery substances which are the cognitive content of the terms that allow them to have 
some similarity in spite of the fact that they may have different meanings and referents.   
This example suggests that our concepts also have a cognitive content to them.  
While concepts are concerned with ways of understanding rather than necessarily 
drawing any conclusions in semantics about the meaning and reference of linguistic 
terms, concepts have what Prinz calls a “cognitive content” to them which makes 
important contributions to how human beings psychologically understand the world.
54
  
Dating at least back to the Early Modern Philosophers, concepts or ideas are largely 
responsible for the human understanding.  The cognitive content of a concept, when 
                                                     
53 Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of “Meaning,”” Philosophical Papers, Vol 2:  Mind, Language, and 
Reality, by H. Putnam, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
54 Prinz, Furnishing the Mind, p. 6-8. 
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discussed at the level of the corresponding linguistic terms, is a way of presenting the 
purported referent of a term that may allow a statement of the terms’ being co-referential 
to be informative.  Also, it may account for the change in truth value of certain linguistic 
expressions in which two co-referential terms are substituted for each other.  
Furthermore, cognitive content may allow two terms that are not co-referential to appear 
to have similarities with each other.  Any theory of moral concepts must be able to 
account for the cognitive content of such concepts in order to explain how human beings 
psychologically understand the world and use moral concepts in cognition.   
As a matter of clarity, the explanation of the cognitive content of a concept has 
been given in light of the notion of reference.  However, providing a theory of reference 
is not required in order to understand the idea of cognitive content.  All that is needed is 
merely the fact that concepts refer or supposedly refer; we do not here need to discuss 
how that is so.  Regardless of what theory of reference may be correct, so long as 
concepts have an (putative) extension then we may comprehend the idea of cognitive 
content in the numerous ways illustrated in this very section.  Providing a theory of 
reference is not necessary in understanding the notion of cognitive content and thus, still 
remains outside our scope. 
 
Desideratum #3:  Acquisition 
Theories of concepts must also provide an account of or at least be consistent with 
the most plausible views on how learned rather than innate concepts are ontogenetically 
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acquired.
55
  For ethical concepts this will primarily be an issue of moral psychology, 
child development, and how we learn right from wrong.  It may be the case that 
ostension, hypothesis testing, and learning from error, either considered individually or in 
combination, may be important means by which human beings generally may acquire 
moral concepts.  Acquisition may examine how both children and adults attain their 
moral concepts by, for example, encountering members of the concept’s extension or by 
being instructed by others. 
 
Desideratum #4:  Induction  
The induction criterion is where theories of concepts must have a structure that 
allows and can explain how we make inductive inferences about the world.  As induction 
is a crucial higher cognitive competence that is reliant on concepts, an ability to account 
for this criterion is important for any theory.  There are many different types of induction, 
but induction in philosophy is commonly understood as a type of reasoning that draws 
general conclusions from particular cases, where the conclusion does not necessarily have 
to follow.  Philosophical induction was the target of Hume,
56
 and it is contrasted with 
deductive reasoning where the conclusion is necessarily entailed by the premises.  An 
example of philosophical induction in category-based language is drawing the conclusion 
                                                     
55 Here, I do not assume that we have innate moral concepts.  Innateness is merely introduced to 
contrast it with concept acquisition. 
56 To note, Hume’s inductive conclusions also included particular predictions that were not 
general. 
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that all objects within the category shark are dangerous based on previous limited 
experiences with particular instances of objects that fall under this class.  As can be seen, 
this kind of philosophical induction is fallibly in play in concept acquisition and how we 
form concepts.    
Now, what is meant by “category induction” in the concepts literature is the 
broadening of information from an already known given category to a new action or 
object that falls within that category, or it may also involve such broadening from a 
previously known given class to a known but different or target category.  An instance of 
the former is that if one has knowledge about good action, where acts that fall under this 
class are ones that a person should perform, and I give you advice in a moral matter that a 
particular action is good, one may induce that this act is the act that one ought to perform.  
An example of the latter is where if I am told that those classified under humble person 
have the property of being soft spoken, then I may induce that those under the target class 
meek person also have this property.  Category induction will be the focus of this essay as 
opposed to philosophical induction.  How the various viable views of moral concepts 
handle induction will be discussed in chapter five. 
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Desideratum #5:  Concept Combination 
It is thought that concepts have productivity and systematicity.
57
  Productivity is 
where with a finite set of concepts and rules of combination, we can have an infinite 
amount of new thoughts.  For example, if we have the concept AND with the letters of the 
alphabet, we can have A AND B, A AND B AND C, AA AND B AND BCC, etc. ad infinitum.  
Systematicity is where if one understands the given concepts and combination rules, one 
can understand variations on a thought.  An example of this is where if one can 
understand JONES SHOT A FEDERALLY PRESERVED AND ENDANGERED WOLF, then one 
may also understand the incredible idea A FEDERALLY PRESERVED AND ENDANGERED 
WOLF SHOT JONES.    
Concept combination is the desideratum that attempts to explain how lexical or 
even compound concepts may combine with each other in order to form even more 
complex concepts or ideas.  Now, compound concepts may still be thought to be 
concepts.  However, for clarification, they will be referred to as “compound” or “complex 
concepts” in order to mark the difference between them and lexical concepts.  
Combination supposedly must not only take into account the productivity and 
systematicity of thought, but it apparently must also account for emergent features, or 
new components of a compound concept that represent features that apparently “emerge” 
from a complex class that are not ordinarily thought to be contained within the 
constituent classes.  For example, Smith and Osherson explored the compound concept 
                                                     
57 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press), 1975. 
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PET FISH in which this compound concept’s constituent concepts, PET and FISH, combine 
to form the given compound concept.
58
  However, PET FISH has as a component LIVES IN 
A BOWL, but, it is not thought that typical examples of pets, such as a dog or cat, and 
typical examples of fish, such as bass and catfish, have lives in a bowl as a property.
59
  
Thus, LIVES IN A BOWL represents an emergent feature because it does not appear to be 
contained in any of the constituent concepts that combine to form PET FISH.  A discussion 
of how the viable theories of moral concepts may account for this criterion will be 
explored in chapter five.  
                                                     
58 Edward Smith and Daniel Osherson, “Conceptual combination with prototype concepts,” 
Cognitive Science 8 (1984), 337-361. 
59 This assumes an exemplar theory of concepts.  The exemplar theory will be fully discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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2.  The Theories of Concepts 
This second chapter will introduce the major concept theories.  Such an 
exploration will examine such theories in light of both concrete and ethical concepts, 
where initial theorizing of how such views will look in the ethical domain will be 
provided here.  The evidence, arguments, and desiderata satisfaction for which theories 
are viable in the moral domain will be examined in later chapters.   
 
2.1  The Classical Theory 
The classical theory of concepts maintains that concepts are composed of bodies 
of knowledge that are about the individually necessary and jointly sufficient features of 
members of a class.
1
  This view is also known as “definitionism,” as it claims that our 
concepts are bodies of knowledge that represent strict definitions that are used in the 
higher cognitive competences.  Our overview of this theory will be brief since it is 
generally held to be a discounted view in psychology for concrete concepts, although it is 
commonly thought to be viable for mathematical and logical concepts.  The criticisms of 
this theory will be provided in the third chapter.  Illustrations of the kinds of concepts we 
have based on the classical theory are that our BACHELOR concept may be constituted by 
BEING UNMARRIED and BEING A MALE or that an EVEN NUMBER may be made up of A 
NUMBER DIVISIBLE BY TWO WITHOUT REMAINDER.  In the first case, if an individual 
                                                     
1 Clark Hull, “Quantitative aspects of the evolution of concepts,” Psychological Monographs, 
XXVIII, 1920.  Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, “The Early Growth of Logic in the Child:  
Classification and Seriation, (London:  Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). 
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satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions of being both unmarried and a male, then 
we will classify this person as a bachelor.  In the latter instance, any number that satisfies 
the definition of being divisible by two without remainder will be categorized as an even 
number.  Therefore, if the classical theory is viable in the moral domain, it may claim one 
may have in mind a definition such as “an act must maximize the best consequences” 
when representing the category right action. 
 
2.2.  The Prototype Theory 
In the 1970’s, psychologists started running studies which began pointing towards 
a new theory of concepts.  Spearheaded by the likes of Eleanor Rosch, Caroline Mervis, 
Edward Smith, Lance Rips, and James Hampton, the prototype theory was born as a view 
of concepts that could account for the new experimental data.
2
  Rosch and Mervis 
explicitly draw inspiration of the prototype view from Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblance, where members of a category may have one to several features or 
characteristics in common with each other, but zero or very few characteristics are 
                                                     
2 Eleanor Rosch and Caroline Mervis, “Family resemblances:  Studies in the Internal Structure of 
Categories,” Cognitive Psychology  7:  573-605.  Eleanor Rosch, “Natural Categories,” Cognitive 
Psychology 4:  (1973), 328-350.  Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorization,” Cognition and 
Categorization.  Ed Eleanor Rosch and B. Lloyd.  Philadelphia, PA:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc., 1978.  M. Posner and S. Keele, “On the Genesis of Abstract Ideas,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 77:  (1968), 353-363.  E. Smith, E. Shoben, and L. Rips, “Structure and Process in 
Semantic Memory:  A Featural Model for Semantic Decisions,” Psychological Review 81:  (1974), 
214-241.  James Hampton, “Polymorphous Concepts in Semantic Memory,” Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior 18: (1979), 441-61. 
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common to all category members.
3
  There are various versions of the prototype theory, 
but it generally states that a concept is composed of a prototype or a body of knowledge 
that is about a list of statistically frequent features that are summary or general 
representations of members of a class.  Such features are considered statistically frequent 
in that it is highly probable that a member of one’s category will have them.  Moreover, 
prototypes do not represent features that are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
determining membership.  For example, one’s prototype of DOG may be HAS HAIR, HAS 
FOUR LEGS, BARKS, PLAYS FETCH, and WAGS ITS TAIL.  The features that are represented 
may be arrived upon based on all of one’s previous experiences with particular dogs.  
Furthermore, a dog may still be considered a dog even though it is hairless or even if it 
only has three legs.  Such features are not necessary and sufficient conditions.  Now, 
some prototype theories may emphasize that features are based on cue validity rather than 
statistical frequency, or it may be the case that feature selection of a category is based on 
both.  Cue validity is a measure that increases with the probability that a feature occurs 
within a category and also decreases with the probability that the feature occurs within 
members of a similar but different contrast category.  For instance, plays fetch may be a 
feature that has high cue validity for dog in that while it may be a feature common among 
the members of dog, items in contrast categories such as wolf and hyena are unlikely to 
                                                     
3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans by G. Anscombe, (New York:  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1953). 
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have this feature as well.  On the other hand, has hair does not have high cue validity for 
dog in that it will most likely occur in members of wolf and hyena.   
On some prototype views, based on statistical frequency or cue validity, features 
may be weighted more heavily than others.  For example, barks and plays fetch may be 
weighed more heavily than has hair.  When calculating how similar a potential or target 
member may be to a category, a prototype theory may take into account the number of 
features the instance may share with a category, or the instance’s satisfaction of heavily 
weighted features, or both.  Prototype theory is considered a similarity-based view 
because when an object or act is similar enough to the representation of summary or 
general features and passes a calculated similarity threshold, then the object falls within 
the class.  Returning to the example, since my pet animal satisfies the importantly heavily 
weighted feature of barks and plays fetch, along with several of the other features, it 
passes the similarity threshold and is categorized as a dog.  When a token passes the 
similarity threshold of two or more categories, it is generally categorized in the class 
towards which it has the highest similarity score.  At the same time, passing the similarity 
threshold for multiple categories can also explain the phenomena of ambiguous cases of 
membership where some individuals may categorize an item as a member of two 
different classes.   
The prototype view also tends to be a linear model where a category’s properties 
are independent cues for categorization in that the incremental increase of a similarity 
score occurs when one feature is matched between the potential member and a category 
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despite the fact that it may not yet have been determined whether there is further feature 
matching between the target item and category.  As we shall see in the non-linear 
exemplar theory, this cognitive processing contrasts with a non-linear model where the 
incremental increase of a similarity score is dependent on the sharing of other features 
between the target item and the category.   
Moreover, prototype theorists believe that an item having a higher similarity score 
to a prototype explains why subjects understand such higher scored items to be more 
typical members of a category than others.
4
  Due to this graded membership or typicality 
effects, for example, a golden retriever will be thought to be a more typical dog than a 
Chihuahua for some individuals.  Typicality effects usually are measured by asking 
subjects to rate how typical an item is of a category on a scale.  An example of the scale 
may be:  1=very typical; 4=moderately typical; 7=not very typical.  While an item’s 
similarity score does play a role in typicality judgments, where a member with a high 
similarity score tends to be a more typical member, it has been discovered that other 
factors, such as a participant’s estimate of how many times she has encountered the item, 
also influence such judgments.
5
  Typical members also are usually learned quicker by 
                                                     
4 Eleanor Rosch, “Cognitive representations of semantic categories,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology:  General 104:  (1975), 192-233.  Rosch and Mervis, ibid.  Hampton, ibid.  S. Armstrong, 
L. Gleitman, and H. Gleitman, “What Some Concepts Might Not Be,” Cognition, 13:  (1983), 263-
308. 
5 Larry Barsalou, “Ideals, central Tendency, and Frequency of Instantiation as determinants of 
Graded Structure in Categories,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 11, 4:  (Oct. 1985), 629-49. 
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subjects, and tend to be categorized faster as members.  Members that are considered to 
be less typical are more difficult to learn and take a longer time to be categorized.   
A common way to examine whether a given concept has prototype structure is by 
giving participants Hampton’s feature listing task or a variation thereof.6  In the first 
phase, participants are asked to list what they take to be the features of several categories.  
In order to tease out the features, several questions are provided to the subjects such as, 
“why is X only loosely speaking a kind of Y?” or “what characteristics of X make it a Y 
rather than a Z?”  Once the questionnaires are gathered, the features are pooled together 
to create a much shorter list based on a production frequency measure.  Those properties 
from the pool that score low on this measure are eliminated.  The list of features that 
remain after the elimination round is considered to be the list of features associated with 
the category.  In the second phase, experimenters provide a list of potential category 
members for each of the previously given categories.  Subjects then rate how well they 
think each potential member belongs or does not belong in the category.  Those that are 
rated highly are taken to be typical members while those that generally are still 
considered to be members but are not rated as highly are taken to be atypical members.  
Next judges determine which features of a category from the first phase each member of 
the category possesses.  Given that judges now have determined which features members 
possess, it may now be seen whether there is a correlation between typical membership 
and the number and degree of features a member satisfies.  It may now also be tested to 
                                                     
6 James Hampton, ibid. 
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see if the features from the first phase are indeed a prototype or if they are a classical 
definition.  The feature list from the first phase is compared with the category’s members’ 
and nonmembers’ features derived from the judges.  If the concept has prototype 
structure, then the feature list will not prove to be independently necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for determining category membership and for excluding instances as 
nonmembers.  As we will see in the next chapter, the results of typicality effects, unclear 
borderline cases of membership, and the absence of psychological evidence for the use of 
definitions combine to state a case against the classical theory of concepts. 
Our examination of the concept DOG presupposes the featural model of prototype 
theory.  This more predominant model for prototype structure uses features for a class in 
which a potential member is calculated as either having the feature or not having the 
feature.  The featural model does not allow for any middle ground where an object may 
be thought to only partially have some characteristic to a certain degree.  For a featural 
calculation or cognitive processing, a potential member either has it or does not have it.  
For example, has four legs, barks, plays fetch and wags its tail may be thought of as 
qualities that a potential member of dog either has or does not have.  Under the featural 
model, whether it does or does not have such features will in part determine whether or 
not the token instance may be categorized as a dog.   
A second, but less prevalent option as compared to the featural model, as 
illustrated by Edward Smith and Douglas Medin, is the dimensional model where 
whether a potential member shares the properties of a category are taken to be a matter of 
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continuous degrees rather than a matter of bluntly either having the property or not 
having it.
7
  For instance, when using a dimensional model, one may calculate the 
similarity of particular objects to dog based on the dimensions of size, athleticism, and 
ferocity.  The object in question will have different degrees or measurements of these 
attributes.  On this model, it is not an issue as to whether the object does or does not have 
these qualities.  Rather, it is an issue as to what degree the object has such characteristics.  
At times, it may be the case that certain qualities can appropriately be used both in a 
featural and dimensional model.  On the dimensional model, a prototype will be a body 
of knowledge that represents the mean or average dimension values for given qualities 
that have been abstracted from one’s experiences of particular instances of a category.  
Such dimensions, like the featural model, may also be weighted in terms of importance.  
Thus, whether or not an object passes the similarity threshold of dog is a matter of degree 
based on whether or not the object is close to the average dimension values for the class.   
If prototype theory is viable for moral concepts, then the prototype for the moral 
concept RIGHT ACTION for some individual may be BEING GENEROUS TO OTHERS, 
HELPING THE HOMELESS IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO BECAUSE IT BENEFITS THOSE IN 
NEED, PREVENT HARM, DOES NOT BREAK LAWS, and EXHIBITS FRIENDLINESS.  Such 
representations, when understood as features of members of a class, are not necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  As we can see, prototypes may be about such things as general 
                                                     
7 Edward Smith and Douglas Medin, Categories and Concepts, (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press), 1981.  
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features of moral situations, virtues, reasons for action, and basic moral principles or 
rules that happen to occur or be extracted from many particular instances of situations 
that fall under right action.  For example, when a person points out to another an instance 
where a stranger is helping homeless people that such is a case of moral rightness, the 
mentally represented reason or justification for action that HELPING THE HOMESLESS SO 
LONG AS ONE IS NOT IN POVERTY ONESELF IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO BECAUSE IT 
BENEFITS THOSE IN NEED may now be a candidate to be a constituent component of this 
listener’s prototype of RIGHT ACTION based on further particular experiences.  The 
abstraction of such features may be based on personal experiences and moral education.  
Now, for the individual in question, the virtue friendliness may carry less weight for this 
individual as compared to heavily weighted features such as the principles prevent harm 
and does not break laws.  Thus, particular acts such as walking away from a potentially 
violent physical confrontation with a meddling person or calling the police when 
witnessing a homicide unfold are more typical instances of right actions than going out of 
one’s way to welcome a new resident to the neighborhood.  Now, all of the above given 
acts supposedly will pass her similarity threshold for right actions to be categorized as 
one of its members.  However, as indicated, if moral concepts have prototype structure, 
there will be graded membership among the acts in question.  Furthermore, the more 
typical members will tend to be categorized faster and learned more quickly as members 
of right actions.   
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Also on the prototype model, assuming that she lives in a society where abortion 
is legal, acts such as abortion may be ambiguous for her in that it may barely pass the 
similarity threshold for both right action and wrong action.  For her, acts of abortion 
match the heavily weighted feature of does not break laws, but it also is a cause of harm 
in that she believes a fetus has personhood.  Given that there are certain hard cases where 
individuals appear to suffer from moral ambiguity, the prototype theory nicely accounts 
for and predicts this phenomenon with its given structure and similarity-based 
calculations.   
If moral concepts have prototype structure, a featural model may work for such 
concepts, where qualities such as does not break laws may be considered to be features.  
However, some characteristics may be more amenable to a dimensional model.  For 
example, the features exhibits friendliness and prevent harm may be accounted for by 
matters of degree and a dimensional value rather than by whether a particular act or 
person does or does not have these features.  A person who invites and actively 
introduces a new, shy, and awkward individual to each person in a social group and 
attempts to include him in conversation may be considered as friendlier than one who 
merely says hello on a daily basis to this individual at work.  We may certainly think that 
a good Samaritan has a higher degree of helping as opposed to someone who merely 
notifies the proper authorities when seeing an injured person on the side of the road.  For 
moral prototype concepts, depending on the list of characteristics a prototype represents, 
the possibility will be left open that a dimensional model may be the actual way by which 
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a person may calculate for similarity as to whether a particular act is categorized as moral 
or immoral.  Nevertheless, for our purposes, when discussing the prototype theory we 
will assume what is considered to be the more predominant featural model, but this is not 
meant to preclude the possibility of the dimensional prototype model.   
 
2.3  The Exemplar Theory 
Soon after the arrival of the prototype theory, some cognitive scientists began 
hypothesizing the existence of a different theory of concepts.  This exemplar theory, like 
the prototype view, also calculated membership based on a similarity score measure.  
However, instead of accounting for similarity by comparing the potential member to a 
summary or general representation of features, it is compared to a set of particular 
members of a category.  An exemplar is a mentally represented particular instance of a 
class.  This view, in which concepts are constituted by exemplars, was initially proposed 
by Medin and Schaffer’s exemplar theory context model.8  Like prototypes, exemplars 
are not considered to be about necessary and sufficient conditions for determining 
membership.  There are various versions of the exemplar theory.  However, depending on 
one’s exemplar view, an exemplar may itself be composed of a body of knowledge about 
                                                     
8 Douglass Medin and Marguerite Schaffer, “A Context Theory of Classification Learning,” 
Psychological Review 85:  1978, 207-38.  L. Brooks, “Nonanalytic Concept Formation and Memory 
for Instances,” in Cognition and Categorization, ed. by E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd, (Hillsdale, NJ:  
Lawrence Erlbaum associates, 1978).  D. Medin, and P. Schwanenfluegel, “Linear Separability in 
Classification Learning,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Human Learning and Memory 7:  
(1981), 355-68. 
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the set of features or dimensions of an instance, and such features or dimensions may or 
may not be weighted.  Thus, what are stored in long-term memory for DOG are bodies of 
knowledge that represent particular instances rather than abstracted summary features.  
For example, one’s concept DOG may have exemplar structure.  Thus, based on one’s 
experiences, it may be constituted by a set of exemplars such as THAT GREYHOUND ON 
THE TRACK, MY NEIGHBORS AMERICAN BULLDOGS, MY ROTWEILLER, and MY SISTER’S 
CHIHUAHUA.  One’s GREYHOUND exemplar may be composed of a body of knowledge 
that is about a set of dimensions of the extension of one’s exemplar such as FAST, LARGE, 
and ATHLETIC.  One’s exemplars for AMERICAN BULLDOG and ROTWEILER is likely 
constituted by a body of knowledge that represents related values as compared to the 
dimensional values held by one’s GREYHOUND exemplar.  On the other hand, one’s 
CHIHUAHUA exemplar will be composed of a body of knowledge that is about quite 
different values compared to one’s other instances of dogs.  Thus, in this case, one’s 
concept DOG has exemplar structure and is constituted by a body of knowledge that is 
about particular instances of a class.  Each exemplar has components that are about a set 
of features or dimensions.   
Now, when one comes across an object that is a Doberman pincer, the exemplar 
theory holds that the target object will be categorized based on its similarity score with 
one’s dog exemplars; a similarity score that must be higher than other similarity scores 
for contrast categories.  Since one’s DOG concept is constituted by exemplars and one has 
exemplars such as MY NEIGHBORS AMERICAN BULLDOGS and MY ROTWEILLER, it is 
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likely that the Doberman pincer will be categorized as a dog.  The set of dimensions for 
the Doberman pincer will be similar to the sets of dimensions contained by several of 
one’s particular instances.  Furthermore, since exemplars do not represent necessary and 
sufficient conditions, the Doberman will still be classified as a dog even though it comes 
nowhere close to matching the dimensional values of a Chihuahua.  The exemplar theory 
can also claim to partially account for graded membership, where more typical members 
are categorized faster and learned quicker than less typical members.  For example, given 
its high degree of similarity to most of one’s particular instances, a Doberman pincer may 
be a typical member of dog and may be categorized faster than less typical dogs.   
When calculating similarity as specified by Medin and Schaffer’s context model, 
its theory on cognitive processing uses a non-linear model, where the incremental 
increase of a similarity measure depends on what other features a target item and 
category share.  For example, if there is a pig in my presence, it may have only one 
instance of feature matching with MY ROTWEILLER concept in that a pig is large.  
However, a pig is neither fast nor athletic.  On a non-linear model of cognitive 
processing, there is very little to no increase in the similarity score measure, as compared 
to a linear model used by the prototype theory, since there is only one instance of feature 
matching.  However, if the pig happened to match many more features, then there would 
be a dramatic increase in the similarity score.  A non-linear model allows for the fact that 
if a target is highly similar to a few or possibly one particular instance, then it is more 
likely to be categorized as a member of the category as compared to if it is only 
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moderately similar to all the particular instances that make up the class.  This leads to the 
fact that the exemplar theory is better suited to account for the classification of novel and 
odd member items as compared to the prototype theory; items that may share few if any 
properties with a representation of summary or general features.  This is a specific respect 
in which the exemplar theory may be superior to the prototype view.  For example, if one 
comes across a pug, then, with a non-linear model, this will receive a higher similarity 
score for the exemplar theory since it is highly similar to one’s particular instance of a 
Chihuahua.  A pug will be categorized as a dog despite the fact that it does not share 
many sets of features or dimensions that correspond with one’s other instances.  
However, if one’s concept of DOG is a prototype, then at first glance, it appears unlikely 
that the features or dimensions of a Chihuahua will make one’s list of statistically 
frequent features that are represented by prototypes given the other more predominant 
experiences one has had of large athletic dogs.  Thus, it appears that a pug may not be 
categorized as a dog on the prototype view because one’s prototype may not represent the 
Chihuahua features or dimensions towards which the pug may feature match.
9
  However, 
due to using a non-linear model, it will be so categorized on the exemplar view.   
If moral concepts are exemplars, then an exemplar of, for example, RIGHT 
ACTION for an individual may be a representation of a grouping of particular cases that 
one has experienced or heard about that are right acts.  For instance, one’s exemplars for 
                                                     
9 I say, ‘it appears,” because the conclusion drawn here may be dependent upon how such things 
as size and athleticism are weighted. 
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RIGHT ACTION may be WORKING IN THAT SOUP KITCHEN LAST THANKSGIVING, 
BREAKING UP THAT FIGHT AT SCHOOL SOPHOMORE YEAR, and MY UNCLE, THE 
FIREMAN, RUSHING INTO THE TWIN TOWERS ON 9/11.  These exemplars themselves have 
constituent components that are about the features of the extension of the exemplars.  For 
example, WORKING IN THE SOUP KITCEN LAST THANKSGIVING may be composed of 
HELPING THOSE IN NEED, VOLUNTEERISM, COMMUNITY, and SACRIFICE.  BREAKING UP 
THAT FIGHT AT SCHOOL SOPHOMORE YEAR may be constituted by NON-VIOLENCE, 
INTERVENTION HELP, COURAGE, and PEACE.  MY UNCLE, THE FIREMAN, RUSHING INTO 
THE TWIN TOWERS ON 9/11 may share similar constituent components with one’s 
exemplar BREAKING UP THAT FIGHT AT SCHOOL SOPHOMORE YEAR.  Thus, when one 
witnesses a policeman intervening in a robbery and assault, since it closely matches the 
particular instance of breaking up that fight at school sophomore year and one’s uncle 
rushing into the Twin Towers on 9/11, one will categorize this as a right act.  Real life 
examples of the possible use of this kind of exemplars are when precedents are cited in 
order to determine whether an act is classified as right or wrong. 
A second possibility of exemplar theory for moral concepts is that one’s concept 
of GOOD PERSON may be constituted by exemplars that are about individuals who are 
moral exemplars.  In other words, one’s moral concept is composed of bodies of 
knowledge that are about particular individual persons who one takes to be exemplary 
models of ethical human beings.  For example, one’s concept GOOD PERSON may be 
composed of MY MOTHER, MY BROTHER, JESUS, and MOTHER THERESA.  These 
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exemplars that are about moral exemplars in turn each are composed of components that 
represent a cluster of features.  For example, MOTHER THERESA and JESUS may have the 
components KIND, HELPFUL, LOVING, and BRAVE.  When one comes across an instance of 
a doctor medically helping the poor in a third world country pro bono, since this case is 
highly similar to one’s moral exemplars of Mother Theresa and Jesus, one classifies this 
person as a good individual.  The commonly heard phrase in today’s society of “What 
would Jesus do?” is an excellent example of the possibility of exemplar theory being at 
work for moral concepts.  In this instance, one’s concept of GOOD PERSON may be 
constituted by JESUS, in which individuals are categorized under good person if they 
match the features contained by Jesus.  Other such examples are when individuals such as 
social activists and politicians cite and use particular moral exemplars such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr. or George Washington when determining which individuals they 
categorize under good person.
10
    
 
                                                     
10 To note, this possible use of exemplars of exemplars is analogous to the ethical normative 
theory of neo-virtue ethics where one should perform that action that the virtuous agent will 
perform.  Implicit within this normative theory is that the virtuous agent who exemplifies the 
virtues; virtues of which lead to eudemonia or a flourishing life, may be an agent from whom it 
may be determined which acts are categorized as GOOD.   The virtues of the virtuous agent in 
neo-virtue ethics are like the features of the exemplars of the exemplars.  Here, particular acts that 
are similar to the exemplars of the exemplars and match its features will be categorized as GOOD 
just as in neo-virtue ethics, actions are categorized under GOOD based, in part, on whether they 
coincide with the virtues that are held by the virtuous agent.  Although neo-virtue ethicists are 
more concerned with the correct concept rather than conception of GOOD, the neo-virtue 
ethicist’s theory to do that action that the virtuous agent will do can be seen to be different yet 
analogous with this particular aspect of the exemplar theory of moral concepts for the 
psychological categorization of particular acts under GOOD. 
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2.4  The Theory-Theory 
The theory-theory is a view that emerged out of psychology in the 1980’s that 
became established based on its power to explain categorization as well as on its capacity 
to provide a detailed account of concept acquisition.   Darwin, in The Origin of Species, 
argues that the classification of biological species should not be based on theory-neutral 
superficial similarities but should be grounded in the causal explanations that underlie the 
similarities among organisms.  Quine in “Natural Kinds” states that an individual’s 
psychological development and the development of society in regards to distinguishing 
and characterizing natural kinds is first based on perceptual superficial similarities.
11
  
However, through continual development and maturation, more sophisticated scientific 
theories are used by the individual and society to draw such distinctions.  Along the lines 
of these thinkers, although not necessarily agreeing with everything they say in their 
works, the theory-theory of concepts states that concepts are themselves theories or mini-
theories.  Theories contain scientific, causal, functional, and general or generic 
background knowledge about the extension of a concept and can explain such things as 
categorization in concrete concepts.
12
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12 Susan Carey, Conceptual Change in Childhood, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1985).  Gregory 
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A major shortcoming of similarity theories is their inability to account for the 
additional knowledge that appears to be stored in concepts that accounts for some cases 
of classification.  The theory-theory attempts to address this issue by claiming that 
background knowledge of the world rather than prototypes that are about superficial 
properties plays a role in such a process.  For example, Francis Keil ran a study where 
participants were asked whether the animal in a given scenario is a horse or a cow.
13
  In 
the situation, there is an animal that is called a “horse,” makes horse sounds, looks like a 
horse, is strapped with a saddle so people can ride on it, and eats oats and hay.  However, 
scientists run blood tests and x-rays on it, and they discover that its insides are actually 
the insides of a cow.  In this experiment, Keil found that older children and adults 
perceived the scientists’ discoveries as relevant for determining natural kind membership.  
These subjects relied not on superficial similarities but on folk biological theories of 
hidden essences to decide that the animal was really a cow despite its superficial horse 
appearances.   
As an example of the importance and use of causal knowledge in cognition, being 
curved is an equally typical feature in bananas and boomerangs.  However, subjects give 
more weight to this attribute in boomerangs rather than bananas because it is falsely 
believed that curvature is causally related to the boomerang’s property of returning back 
                                                     
13 Keil, 1989, 162. 
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to the thrower.
14
  Due to this relationship between the two features, it is thought that 
being curved is more required for a boomerang rather than a banana.  Theories may 
provide other causal explanatory relations between superficial features of an object.  As 
an example that is an oversimplification for the point of illustration, the prototype FISH is 
constituted by HAS FINS, HAS A TAIL, and SWIMS.
15
  Folk theoretical knowledge of fish 
provides the explanation of the relation between fish attributes since in order to properly 
swim, a fish needs fins and a tail.  Here, theory-theorists typically do not necessarily deny 
that one may have in mind superficial features when representing a class, but they do 
emphasize the importance of background knowledge or theories in providing the 
underlying causal explanation to such features as well as in deciding what weight such 
features may possess. 
Theory-theorists also hold that there are domain differences for types of 
knowledge where different ontological domains contain different types of central beliefs.  
For example, while natural kinds are believed to have hidden essences, the analogue for 
artifact kinds generally is intended function.
16
  For example, Lin and Murphy ran an 
                                                     
14 D. L. Medin and E. Shoben, “Context and Structure in Conceptual Combination,” Cognitive 
Psychology 20: 1988, pp. 158-190. 
15 Murphy and Medin, 1985. 
16 One may wonder, “Will subjects categorize a broken mousetrap as a mousetrap?”  While I am 
not aware of any experiments testing for this, theory-theory studies, such as the tuk study 
described below, suggest that if shown a picture of a complete mousetrap, but for some reason 
the spring in the trap will not work, subjects will still categorize it as a mousetrap since its maker 
intended the function of it to be a mousetrap.  However, if shown a picture of just the flat board 
of the mousetrap or just the spring of the trap, then participants will not classify it as a mousetrap 
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experiment where they first described and showed pictures of certain artifacts from 
foreign countries.
17
  One such item is a tuk.  A tuk is a hunting tool that is a stick with a 
special handle on one end that protects the wielder’s hand from animal bites.  On the 
other end of the stick is a noose that goes around the head of the animal.  The function of 
the tuk is to be able to control an animal by placing the noose over its head.  After 
informing participants about what a tuk is and the function it performs, the experimenters 
showed participants a picture of what looks like a tuk minus only the special handle.  
When asked to categorize the item, participants categorized it as a tuk.  When shown a 
picture of what looks like a tuk minus only the noose, subjects did not categorize it as a 
tuk.  This suggests that functional knowledge plays a role in categorization, where 
participants did not categorize the latter item as a tuk because it could not perform the 
tuk’s function.  This contrasts with natural kinds where, for example, so long as an 
animal still has cow innards or a cow essence, it is still a cow in spite of its superficial 
appearances of being a horse.   
Moreover, theory-theory knowledge may not only contain knowledge of hidden 
essences, theoretical entities, and causal knowledge, but they may also contain 
knowledge of explanation and prediction.  For example, Murphy and Medin claim that 
                                                     
 
because such single items when presented alone do not have the intended function of being a 
mousetrap.  Carey, 1985.  Keil, 1989. 
17 E. Lin and G. Murphy, “The effects of background knowledge on object categorization and part 
detection,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A:  (1997), 25-48. 
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most people think the feature of flammable is a quality of wood rather than paper money 
even though both wood and paper money are flammable.  The reason behind this is that 
we have general knowledge about the world concerning human activity where wood is 
used for burning fires and paper money is mostly used for economic purposes in which 
its flammability plays no role.  On their view, this knowledge still counts as a theory that 
influences feature attribution for classes.  For, such knowledge in principle does provide 
an explanation of why we may attribute certain features to certain classes.   
A philosophical matter that deserves attention is the actual relationship between 
theories and concepts.  On the one hand, concepts are at times understood to be theories 
or mini-theories.  It is also generally held that theories causally influence concepts.  Here, 
concepts are not themselves theories, but concepts are affected by theories.  However, 
Prinz correctly notes that if this is the case, then this provides no explanation of the 
structure of concepts.
18
  Thus, Prinz proposes that for the theory-theory, the components 
of a concept are knowledge of hidden essences.  Such knowledge of hidden essences may 
represent necessary conditions that may be empirically defeasible given further findings 
in science, so therefore, such knowledge may be understood to occupy empirically 
defeasible placeholder positions.   The fact that hidden essences may represent necessary 
conditions is empirically supported by Barbara Malt’s famous study on WATER.19  When 
asking subjects to list what percentage of various kinds of water, like purified water, 
                                                     
18 Prinz, 81-82. 
19 Barbara Malt, “Water is not H2O,” Cognitive Psychology 27:  (1994), 41-70. 
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swimming pool water, and swamp water, are H2O, positive but varying percentages were 
given to all forms of water presented, as well as to several items that are not typically 
considered to be water.  Thus, Malt concludes, “It should be noted, though, that H2O was 
judged to be present in all the water examples collected.  It may be that one property, the 
presence of H2O, is necessary, but not sufficient, for a liquid to be considered water.”
20
  
Unlike definitionism, as a psychological matter, such knowledge of hidden essences does 
not represent explicit necessary and sufficient conditions.  Furthermore, constituent 
components may be knowledge of explanatory relations that are acquired from 
background information rather than superficial appearances.  In this case many concepts 
are mini-theories.  Second, concepts can be constituents of mini-theories, where some 
constituent concepts are also bottom level primitive concepts.  These primitive concepts 
are not mini-theories and have no structure.  If concepts have other concepts as 
constituents, then these constituent concepts also have constituent concepts, ad infinitum.  
In order to stop the regress, theories of concepts need to posit primitive concepts.  Third, 
mini-theories may be causally influenced by other mini-theories.  For instance, one’s 
mini-theory of AVIATION can cause one to attribute the knowledge WINGS ENABLE 
FLIGHT to one’s mini-theory of BIRD. 
Adopting and applying Prinz’s clarification of the theory-theory to ethical 
concepts, ethical concepts may themselves be mini-theories that have as components such 
things as knowledge about master moral principles from which other basic moral 
                                                     
20 Malt, ibid., 66. 
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principles are derived.  For example, the concept RIGHT ACTION may be composed of 
normative theoretical information akin to divine command theory.  The theory ACT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES MANDATED BY GOD is a component of RIGHT ACTION.  
The full explanation of “master moral principle” will be provided in the subsequent 
paragraph.  Theory-theory components may be acquired from background information 
and may be considered to occupy defeasible placeholder positions rather than strict 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  I do not claim that moral theory knowledge 
represents necessary conditions, as with hidden essences, because PAC requires that 
empirical evidence be presented in order to substantiate such a claim, although I do leave 
the door open that future research may establish this.
21
  Second, some concepts will be 
constituents of mini-theories where some constituent concepts inevitably will be 
primitive concepts that are not mini-theories and that will allow ethical concepts to 
escape the infinite regress.  Third, it is possible that some ethical mini-theories may 
causally influence other mini-theories.  For instance, one’s mini-theory of JUST may 
influence what features one thinks are attributed to political policy. 
As previously stated, prototypes are about features that may be moral principles, 
reasons for action, and virtues.  One may derive such principles, reasons, and virtues as 
                                                     
21 In the fourth chapter, we will explore an example in which theory knowledge does not 
represent necessary conditions.  One may hold two different theory beliefs with the same equally 
strong conviction, and these two beliefs may produce contradictory judgments on a particular 
matter.  In this case, the subject holds two contradictory judgments, where neither of the two 
theory knowledge is taken to represent a necessary condition that applies to both contradictory 
judgments. 
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general or summary representations from particular moral situations or individuals.  
However, the theory-theory components are more about master or top moral principles 
from which those middle moral principles, reasons, and virtues may be thought to 
purportedly derive.  Drawing on a distinction made by Robert Audi, master or top moral 
principles are principles from which middle principles may be inferred.
22
  For example, 
from divine command theory, where one must obey those laws mandated by God, one 
may arrive upon middle principles such as do not lie and do not steal.  One may adhere to 
these middle moral principles based on one’s background belief in the ethical theory of 
divine command theory.  While the theory-theory is a distinct theory from the others 
based on the specific kind of knowledge it posits concepts as containing, as we can see, 
there is an intimate link between the theory-theory and the prototype theory for moral 
concepts.  This is just like the intimate link between both concept theories in the concrete 
realm, where as shown in our previous example, background explanatory knowledge is 
the reason why the folk attribute the prototypical property of flammable to wood but not 
paper money. 
It is knowledge about these top principles that constitute the theory-theory of 
moral concepts, while the middle moral principles, reasons, and virtues belong more in 
the domain of the prototype view.  The reason why this is the case is that such top 
principles are those that  ostensibly underlie the middle principles, virtues, and reasons 
                                                     
22 Robert Audi, The Good in the Right, (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press), 2004.   
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for action at a deeper level of theoretical abstraction just as, for example, biological 
theories underlie the superficial features of a biological natural kind.  Second, and a 
related point, is that just as biological theories may be about explanatory relations 
between superficial features, top moral principle knowledge may provide an explanatory 
link between middle principles, virtues, or reasons.  In this respect, middle principles, 
reasons, and virtues may be thought of as being superficial, although there may be 
varying levels of superficiality at this middle level.  For instance, the middle principle do 
not shoot innocent persons can be explained by the less superficial middle principle do 
not kill.  Meanwhile, top principles are more theoretical and lie at the deepest explanatory 
level.  For example, do not kill may be ultimately explained by divine command theory.  
Now, based on potential further theorizing, what I have provided thus far for an 
explanation of the structure of the theory-theory for moral concepts may not exactly 
parallel the structural components of the theory-theory for concrete concepts given the 
differences between the abstract and concrete domains.  However, in allying some 
theories with knowledge of top moral principles, we can see that several important 
similarities as just discussed exist between the given moral and concrete theory-theory 
structures to warrant drawing the distinction between moral concept prototype and 
theory-theory structural components in this manner.
23
  
                                                     
23 There is a theory of concepts called the ideals view that is commonly thought to be a specified 
version of the theory-theory.  It states that concepts are constituted by mental representations that 
are about features that members of a class ought to have to determine membership.  Moreover, 
such components are goal oriented background knowledge.  A class of concepts that is thought to 
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2.5  The Emotion Theory 
While there are numerous theories of concepts in the concepts literature, very 
little attention within this field has been paid to the view that concepts may be composed 
of sentiments and emotions.  However, I believe that some of our concepts may be so 
constituted and that scientists and philosophers of the mind need to have greater 
awareness of this fact.  This theory at hand will be called the emotion theory.  It claims 
that some moral concepts are sentiments and emotions.
24
  Before discussing the nuances 
                                                     
 
have ideals structure is ad hoc concepts.  Ad hoc concepts refer to novel classes that are not 
usually stored in long-term memory.  They are also instrumental in achieving goals.  Some 
examples of what are thought to be ad hoc categories are things to take from one’s home during a fire.  
For example, when determining what to take from one’s house when it is burning, some things 
might be pictures, computer, contact lenses, money, children, and pets.  The smorgasbord of 
members may not lend ad hoc classes to have a set of superficial summary features that are 
closely correlated with each other.  Rather, there is most likely some kind of abstract goal-based 
knowledge that is at work when determining membership in such classes.  It is such background 
features that the ad hoc category ought to have that may account for typicality effects.  This 
contrasts with potential other concrete theory-theory concepts in which the components lack a 
normative flavor and are not goal-oriented knowledge.  I do not further discuss this view since it 
is merely a specific kind of theory-theory and furthermore, it is questionable whether the 
components of moral concepts represent features that members of a class should have.  For 
example, in my GOOD LIFE concept, components of it, such as ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS, 
seem to represent features that simply belong to some lives that are good.  It seems odd to say 
that such features are ones that good lives ought to have.  However, even if the relevant 
knowledge components of moral concepts represent normative and goal oriented features, then 
the ideals theory for moral concepts is still just a kind of theory-theory for moral concepts, and 
we need not expound further into this view. 
24 This view differs from the others previously discussed since here, concepts are actually 
constituted by emotions.  While other views such as the prototype theory may mention emotions 
by claiming, for example, that RIGHT ACTION is composed of BRINGS HAPPINESS, ELICITS 
APPROBATION, and ELICITS JOY, the emotion theory may be thought to use rather than 
mention emotions since moral concepts are actually constituted by them rather than being 
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of the emotion theory, it will be best to first discuss Prinz’s neo-empiricist theory of 
moral concepts since the emotion theory is very similar to it.  After detailing Prinz’s 
view, the emotion theory will be distinguished from Prinz’s neo-empiricist theory in that 
the emotion theory does not necessarily espouse neo-empiricism. 
For his neo-empiricist view of moral concepts, Prinz states, “Thus, we can capture 
the idea that moral concepts are perceptually-based detectors of moral properties by 
postulating that moral concepts are constituted by sentiments.”25  In The Emotional 
Construction of Morals Prinz attempts to show that moral concepts are constituted by 
sentiments and emotions, and his method for doing so will later be examined and 
scrutinized in chapter four.
 26
 
                                                     
 
composed of concepts that refer to them.  Emotion theory structured concepts sharply differ from 
the others in that they contain different information carrying mental states (emotions) as well as 
in the fact that they rely on emotion-based processing.  In that emotion theory concepts have a 
cluster of properties or scientific generalizations that differ from other types of bodies of 
knowledge, such concepts may be thought to constitute its own natural kind.   
25 Ibid, 97. 
26 Prinz’s essentially Humean view of moral concepts is also somewhat mirrored by meta-ethical 
non-cognitivists who also generally espouse a Humean theory of moral concepts.  For, meta-
ethical non-cognitivism generally claims that moral judgments are the expression of one’s 
emotions.  Insofar as moral judgments are the expression of one’s attitudes, meta-ethical non-
cognitivists generally are committed to the view that the moral concepts contained within the 
judgment are constituted by emotions.  It is fair to say that the concepts literature in the 
Philosophy of Mind/Cognitive Science has largely ignored or has been unaware of meta-ethical 
non-cognitivism’s stake on an emotion-based theory of concepts.  On the other hand, I also 
believe it is fair to say that meta-ethical non-cognitivists have largely ignored or have been 
unaware of the many nuances and theories that have developed in the concepts literature; issues 
such as the compositionality of thought.  Due to the more sophisticated nature of Prinz’s theory 
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First, neo-empiricism as a theory of concepts will be explained with most of the 
emphasis being placed on Prinz’s version of this view.  It will then be illustrated how 
there is an apparent contradiction in Prinz’s theory of moral concepts between his first 
book Furnishing the Mind versus his later writings in The Emotional Construction of 
Morals.  His initial effort can be seen as a structurally dualistic theory of moral concepts, 
where such concepts may have exemplar and sentiments/emotions structure, but his later 
work appears to adopt a monistic view where moral concepts are only constituted by 
sentiments/emotions.
27
  His earlier work is a dualism in the sense that there are the dual 
exemplar and sentiment/emotions structures for moral concepts.  Next, both views will be 
reconciled such that Prinz’s theory may still be construed as a dualism.  Now, remember 
that the emotion theory claims that some moral concepts are composed of our sentiments 
and emotions.  Hence, the emotion theory may appear to be similar to Prinz’s 
sentiments/emotions structure for moral concepts.  However, in the final part of this 
section, these two views will be differentiated from each other.   
Neo-empiricism finds its roots from the British empiricist philosophers in the 17
th
 
and 18
th
 centuries such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.  However, while the British 
empiricists, in varying degrees, generally viewed concepts as conscious picture-like 
images that are derived from perceptual states or what Hume calls “impressions,” neo-
                                                     
 
of moral concepts at the concepts level, we will focus on Prinz’s Humean account of moral 
concepts rather than meta-ethical non-cognitivists’ Humean account.  Prinz, Emotional. 
27 Prinz’s distinction between sentiments and emotions will shortly be given. 
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empiricists like Barsalou, on the other hand, believe concepts are records of information 
carrying neural states that underlie perception.
28
  Barsalou believes that such neural 
representations are unconscious though they may make conscious counterparts.  While 
there are different versions of neo-empiricism, they generally hold the view that 
information in concepts are encoded in modal or perceptual symbols that are represented 
in the same systems as the perceptual states that produced them.  For neo-empiricists, 
perception is conceived of broadly to include audition, vision, touch, smell, taste, and 
emotions.  The view that emotions are perceptions will be explained shortly.  
Furthermore, such theorists believe that the higher competences involve the use and 
manipulation of such perceptual symbols, where conceptual processing concerns the 
reenacting and manipulation of some perceptual states.  Prinz states, “Tokening a 
[concept] is generally tantamount to entering a perceptual state of the kind one would be 
in if one were to experience the thing it represents.”29 
This is contrasted with the more predominant view that concept knowledge is 
stored in arbitrary amodal or non-perceptual formats.  For amodal symbol systems, once 
a perceptual state arises in the sensory-motor system, it gets transduced or converted into 
                                                     
28 Lawrence Barsalou, “Perceptual Symbol Systems,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, (1999), 577-
660.  L. Barsalou, W.K. Simmons, A. Barbey, and C.D. Wilson, “Grounding conceptual 
knowledge in modality-specific systems,” Trends in Cognitive Science 7 (2003), 84-91.  L. Barsalou, 
D. Pecher, R. Zeelenber, W.K. Simmons, S.B. Hamann, “Multimodal simulation in conceptual 
processing.  Categorization inside and outside the lab:  Essays in honor of Douglas L. Medin, ed. W. 
Ahn, R. Goldstone, B. Love, A. Markman, Nad P. Wolff, (Washington, D.C.:  American 
Psychological Association), 2005. 
29 Prinz, Furnishing, 150. 
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an amodal symbol system to be used in the higher cognitive functions.  Amodal symbols 
are language-like in that just as the word ‘dog’ is not similar to a physical dog, the 
amodal DOG symbol is not similar to a perceived dog.  Moreover, just as processing a 
language requires the processing of individual words in a sentence, conceptual processing 
is based on the processing of individual amodal symbols that are in sentence-like or list-
like structures.
30
 
While Locke motivated his empiricism from an anti-nativist stance, neo-
empiricists need not be committed to anti-nativism.  Rather, they may motivate their view 
from alternative means.  Two major forms of motivation for neo-empiricism and the 
positing of modal symbols are the issues of parsimony as well as numerous findings in 
neuroscience and cognitive science that indicate that concepts are stored in modal rather 
than amodal formats.  For example, Barsalou and Prinz support their neo-empiricism 
based on an argument from parsimony.  Remember that amodal theories posit that modal 
representations get transduced into amodal representational formats for cognition.  
However, it will be more cost-effective if our modal representations can be used in 
cognition without the use of amodal symbols.  If we already have modal symbols and 
they can do the proper work in all the various facets of cognition, then it will be more 
parsimonious not to posit the existence of amodal symbols.  Moreover, neo-empiricism 
                                                     
30 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1980).  Jerry 
Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:  A critical analysis,” 
Cognition 28:  (1988), 3-71.  
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may be independently supported based on empirical data.
31
  For example, McCarthy and 
Warrington examined patients with focal brain lesions and found that such subjects lose 
their ability to categorize in certain domains.
32
  For instance, in some cases patients’ 
categorization abilities are impaired for abstract concepts rather than concrete concepts.  
The explanation offered is that concepts consist of modality-specific perceptual 
information and, in that different category domains may be represented by different 
sensory representations, such selective impairments will occur.  To note, while this modal 
versus amodal issue has been introduced in order to provide a sufficient explanation of 
the neo-empiricist view of concepts, no stand will be taken on this debate as to whether 
all moral concepts are stored in modal or amodal representational formats, as this issue 
concerning the vehicles of thought is outside the scope of this essay and may itself 
comprise an entire dissertation.   
Since Prinz discusses moral concepts with more depth than any neo-empiricist, 
his brand of neo-empiricism will be the central view for our discussion.  In that it takes 
Hume the three books that comprise his Treatise of Human Nature – “of the 
Understanding,” “of the Passions,” and “of Morals” – to expound his view of moral 
concepts, it may be read that it also takes Prinz his first three books on the same 
                                                     
31 Antonio Damasio, “Time-Locked Multiregional Retroactivation:  A Systems-Level Proposal for 
the Neural Substrates of Recall and Recognition,” Cognition 33:  1989, 25-62.  Barsalou, Perceptual 
Symbol Systems.  D. Morrow, S. Greenspan, and G. Bower, “Accessibility and Situation Models 
in Narrative Comprehension,” Journal of Memory and Language 26:  1987, 165-87. 
32 R. McCarthy and E. Warrington, Cognitive Neuropsychology:  a Clinical Introduction, (San Diego, 
CA:  Academic Press), 1990. 
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sequentially presented general subject matters of concepts, emotions, and ethics to make 
his broadly Humean claim on the nature of moral concepts.  We will first examine his 
view in light of his first book, Furnishing the Mind.  In this work he endorses concept 
empiricism: 
Concept Empiricism:  all (human) concepts are copies or combinations   
 of copies of perceptual representations.
33
   
 
Here, copying is to be understood as a causal process, where perceptually 
produced representations may be duplicated in other systems or where perceptual 
representations leave behind records, which are instructions for producing copies, in 
other non-perceptual systems that allows for regeneration in the original perceptual 
systems.  Prinz believes that perceptual representations are in dedicated input systems 
that use different kinds of mental representations for different sense modalities.  An input 
system is a system that receives input from outside the brain in the external environment 
or from within the body such as through proprioception or interoception.  An input 
system is dedicated in that the different senses are tuned to disparate physical 
magnitudes.  For example, vision responds to wavelengths of light while olfaction is 
sensitive to molecular shapes.  Furthermore, for Prinz, an input system is dedicated in 
that different modalities have different representational primitives.  This is based on such 
reasons as 1) that our senses have different types of information processing, 2) different 
types of representations may be better able to handle different sensory-based tasks, and 3) 
                                                     
33 Prinz, Furnishing, 108. 
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our sensory modalities are relatively independent systems.  The concept empiricism 
thesis and the fact that perceptual symbols are in dedicated input systems leads Prinz to 
the Modal-Specificity Hypothesis: 
The Modal-Specificity Hypothesis:  Concepts are couched in 
 representational codes that are specific to our perceptual systems. 
 
Prinz calls perceptual representations “proxytypes” since such representations 
stand in as proxies for the categories they represent.  “Proxytype theory” will be 
understood as Prinz’s specialized neo-empiricist view of concepts.  Thus, proxytypes are 
perceptually derived representations that are or can be activated in working memory to 
represent a class.  Long-term memory networks, or a group of linked proxytypes, can 
store a wide variety of information that concepts are thought to store.  Proxytypes may 
accomplish this feat because they may be multimodal, a single visual model, or a 
representation of a word, such as an auditory representation of “dog.”  Prinz claims that 
proxytypes are bodies of knowledge that represent summary features, particular 
instances, and theoretical causal explanatory facts that are acquired empirically.  For 
example, one’s concept of DOG may be constituted by a prototype that contains BARKS, 
PLAYS FETCH, HAS FOUR LEGS, and HAS A TAIL.  Proxytypes may also be exemplars that 
are about mentally represented particular instances such as the exemplars THAT 
GREYHOUND ON THE TRACK, MY NEIGHBOR’S AMERICAN BULLDOGS, MY ROTWEILLER, 
and MY SISTER’S CHIHUAHUA for one’s DOG concept.  Proxytypes may also contain 
causal explanatory knowledge of the world.  Thus, Prinz’s view is a pluralism which 
includes the prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory, although proxytypes are clearly 
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taken to be modal representations.
34
  Finally, Prinz states that his view on moral concepts 
may be understood as a conception rather than correct concept view.
35
  Given that Prinz’s 
primary focus is on moral “concepts” as being mental representations in the head and that 
he is not talking about “concepts” as being abstract objects that contain the universally 
correct means for categorizing acts as moral or not, Prinz may be read as holding a 
conception rather than a correct concept theory.
36
   
In Furnishing the Mind and specifically in relation to moral concepts, Prinz 
argues that ethical concepts such as VIRTUE may be constituted either by emotions or by 
exemplars that are about specific acts of moral deeds and good actions.  Prinz believes 
moral concepts may have exemplar structure based on his personal observation, rather 
than on evidence consistent with PAC, that when asked about the nature of our moral 
concepts, we will eventually provide examples of particular moral cases.  The claim that 
                                                     
34 Prinz states that “Proxytype theory is a hybrid…”  But it is more charitable to read him as a 
pluralist since he does not maintain that there is a criterion of correctness that may be 
competently mastered.  Prinz, Furnishing, 164.  My italics. 
35 Based on conversation with Prinz and Prinz, Emotional, p. 94. 
36 Prinz also holds a moral subjectivism, where moral truth is relative to the individual and where 
there is no universally correct way for categorizing acts as moral or not.  To note, Prinz still 
believes that moral concepts and judgments refer and have truth conditions.  For, on his view, 
moral concepts that are constituted by sentiments and emotions may represent both secondary 
qualities and concerns via an informational and functional theory of content for emotions.  
Having truth conditions is perfectly consistent with focusing one’s discussion on moral 
conceptions or moral mental representations.  The main emphasis as to why Prinz’s view is a 
conception rather than correct concept theory is that he understands “concepts” to be in the head 
and constituted by emotions rather than being abstracta outside the head.  Second, when 
discussing “concepts,” he is not talking about a morality where there is a universal moral truth 
since he is a subjectivist.  For Prinz, moral conceptions can still refer to secondary qualities and 
concerns and have truth conditions even though he believes that there is no such thing as an 
abstract universally correct moral concept.   
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concepts are constituted by emotions is held due to the work done by Antonio Damasio 
and how mental representations of actions are accompanied by “somatic markers.”  These 
markers cause us to experience certain emotions when a particular act is brought up in 
cognitive deliberation as to whether we should perform the act or not, where the emotions 
are thought to play a role late in moral deliberation.  When a mental representation about 
a particular act is accompanied by a positive marker, we will be motivated to perform the 
action.  When negative, the relevant somatic marker leads us to avoid the action.  Given 
that somatic markers may ground mental operations in moral cognition and practical 
reasoning, moral concepts may be constituted by emotions.  While his focus for ethical 
concepts is primarily on these two views in Furnishing the Mind, when taking into 
account the other previously discussed structures such as the prototype and theory-theory 
that proxytype theory is compatible with, it may well be possible that Prinz may also 
include such other structures as being viable for moral concepts as well.  Although this 
possibility will be left open, our focus on Prinz’s moral concepts view in Furnishing the 
Mind will be on his explicitly discussed exemplar and emotion-based structures for moral 
concepts.  Before moving on, more will now be stated in regard to the emotion structural 
aspect of his view.  
In his second book, Gut Reactions, Prinz maintains the James-Lange view that all 
emotions are perceptions of our bodily states rather than action tendencies that dispose us 
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to act.
37
  When a bully approaches a student, the oncoming bully causes the student to 
perspire, tremble, and have an elevated heart rate.  On this view, the emotion of fear is 
merely the experience or perception of these bodily states rather than that which disposes 
us to perspire and tremble.  It is from such perceptions that the qualia that constitute 
emotions are produced.  In other words, we feel fear because we tremble rather than 
tremble because we are afraid.  Insofar as emotions are felt perceptions, neo-empiricism 
may account for moral concepts being constituted by the passions since proxytypes are 
perceptual representations.  Thus, our first interpretation of Prinz’s theory of moral 
concepts is that of a structurally dualistic neo-empiricist view where our moral concepts 
are composed of exemplars and emotions which are stored in perceptual representation 
formats.     
There is a second possible interpretation of Prinz’s theory of moral concepts that 
apparently contradicts the first interpretation.  In his later book, The Emotional 
Construction of Morals, Prinz holds what he calls epistemic emotionism, which contends 
that our moral concepts are essentially related to emotions.  By “essentially related,” 
Prinz means that moral concepts may be constituted by dispositions to feel emotions and, 
at times, be made up of emotions themselves.  Prinz distinguishes between sentiments 
and emotions, where sentiments are standing dispositions stored in long term memory to 
feel emotions.  Emotions are occurrent manifestations in working memory of 
                                                     
37 Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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dispositional sentiments.  In making this distinction, Prinz allows for the fact that at times 
one may make a moral judgment without feeling any emotions, but one is still disposed to 
feel such emotions.  Thus, in such cases of judgment, we may say that our moral 
concepts, which are, in part, the building blocks of moral judgments, are themselves 
constituted by our sentiments, which are dispositions to feel emotions of approbation and 
disapprobation even though one does not presently experience any emotions.  In other 
cases where one does feel emotions when making a moral judgment, we may say that 
one’s moral concept in the moral judgment when activated occurrently in working 
memory is constituted by emotions.  All moral concepts which are stored in long term 
memory are composed of sentiments, but when a moral judgment is actively rendered in 
working memory, the moral concept in the judgment in many but not all cases is 
constituted by emotions.   
Prinz appears to waver at times in The Emotional Construction of Morals as to 
whether moral concepts are constituted by sentiments or if they are, on the other hand, 
constituted by emotions.  However, as we shall see shortly below in Prinz’s story of how 
we come to make moral judgments, in certain passages it appears that he says that moral 
concepts are constituted by sentiments and at times by emotions.  I adopt this latter 
interpretation of Prinz since it is able to account for the nature of moral concepts in both 
long-term and working memory.  As concepts are stored in long-term memory and 
recruited into working memory when actively forming thoughts and judgments, moral 
concepts on Prinz’s view can have different primary natures depending on whether the 
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moral concept is in long-term or working memory.  This variance allows for my previous 
interpretive statement that moral concepts may at times be constituted by emotions.  
When simply stored in long-term memory and not being actively rendered, a moral 
concept is a disposition.  However, when the concept is brought into working memory 
such that it is a constituent of a moral judgment and the disposition is manifested into an 
actual experience of an emotion, then it is primarily the case that the occurrent moral 
concept is constituted by emotions since the judgment of which the concept is a 
constituent is an expression of an emotion.  To note, Prinz may maintain that there is still 
some kind of disposition to feel emotions in this occurrent state – for example, one may 
still be disposed to feel the emotion more intensely or for a longer period of time.  
Therefore, in order to account for the different possible stages a moral concept may be in, 
I take it that a comprehensive interpretation of Prinz’s view will be that moral concepts 
are constituted by sentiments and at times by emotions.  Hence, we may say that Prinz’s 
epistemic emotionism claims that moral concepts are related to emotions dispositionally 
and at times constitutionally.
38
   
In holding epistemic emotionism, Prinz does not explicitly state that our moral 
concepts may be constituted by other things such as exemplar features.  He only states 
that our moral concepts are constituted by sentiments and at times by emotions.  Insofar 
                                                     
38 Notice also that this interpretation is consistent with his statement in The Emotional Construction 
of Morals that since sentiments represent secondary qualities and emotions represent concerns, 
when an emotion is experienced during judgment, the moral concept represents both a secondary 
quality and a concern. 
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as this is the case, it initially appears that no other concept structure may be allowed in 
Prinz’s more mature view to allow for the type of moral concept dualism maintained in 
his earlier work.  In Gut Reactions, he holds a purely non-cognitivist rather than 
cognitivist theory of emotions, where emotions have a felt and perceptual aspect but do 
not contain cognitive appraisal judgments and are not composed of the relevant concepts; 
concepts which may be the constituents of appraisal judgments.
39
  Here, a cognitive state 
is a specific kind of propositional mental state made up of a collection of individual 
semantically interpreted concepts.  A cognitive state is more precisely an appraisal 
judgment.  An appraisal judgment is an evaluative judgment related to one’s well-being.  
For example, if someone strikes me in the face, then I experience the emotion of anger.  
If my anger is cognitive, then such anger may be made up of a collection of highly 
structured appraisal judgments related to such things as goals, blame, praise, coping 
potential, and future expectations.  Such anger may be made up of MY WELL-BEING HAS 
BEEN DAMAGED, HIS ATTACK IS UNPROVOKED, and HIM HITTING ME IS PAINFUL.40  
However, for Prinz’s pure non-cognitivism, moral emotions do not contain cognitive 
appraisal judgments of things like moral blame or praise such that these cognitive 
appraisal may themselves be some other concepts structure like exemplars that are always 
                                                     
39 A deeper discussion of pure non-cognitivism will be discussed below. 
40 As judgments are conclusive thoughts that something is in fact the case and concepts are the 
constituents of thought, judgments are made up of a string of connected concepts.  In this 
cognitivist situation being discussed here, a concept may be constituted by emotions, where 
emotions are just appraisal judgments.  Therefore, the concept in question is constituted by 
appraisal judgments or a string of relevant concepts.  This concept structural formation is similar 
to, for example, the prototype or theory-theory views. 
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attached to the emotions.  Emotions are not tied to cognitive states.  Thus, Prinz’s later 
writings on moral concepts appear to be a monistic view in that moral proxytypes are 
constituted by our sentiments/emotions tout court.  It may not be the case that our moral 
proxytypes are also constituted by exemplars.  At first glance it seems that if our moral 
concepts are constituted by our sentiments/emotions, then moral concepts are simply 
constituted by our disposition to have pure feelings and perceive bodily changes as well 
as at times to be constituted by such feelings and perceptions themselves with no other 
conceptual structures at work.  In other words, his more mature and focused view appears 
to be a monistic rather than dualistic theory of moral proxytypes.
41
  Moreover, he makes 
no further claim in The Emotional Construction of Morals that other concept structures 
may also be at play. 
However, with some additional labor, Prinz’s disparate dualistic and monistic 
views in his earlier and later works, respectively, may be reconciled.  In order to 
accomplish this task, we will examine Prinz’s story of how one comes to make moral 
judgments.  This story will have a certain opening where it may be plausible to add in the 
                                                     
41 Prinz’s later view in The Emotional Construction of Morals may be construed as a structural 
dualism in that moral concepts are constituted by sentiments and at other times emotions.  
Sentiments and emotions may be viewed as two different things.  However, for our purposes, 
what is important is that his later view does not initially appear to allow for other predominant 
concept structures such as the exemplar structure that are discussed in his earlier work.  It is with 
this apparent discrepancy in mind that I state that his later work is a monism rather than a 
dualism.  While it is possible that his later view may still at first glance appear to be a dualism, 
my use of the term “monism” and “dualism” is meant to indicate the apparent discrepancy 
between his works, and these terms may be altered in a qualified way without loss of effect if 
need be.   
 87 
exemplar structure to moral concepts.  In this story, Prinz asks us to imagine that a person 
witnesses an act of theft.  Prinz claims that first this person categorizes the act as an act of 
theft.  After this, in long-term memory, one has a sentiment towards theft that becomes 
activated.  In that a sentiment is kind of like a standing belief, Prinz calls sentiments 
“moral rules.”  The activated sentiment along with contextual factors then determines 
what emotions become elicited.  Let us say that in this particular case, one has elicited the 
emotion of anger at theft.  The state of being angry at theft constitutes the judgment that 
theft is wrong insofar as the emotion is generated by a sentiment.  Prinz states that in that 
an emotion is somewhat like an “occurrent belief,” only in the limited sense that the 
emotion is what constitutes the occurrent judgment, Prinz calls relevant moral emotions 
“moral judgments.”   
Now, since sentiments are dispositions that generate emotions rather than being 
non-cognitive emotions themselves, we may claim that sentiments are, in part, constituted 
by exemplars such as particular instances of theft, robbery, and pick pocketing.  We may 
now claim that in Prinz’s story, once an act is determined to be one of theft, one’s 
sentiment towards this act becomes activated precisely because one’s sentiment or moral 
rule is partly constituted by exemplars of stealing.  This introduction of exemplar theory 
adds to Prinz’s story in that it accounts for why a particular sentiment is activated when a 
certain act is witnessed or discussed.  The activation occurs because the particular act in 
question matches the exemplars contained in the sentiment.  The activation of the 
sentiment then leads to the elicitation of emotions and eventually moral judgment.  In this 
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fashion, we may reconcile the disparate views of concepts contained in Prinz’s earlier and 
later works.  Since epistemic emotionism claims that 1) moral concepts are constituted by 
sentiments and at times emotions; 2) sentiments are in part composed of exemplars; and 
3) emotions are pure perceptual-based feelings, it may be thought that overall, Prinz 
consistently holds a structurally dualistic view of moral proxytypes across his disparate 
works. 
At this point, we will now discuss the difference between the emotion-based 
aspect of Prinz’s reconciled proxytype dualism versus the emotion theory.  The James-
Lange view of emotions as perceptions is highly contentious, where it does appear that 
the James/Lange theory is the minority view.  An example of the controversial nature of 
this debate can be witnessed by Joshua Greene’s work in moral psychology in which he 
presupposes the view that emotions are not perceptions.
42
  Nevertheless, this 
philosophical debate on the nature of emotions is largely beyond the scope of the 
dissertation.  Therefore, as mentioned, a general emotion based view for moral concepts 
will be adopted and will be called the emotion theory.  The emotion theory differs from 
Prinz’s emotion-based aspect of his neo-empiricism in that it is able to remain theory 
neutral concerning what emotions are, and as we shall see in later chapters, it is 
                                                     
42 To note, in the Emotional Construction of Morals, Prinz claims it may be the case that emotions 
may be both perceptions and action tendencies.  If this is the case, Prinz can still hold onto the 
view that concepts are modal symbols since emotions are still in part perceptions.   Joshua 
Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” Moral Psychology Volume 3.  Ed Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong.  (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press), 2008. 
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established and defended by new means.
43
  Emotion theory moral concepts are not 
necessarily perceptual-based representations because I leave open the possibility that 
emotions are not perceptions.  The emotion theory is not necessarily a neo-empiricist 
view.  Hence, we shall entitle the relevant moral concepts view the emotion theory, in 
which moral concepts are constituted by sentiments and emotions.  To note, it will 
continually be maintained that some moral concepts may be constituted by sentiments, 
which will still be understood to be dispositions to feel emotions.  On this view, moral 
judgments need not necessarily involve occurrent emotions if the moral concept in the 
moral judgment is only constituted by sentiments.   
At this juncture, we will examine several objections against the emotion theory.  
Objections against other concept theories such as the prototype view will be anticipated 
in later chapters.  This is due to the fact that such objections pertain to specific desiderata 
of theories of moral concepts, such as concept combination.  As discussed in the first 
chapter, discussion of such desiderata has been assigned to later chapters.  Therefore, 
such objections will be entertained later.  However, I anticipate in this chapter several 
objections against the emotion theory that are not pertinent to the stated desiderata of 
theories of moral concepts as outlined in the first chapter.  The first objection is 
concerned with whether I can remain theory-neutral on the issue of the nature of 
emotions. 
                                                     
43 In the fourth chapter, I will demonstrate and defend the use of causal evidence in the moral 
psychology literature to draw concept constitution claims for the emotion theory. 
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Due to space concerns, I will not be taking a complete stand on what emotions are 
for the emotion theory of concepts, although certain restrictions will be given and we will 
discuss what the potential nature and psychological constituents of an emotion may be.  
While we obviously do not have the space to provide a complete theory of what mental 
states constitute emotions, I see it as beneficial for the emotion theory that it remains to a 
significant extent theory neutral concerning taking a stand on what emotions are.  In this 
fashion, philosophers and psychologists can examine and explore the emotion theory of 
concepts without necessarily having to worry about any meta-foundational issues 
concerning a theory of emotions.  This is somewhat similar to how a philosopher of 
physics may write a paper on quantum mechanics without having to defend scientific 
realism in the same paper.  Moreover, theorists still can discuss the emotion theory with 
each other despite the controversial nature of the topic of what emotions are and even if 
the given theorists disagree on a theory of emotions. 
However, there may be an initial issue as to whether the emotion theory is distinct 
from other theories of concepts in that emotions may themselves be made up of concepts; 
concepts that may form appraisal judgments.  The major concept theories such as the 
prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory all claim that concepts decompose into further 
concepts.  If emotions also decompose into concepts that form appraisal judgments, then 
the emotion theory potentially may not be a different theory from the others.  In the 
philosophy of emotions, a purely cognitivist view generally claims that emotions are only 
constituted by appraisal judgments.  For instance, Martha Nussbaum, a pure cognitivist, 
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writes, “[e]motions are appraisals and value judgments.”44  Pure cognitivists claim that all 
emotions are only constituted by this specific kind of cognitive state.  If emotions are just 
appraisal judgments, then in this instance, the emotion theory may potentially be nothing 
more than, for example, the prototype theory since concepts that are composed of 
emotions are really decomposable into further relevant concepts that form appraisal 
judgments.   
However, purely cognitivist views have come under attack from psychological 
findings.  For instance, some such as Lazarus argue that the feeling of emotions is caused 
by appraisal judgments.
45
  Therefore, all emotions are constituted by such judgments.  
While it is wholly unclear as to how causation can lead to a constitution claim for 
emotions, even if we grant this move for the sake of argument to the likes of Lazarus, 
Zajonc has argued that emotions can be induced without any prior cognitive mental states 
such as appraisal judgments.
46
  For example, emotions can be directly evoked through 
physical means by drugs or hormone treatments without any prior emotion related 
appraisal judgments occurring in the subject’s mind.  Moreover, there is support that 
there is a direct subcortical pathway from the retina to the amygdala, a phylogenetically 
primitive emotional region of the brain, which bypasses cognition regions that are 
                                                     
44 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought:  The Intelligence of Emotions, (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press), 2001, 4. 
45R. S. Lazarus, “On the primacy of cognition,” American Psychologist 39:  (1984), 124-129. 
46Robert Zajonc, “On the primacy of affect,” American Psychologist 39: (1984), p. 117-123. 
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associated with appraisal judgments.
47
  It is thought that many human beings have an 
immediate fear response in seeing snake-like coiled objects even before any cognitive 
appraisal judgments regarding the snake-like object may even be made.  Lazarus 
responds that even though there may be a direct pathway to some phylogenetically 
primitive subcortical neural structure that correlates with emotions, such a structure may 
still be able to harbor the capacity to produce appraisal judgments.
48
  However, keeping 
in mind that the subcortical pathway in question bypasses cognitive regions of the brain, 
the problem with this is that damage to the amygdala can lead to significant deficiencies 
in affect, but such damage does not impair one’s general ability to think about and 
formulate the cognitivist’s appraisal judgments, such as those concerning blame and 
praise.
49
  Therefore, it is doubtful that the amygdala harbors the capacity to produce 
appraisal judgments.  When having, for example, an immediate fear response to snake-
like coiled objects in which cognitive regions are bypassed, there are no appraisal 
judgments involved in the constitution of the emotion.  Thus, there is strong empirical 
evidence against purely cognitivist views of emotions, and I understand such views to be 
untenable. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, one may claim that all emotions may be 
non-cognitive and contain no appraisal judgments.  One may be a pure non-cognitivist 
                                                     
47 J. E. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
48Lazarus, ibid. 
49 See also, M. Siebert, H. Markowitsch, P. Bartel, “Amygdala, affect and cognition: evidence from 
10 patients with Urbach–Wiethe disease,” Brain 126:  (2003), 2627-2637. 
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and hold that all emotions do not contain appraisal judgments.  This differs from the 
position of regular non-cognitivism in that this latter view allows for the possibility that 
some emotions may contain appraisal judgments, but not all emotions may do so.  If pure 
non-cognitivism is the case, then the emotion theory is clearly distinct from the other 
concept theories, and the present issue or worry at hand need not concern us.
50
 
However, as another potential option, one may hold a hybrid view where some 
but not all emotions contain appraisal judgments as well as some other mental state 
component(s) that are essential to all emotions.  While there are many potential 
components of emotions in the literature, I take it that the other three major possible 
components of an emotion are a felt qualitative “what it is like” aspect, a somatic 
component where emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, or an action tendencies 
component where emotions are dispositions to act.  Such a hybrid view may be 
problematic in that emotions at times may once again be constituted by appraisal 
judgments since emotions in some instances are in part constituted by such judgments.  
But if such a hybrid view is the case, then at times an emotion is a conjunction of an 
                                                     
50 One objection against pure non-cognitivism is that we make many distinctions between 
different types of emotions.  However, it appears that a pure non-cognitivist theory cannot 
account for this diversity of distinctions we make based on just feels, perceptions, or action-
tendencies.  It seems that we must introduce some kind of cognitivism to account for the 
diversity of distinctions we make for emotions.  While there is an ensuing debate about this issue, 
we need not pursue it here for our purposes given that pure non-cognitivism poses no threat to 
an emotion-based theory of concepts being different from the prototype, exemplar, and theory-
theories.  For our purposes, we may assume that pure non-cognitivism is a possible viable 
candidate for a theory of emotions, especially taking into account the additional fact that in this 
dissertation, no complete stand on a theory of emotions is taken. 
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appraisal judgment and some other factor(s) x.  For our present concern, we need not 
specify what x is, although x may be any combination of the above three discussed 
potential components.  Thus, on this theory of emotions, the emotion theory will differ 
from the other concept theories due to the x component, which the concepts that are not 
composed of emotions will not have.  In this respect, emotion theory concepts in some 
cases may be composed of concepts that form appraisal judgments, but they will also be 
made up of x.  Due to this conjunction, emotions on this hybrid view still will be different 
from prototypes, exemplars, and theory-theories.  Here, emotions may in part be 
constituted by appraisals, but appraisals cannot be constituted by emotions.  This 
difference allows us to escape the worry at hand in that the emotion theory is still a 
different view of concepts from the others regardless of whether emotions are this 
specified type of hybrid or whether emotions contain no appraisal judgments at all.
51
 
Emotions are constituted by an x factor on both of these possible available 
theories of emotions.  Although on the hybrid view, emotions at times may be made up of 
                                                     
51 Another objection one may have to the emotion theory is that concepts can be triggered 
endogenously, but it appears that emotions cannot be.  Concepts can be under the control of and 
be activated by the agent (endogenous control) rather than be under the control of the 
environment (exogenous control).  Thus, since emotions appear to be only under exogenous 
control, concepts cannot be constituted by emotions.  While much of emotional experience 
appears to be under exogenous control, it is important to first point out that non-emotion theory 
conceptual knowledge in the subconscious is also under exogenous control.  Second, it seems that 
we can purposefully excite emotions in our imaginations.  For example, when deciding whether I 
should ride the rollercoaster, in order to make my choice, I may imagine the fear and elation I 
would feel if I was on the rollercoaster.  Also, certain groups such as the stoics and Buddhists are 
well-known for their ability to control what emotions they do and do not feel.  Thus, emotions do 
appear to be under endogenous control to an extent, and they are under such control especially 
for those with the proper training. 
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appraisal judgments as well, we cannot claim that the emotion theory of moral concepts 
is viable merely based on the evidence for prototype, exemplar, or theory-theory 
structure.  For, what is essential to all emotions is some x factor rather than appraisal 
judgments.  Even though it is not specified what this x factor is, we may still determine 
whether emotions influence categorization, which may lead to the viability of the 
emotion theory.  The second objection asks, “How is this possible without knowing 
exactly what emotions are?”  If we closely examine how cognitive scientists determine 
what emotions are, one method may be seen as a bottom-up approach in which they 
stimulate what may be potential components of emotions to see if they lead to the 
experiencing of an emotion in subjects.  Whether and what emotions are experienced may 
be determined by providing a written questionnaire at an appropriate time after the 
stimulus is provided that asks participants what emotions they may be presently 
experiencing.  For instance, Lazarus and Alfert have run studies in which subjects are 
given different written descriptions of a graphic film they are about to see.  These 
descriptions influenced what type of emotion was felt by subjects when viewing the film.  
What emotions subjects felt was determined by providing them the Nowlis Adjective 
Checklist of Mood that scores for eight variables such as anxiety, pleasantness, and social 
affection.  This study purportedly shows that given the influence of appraisals, some 
emotions at times may be constituted by them.
52
   
                                                     
52 R. Lazarus and E. Alfert, “Short-circuiting of threat by experimentally altering cognitive 
appraisal,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 69:  (1964):  195-205. 
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Another method may be viewed as a top-down approach in which cognitive 
scientists induce emotions in subjects, examine subjects that are already experiencing 
certain emotions, or study patients with blunted emotions in relation to normal subjects 
and then attempt to discern the x factor or what constitutes emotions.  For cases of 
inducing emotions, whether and what emotions are felt by subjects after they are 
potentially induced by emotions may also be determined by providing a written 
questionnaire to them.  For example, Smith and Lazarus asked participants to imagine 
themselves being in emotionally charged scenarios such as imagining that there is a great 
threat and danger that one’s relative will die.53  This particular vignette attempted to elicit 
fear in the participants, and whether such fear was in fact elicited were determined based 
on subjects’ reports.  Participants then answered several questions in respects to how 
applicable certain appraisal judgments were to a given scenario, where each circumstance 
attempted to elicit a particular emotion.  Given that the above experimenters had adopted 
a particular cognitivist theory of emotions in which specific appraisal judgments 
correspond to specific emotions, their theory of emotions predicted that there will be a 
correspondence between particular appraisal judgments and particular emotions in the 
experiments.  For instance, in the threat vignette that elicits fear, subjects should relate 
thoughts about physical danger and a low coping potential to the particular situation.  In 
                                                     
53 C. A. Smith and R. S. Lazarus, “Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the 
emotions,” Cognition and Emotion 7:  (1993), pp. 233-269. 
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this manner, the experimenters attempt to establish some evidence that emotions are at 
least in part composed of appraisal judgments. 
Given the availability of the top-down approach in cognitive science, we can 
determine whether an emotion influences moral judgment without specifying the x factor 
that constitutes the emotion.  Simply put, we may induce emotions in subjects by, for 
example, asking them to recall an emotional moment of their lives or deal with patients 
who are already known to have deficiencies in affect, without knowing what essentially 
constitutes the emotion.  At this point, we may then attempt to discover what the x factor 
is if we so choose; a project that will not concern us in the dissertation.  At this same 
point, we may also then run other tests to see whether the induced emotion influences 
reasoning or see whether the fact that the blunted emotions of certain subjects is 
experimentally responsible in some way for being able to infer the influence of emotions 
in the higher competences in normal subjects, which may lead to the viability of the 
emotion theory; a project we will be very interested in in the dissertation.  This general 
strategy will be adopted in attempting to prove the viability of the emotion theory later in 
this essay while simultaneously not providing a complete account of what emotions really 
are. 
Another objection may be that on the emotion theory, concepts are constituted by 
emotions.  Concepts have intentionality and content in that they are mental 
representations that are about, of, or represent properties in the world.  Given that some 
concepts may be composed of emotions, these emotions must also be mental 
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representations.  Yet, how can this be the case if you leave open the possibility that 
emotions at times may not be composed of appraisal judgments?  While it is obviously 
beyond the scope of this essay to offer a theory of intentionality for emotions, how can 
emotions represent if emotions are not composed of concepts that are the constituents of 
appraisal judgments; appraisal judgments which represent propositions?  The strategy 
here is to lessen the worry of this second criticism by offering a plausible way for 
emotions to be intentional mental states even if emotions may be non-cognitive. 
In the emotions literature, I generally take it that many to most believe emotions 
represent material and/or formal objects.  The material object can be understood as a 
specific object while the formal object is a description of the material object that must 
hold for the material object in order for the emotion in question to be appropriately 
instantiated.  For example, the feeling of fear when being chased by a lion is materially 
directed upon the lion and is formally about danger, where the lion is represented as 
being dangerous.  My emotion of anger may be materially about my enemy but formally 
be about the fact that an offense has been made against me.  This is generally thought to 
differ from moods in that my general mood of being anxious may not be directed upon 
any object or state of affairs.  Now, some theorists may believe that emotions can only 
refer by virtue of the fact that emotions are composed of appraisal judgments.  As 
appraisal judgments are about propositions or states of affairs, there is no dilemma in 
claiming that emotions are mental representations so long as emotions are composed of a 
string of concepts that form an appraisal judgment.  Some cognitivist oriented 
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philosophers have taken this as an indication that emotions must be constituted by 
appraisals since emotions are intentional mental states.  However, since I leave open the 
possibility that some emotions may not be composed of appraisals, how can such 
emotions be mental representations? 
Even though some emotions may not be composed of appraisal judgments, we 
may potentially lessen the urgency of this criticism in that many naturalistic theories of 
content such as an informational or even a number of teleosemantic views allow for a 
mental state to represent even though what constitutes the mental state does not itself 
describe its content.  In other words, the complexity of a mental state’s content need not 
be mirrored within the structure of the mental state itself.  There are numerous variations 
and refinements of informational and teleosemantic theories.  Informational theories may 
be understood to claim roughly that mental representation R represents C so long as R is 
reliably caused by C.  A teleosemantic theory generally might instead claim, for example, 
that R represents C only if R has been selected for the job of indicating C.  While no 
stand will be taken on a particular naturalistic theory of content, such widely discussed 
theories generally allow for emotions to represent even though the emotion in question 
may not be constituted by an appraisal judgment.  Due to obvious space concerns, even 
though I do not argue that any of these relevant naturalistic theories of content are 
correct, I attempt to lessen the immediate worry of this second objection by showing that 
many popular naturalistic views of content, if any of them may be correct, can account 
for the concern at hand. 
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Although I do not necessarily espouse his view of intentionality for emotions, 
Prinz’s theory provides a nice illustration of how emotions may plausibly represent even 
though they are not themselves constituted by appraisals.
54
  Prinz maintains a purely non-
cognitivist view of emotions in which emotions are not composed of appraisal judgments.  
However, in line with Fred Dretske’s later and general theory of mental content, Prinz 
offers a hybrid informational and teleosemantic theory of intentionality for emotions.
55
  
He claims that emotions represent formal objects that are Lazarus’s core relational 
themes, where core relational themes are formal relational properties that may pertain to 
one’s well-being, and such formal relational properties reliably cause one to have certain 
emotions.  For example, anger can represent the core relational theme offense, and fright 
is about the core relational theme concrete dangers.  An offense reliably causes one to 
feel anger while concrete dangers reliably cause one to feel fear.   
Moreover, the teleosemantic element enters the equation when he claims that 
emotions have the function of being caused by core relational themes in that there is an 
evolutionary advantage to have emotions that detect such themes.  For instance, anger in 
part motivates us to respond when material goods have been taken away from us, and fear 
confers a survival advantage in that it protects us from dangers.  On this hybrid theory of 
intentionality for emotions, emotions can represent core relational themes even though 
                                                     
54 Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004). 
55Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1981).  
Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation,” in Belief:  Form, Content and Function, ed. By R. Bogdan, 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 17-36. 
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emotions are non-cognitive.  Similar to how the beeping of a police detector in one’s car 
represents the presence of a police radar but the beeping itself lacks structure and cannot 
be semantically split into a tone meaning “police” and another meaning “radar,” emotions 
can represent so long as the emotion stands in the proper mind-world causal relation to C, 
and the emotion has the function of indicating C even though the emotion itself is not 
constituted by appraisal judgments. 
Moreover, a concept of x is thought to be constituted by mental representations 
that are about x or about a property of x.  For example, my LION concept, which 
represents the category lion, may be in part constituted by FOUR LEGS, MANE, YELLOW, and 
ROARS, where, for example, YELLOW refers to or represents the property of being yellow; a 
property that lions have.  While the answer to whether an actively rendered non-cognitive 
emotion that constitutes a moral concept relevantly can be about x or about a property of 
x is in part dependent on what particular theory of intentionality is espoused for emotions, 
it is quite plausible that a positive answer may be given to this question.  For example, on 
Prinz’s particular view only in regards to intentionality, take the moral emotion of anger 
that may represent being an offense.  If my moral concept MORALLY WRONG in my moral 
judgment is in part made up of the actual and actively rendered emotion of anger, then 
since anger represents being an offense and being an offense is normally thought to be a 
property of the category morally wrong, MORALLY WRONG may be constituted by the  
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emotion of anger in that anger is about a property of the category morally wrong.
56
  
 
                                                     
56 While this example clearly works if moral properties are mind-independent, if moral properties 
are mind-dependent where specifically moral properties are themselves constituted by emotions, 
then there may be some confusion.  For, if a moral property is constituted by anger and anger 
refers to being an offense, where being an offense may be thought to be a property of the moral 
property, then how can anger reliably detect a property that is a property of itself?  While this 
may be a salient objection against views that claim that moral properties are constituted by 
emotions, no stand is explicitly taken in this dissertation concerning the nature of moral 
properties.  This dissertation is primarily about the nature of moral concepts rather than of moral 
properties.  If this potential objection does indeed work, then we may make a general underlying 
assumption here that moral properties cannot be constituted by emotions. 
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3.  The Classical, Prototype, and Exemplar Theories 
This chapter will assess the viability of the classical, prototype, and exemplar 
theories for moral concepts. 
 
3.1  The Arguments Against the Classical Theory 
There exist several general arguments against the classical view for non-
mathematical and non-logical concepts.  A common objection is that for over two 
thousand years, philosophers have attempted to arrive upon definitions for concepts such 
as JUSTICE and KNOWLEDGE with no success.
1
  There is still no consensus on such 
definitions, and if there is a definition for them, it should have been discovered by now.  
Given that such definitions have not been discovered, this provides reason to believe that 
many of our concepts generally do not have classical structure.  For, if our concept of, for 
instance, JUSTICE might embody definitional structured knowledge, then it is reasonable 
to expect that we should have come upon it by now.  The fact that for well over two 
thousand years we have not arrived upon knowledge of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for JUSTICE lends some support to the inference that perhaps our JUSTICE 
concept does not have classical structure.   
                                                     
1 By “KNOWLEDGE,” I mean the concept that is traditionally defined in philosophy as true 
justified belief rather than as an information carrying mental state. 
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Another objection is made by Wittgenstein in his analysis of GAME.
2
  He claims 
that the features used to classify things as games are not necessary for membership.  For 
instance, involving the use of a ball is not a feature because chess and poker are games 
that do not include the use of a ball.  Involving two or more people is not a necessary 
characteristic due to games such as solitaire that are played by oneself.  Rather than 
having a definition, Wittgenstein suggests that we classify things as games based on his 
aforementioned family resemblance, which, as previously stated, is the main 
philosophical influence for the prototype view. 
Another objection against the classical view is related to the typicality effects in 
prototype studies.  While psychologists such as Piaget have assumed definitionism to be 
true, typicality effects have put this theory in serious jeopardy.  In positing that we have 
in mind necessary and sufficient features when representing a category, the classical view 
predicts that the members of a category should be considered as equal tokens, where no 
member is considered to be a better or more typical instance of the class.  After all, in 
order to be a member, all must equally satisfy the strict definition.  However, as 
previously mentioned, cognitive scientists have discovered that for concrete concepts, 
there are such typicality effects or graded membership, where members do stand in a 
graded relationship with each other.  This is not predicted by definitionism, and such 
effects actually stand as contrary to the equal membership definitionism predicts.  
Moreover, the inability of definitionism to explain typicality effects also includes its 
                                                     
2 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical. 
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inability to explain how typical members are categorized more quickly than atypical 
ones.  While views such as the prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory can provide an 
explanation for such phenomena, the classical theory cannot. 
Second, researchers have discovered through prototype studies that human beings 
do not use definitions in the higher cognitive competences, at least for non-mathematical 
and non-logical concepts.  For instance, prototype studies have shown that subjects 
frequently list features of members of a category that are not necessary and sufficient 
qualities.  For example, members of the bird class may have the features flies, sings, and 
has wings, but these qualities are not individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an 
individual to classify an object under bird.  An object may still be classified as a bird 
even though it has lost its wings and does not fly or sing.  Given that the features 
attributed to members of a class are not necessary and sufficient conditions and that there 
is no evidence for definitionism, cognitive science has shown that humans generally do 
not use definitions in the higher cognitive competences.   
The above psychology-based arguments lead to the generally held conclusion that 
definitions most likely are not psychologically real.  Now, some may claim that humans 
psychologically still do have definitional knowledge as well as some other body of 
knowledge such as prototypes.  Recall that several of the early hybrid theories such as 
Osherson and Smith’s are set up to make this claim.  Remember that for them, prototype 
features are used in fast categorization, but when one must really classify things 
correctly, definitions are used.  However, from a psychological standpoint, it has been 
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shown that the classical view does not partake in the scientific explanation of concept 
phenomena such as categorization and typicality effects.  Moreover, psychology studies 
have been successfully conducted in which opposite predictions from that of 
definitionism are born out.  The claim that a hybrid theory that contains definitionism 
may be correct and that we still have definitional knowledge is empty in that there 
currently is no evidence for the psychological reality of classical structure, and it plays no 
role in the scientific explanation and prediction of psychological data.  Now, some 
philosophers such as Rey escape this psychological reality objection by claiming that the 
classical view is in regards to correct concepts rather than conceptions.  However, as 
mentioned, our primary concern here is only in regard to conception theories, and such a 
move by Rey need not be addressed. 
If the classical view is not viable for moral concepts due to such above related 
reasons, some may argue that through further reflection upon our moral beliefs we 
psychologically may be able to arrive upon components that represent necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  While this remains a possibility, as it also does with concrete 
concepts, given the numerous prototype studies to be discussed below, there is no 
scientific evidence consistent with PAC to justify the expectation that this may be so.  As 
it will be shown that the classical view currently plays no role in scientific explanation 
and prediction in our moral psychologies, even though it may be possible that future 
studies will demonstrate the viability of definitionism, a level of doubt may be 
established against this theory such that we are warranted through inference to the best 
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explanation in concluding that a classical structure for moral concepts is most likely not 
psychologically real.  This conclusion is further supported by the previously mentioned 
fact that for over two thousand years, we have not yet arrived upon a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for moral terms. 
In the following section, we will see positive evidence for moral concepts that, 
like concrete concepts, produce typicality effects and that show that subjects do not use 
or rely on definitions for categorization.  Such evidence, as previously indicated, will be 
taken to provide the ammunition for making arguments against definitionism for moral 
concepts.   
 
3.2  The Arguments for Prototype Theory 
A few philosophers have adopted the prototype theory as a viable view for moral 
concepts.  For instance, Paul Churchland, in A Neurocomputational Perspective, can be 
read as providing an account of moral concept acquisition by positing the existence of 
moral prototypes.
3
  Churchland argues that learning about morality is more about 
learning how rather than a matter of learning that.  In other words, moral concept 
acquisition is about learning how to recognize various complex situations and how to 
appropriately respond to them by way of an at times long and painful process of social 
learning rather than by applying abstract moral principles.  On this view, certain moral 
                                                     
3 Paul Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1992), 297-
303. 
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situations will activate prototypes given the situation’s similarity to one’s previous 
experiences and training in other moral situations.  Through social experience and further 
development, a child’s moral prototype and practical wisdom can change and expand by 
being impacted by factors such as how society expects them to react to certain situations.  
For instance, a child may be guided in life primarily by self-interest.  However, later the 
child comes to realize that her society generally expects her to take into consideration 
others’ feelings and interests in certain moral scenarios.  Fully taking into account other 
people’s considerations leads to a change in her moral prototypes.   
While the enthusiasm and insight of applying the prototype theory to moral 
concepts is duly noted, Churchland does not support the fact that moral concepts have 
prototype structure with the appropriate evidence that is required from PAC.  Remember 
that PAC requires as a matter of precaution that all abstract concepts must have 
experimental support specifically in regards to the particular abstract concept in question 
in order to make any claims about its conceptual structure.  For example, no experimental 
studies on moral concepts are cited in Churchland’s work to warrant the claim that moral 
concepts have prototype structure.  Thus, his prototype conclusion in-and-of-itself is 
unjustified based on PAC. 
While most experimental work on prototype theory has generally focused on 
concrete concepts, there are a handful of studies on certain concepts that do not appear to 
be straightforwardly moral concepts but may be somehow related to them.  For example, 
Linda Coleman and Paul Kay have run a study that illustrates prototype structure for the 
 109 
concept LIE.
4
  The issue with LIE is that it appears to be a concept that has components 
that are in some way or another merely about descriptive acts.  Therefore, LIE may not 
itself be a normative concept.  There does not appear to be any explicit rightness or 
wrongness associated with the concept LIE, as opposed to if LIE is a constituent in the 
judgment, ONE OUGHT NOT LIE, where this entire thought itself is about a normative 
principle.  It will be important to keep this potential problem in mind while we examine 
Coleman and Kay’s studies.  Now, this initial test is replicated and supported by two 
further experiments on the concept by Eve Sweetser on the one hand and Abigail 
Strichartz and Roger Burton on the other.
5
  In the Coleman and Kay experiment, they ran 
a study to see if the following features that are represented by the constituent components 
of LIE are defining necessary and sufficient conditions or whether they are a summary 
representation of features for folk in determining when a particular act is a lie: 
 1)  P is false. 
 2)  S believes P to be false. 
 3)  In uttering P, S intends to deceive A.
6
 
 
Thus, in essence, they tested for falsehood, deliberate falsehood, and intent to 
deceive.  They provided participants with a host of situations that contained eight various 
combinations of the three given features; features that may be present or absent in the 
                                                     
4Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, “Prototype Semantics:  The English Word Lie,” Language 57:1 
(March 1981), 26-44.   
5 Eve Sweetser, “The definition of lie:  An examination of the folk models underlying a semantic 
prototype,” in Cultural Models in Language and Thought, ed. D. Holland and N. Quinn (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43-66.  Abigail Strichartz and Roger Burton, “Lies and Truth:  
A study of the Development of the Concept,” Child Development 61:1:  (Feb., 1990), 211-20. 
6Coleman and Kay, Ibid. 
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various combinations, where subjects were asked to circle whether the situation is a lie, is 
not a lie, or unknown.  They were also questioned on the typicality of each situation as an 
instance of lying or not lying.  Coleman and Kay found that the more of the three features 
of lying that a situation contained, the more typical or better instance of a lie the situation 
is deemed to be.  Moreover, they discovered weighted features, where 2) is the most 
heavily weighted and 3) is next in importance.  Strichartz and Burton, who were able to 
successfully replicate this study, also discovered that the weight placed on each of the 
features differs based on age or maturity.
7
  Also, situations that contained any variation of 
two of the features tended to have a mean score where such situations are still considered 
as lies.  Typicality effects, weighted features, and the fact that the three given features are 
not held to be necessary and sufficient conditions for determining category membership 
leads to the conclusion that LIE has prototype rather than definitional structure. 
Another study in which the concept in question may or may not be a moral 
concept is Hampton’s aforementioned study on abstract concepts that examined the 
concept CRIME.
8
  This too, like LIE, initially appears to have components that are only 
about a descriptive kind of act.  He was able to produce typicality effects and reach the 
conclusion that CRIME has prototype structure.  By way of a feature listing task where 
participants list what features they think belong to a category, he was able to discover that 
participants associated features such as an act, adverse effect on victim, and is done 
                                                     
7Stichartz and Burton, Ibid. 
8 Hampton, “An Investigation of the Nature of Abstract Concepts.” 
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deliberately with the abstract category crime, where such features have different weights 
and account for typicality effects.  Furthermore, such features are not necessary and 
sufficient conditions for determining category membership based on the fact that some 
situations are deemed to be crimes, but they do not satisfy all of the perceived features of 
crime.     
The question now is whether the perceivably descriptive prototype concepts LIE 
and CRIME are in fact normative moral concepts that have prototype structure.  For, if 
they are, then this shows that in some cases prototype theory is a viable theory of moral 
concepts.  Mark Johnson argues that specifically LIE is in fact a moral concept that has 
prototype structure.
9
  He makes this claim based on Sweetser’s insight that the prototype 
structure of LIE is dependent on one’s background knowledge or what George Lakoff’s 
calls an idealized cognitive model.
10
  As Lakoff contends, “category structures and 
prototype effects are by-products of [idealized cognitive models].”11  Idealized cognitive 
models are structural organizations of our background knowledge, where such models are 
themselves exercised in the higher cognitive competences.  They are similar to a complex 
version of the theory-theory of concepts in that they associate general background 
knowledge and beliefs with a concept.  Idealized cognitive models or organized 
abstracted background beliefs and information we have acquired through our experience 
with the world becomes selected during cognition based on the context or situation we 
                                                     
9 Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination, (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 95-98. 
10George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
11Ibid., 68. 
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find ourselves in.  Such knowledge may be in the form of imaginative structures that help 
us make order and sense out of the world by aiding us in such things as categorization 
and concept combination.  Moreover, such knowledge provides a way for us to evaluate 
certain circumstances and judgments based on our previous social experiences.  Lakoff 
claims that idealized cognitive models underwrite the prototype structure of concepts.   
Johnson claims that LIE is dependent on the idealized cognitive model of 
“ordinary communication.” This cognitive model may account for the fact that 
communication is even possible.  Thus, such a cognitive model provides the requisite 
background information when we converse with others, such that we have the proper 
expectations that in normal conversations we may assume such things as that the truth 
will normally be told among human beings given that we do not always have to worry 
that any and every person we talk to could very well be lying to us.  Thus, we have: 
The Idealized Cognitive Model of “Ordinary Communication” 
(1)  People intend to help rather than harm one another.    
(2)  Truthful information is helpful. 
(3)  The speaker intends to help the hearer by sharing information. 
(4)  A Speaker who knowingly communicates false information intends to   
        harm the hearer.
12
 
 
Since the cognitive model of “ordinary communication” accounts for the 
background beliefs (1)-(4) that most people have with respects to lie and the prototype 
effects for LIE are grounded in this cognitive model as well, Johnson claims that LIE is a 
moral normative concept.   
                                                     
12Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. 
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[W]e need only remind ourselves why lying is usually considered to be a bad 
 thing to do.  The answer is that lying is typically harmful to others.  But notice 
 that the relevant notion of harm is partially specified by the idealized cognitive 
 model of ORDINARY COMMUNICATION.  A notion of helping and harming is 
 built into that model.  Therefore, to the extent that our determination of what 
 counts as a lie in a particular situation depends on the idealized cognitive model 
 of ORDINARY COMMUNICATION, our understanding of lie is inextricably 
 tied up with an evaluative notion of help and harm.
13
 
 
Johnson may be on the right track here in that he appears to want to bring in the 
notion of the moral wrongness of harming others as part of “ordinary communication.”  
Insofar as there is some connection between the prototype of LIE and the idealized 
cognitive model, LIE may then be considered to be a normative moral concept that has 
prototype structure.  However, the first problem is that if we closely examine the four 
beliefs in the idealized cognitive model for “ordinary communication,” we still do not see 
anything explicitly normative.  The concepts HELPING and HARMING, by themselves, 
may be thought of as merely being about a descriptive class of acts that have to do with 
alleviating or instigating physical or psychological harm from or to another human being, 
respectively.  Therefore, since there is no explicit notion of moral wrongness in (1)-(4), it 
still may not be the case that LIE is a moral concept. 
Second and what is even more problematic is that since the idealized cognitive 
model is claimed to be one of the fundamental structures of the abstract concept LIE, no 
experimental evidence consistent with PAC is given to indicate that LIE has such a 
structure.  Idealized cognitive models such as “ordinary communication” are purported 
                                                     
13 Johnson, 95-96. 
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structural aspects of LIE, but no empirical data on this potential moral concept has been 
collected to warrant this assertion.  Rather, such a conclusion is blindly given based on 
concrete concept studies and speculation, which is in violation of PAC.  Therefore, 
insofar as idealized cognitive models underwrite the prototype structure of moral 
concepts and supposedly allows LIE to be a moral concept, Johnson’s claim that LIE is a 
moral concept does not satisfy PAC, and he does not have the appropriate evidence to 
show that it is a moral concept. 
The question still remains as to whether LIE may be shown to be a moral concept 
in a manner where the concept has prototype structure.   In this way, we may conclude 
that the prototype theory is a viable theory for some moral concepts.  In order to 
accomplish this, we will need to bring in the aid of Bernard Williams and his discussion 
of thin and thick moral concepts; a view which is influenced by John McDowell.
14
  
Williams argues that there are thin moral concepts which appear to be purely normative 
such as RIGHT, GOOD, BAD, and OUGHT.  On the other hand, there exist thick concepts 
that have both a normative and descriptive component to them; components that are not 
separable and are culturally formed.  Williams does explicitly list LIE as a thick concept 
among others such as PROMISE, BRUTALITY, COURAGE, and GRATITUDE.15  For example, 
LIE has a descriptive or factual component in that such a component is typically about a 
                                                     
14Bernard, Williams,Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press), 1985.  John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 52:  (1978); “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 62: (1979). 
15Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 140. 
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particular kind of verbal act of deception and members of a particular community that 
have this concept can point out when an instance of lying has occurred.  However, it also 
has a normative or value component that is about “oughtness” which provides reasons for 
action that generally one ought not to lie.  It is contended that these features the two 
components represent are necessarily intertwined and inseparable in that they are 
represented by the components of culturally-conditioned concepts, where, as McDowell 
argues, an outside observer of a community cannot fully pick up and understand the 
features represented by the descriptive component of a community’s thick moral concepts 
without also imaginatively grasping the features represented by the normative evaluative 
component of the concept.  Thus, Williams and McDowell argue that the fact/value 
distinction has not been found or discovered in the concepts and language of ethics, but 
rather, it has been artificially brought there by the minds of philosophers such as R. M. 
Hare.
16
  What we can see here is that even though lie first appears to have features 
pertaining to descriptive acts, it generally is thought to have a negative normative feature 
attached to it in the United States, where there is an initial defeasible presumption that 
acts of lying are wrong.  Something similar to this may be at work for promise as well, 
albeit in a positive normative sense.  It is this normative aspect that is represented by the 
components of LIE that allows LIE to be a proper thick moral concept.   
Given that it has been determined that LIE has a prototype structure and that it 
may be a thick moral concept where members of a community that acquire the concept 
                                                     
16R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1982). 
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understand it to have components that are about descriptive and normative features, we 
should expect that experimentally, at least one of the components of the prototype for LIE 
will be about a moral normative feature.  However, the three prototype studies for LIE are 
not feature listing tasks where participants list what features they believe belong to the 
category a concept represents.  Rather, the possible features for the class are already 
preconceived by the experimenters and given to the participants with no room for 
expansion.  The predetermined features for lie are not explicitly normative features.  
Thus, we cannot know for certain whether participants attributed a normative moral 
feature to the class.  However, Hampton’s feature listing task study for crime, which was 
run in the U.S., did show that the corresponding concept had prototype structure in which 
one of the features for crime frequently listed by participants appears to be morally 
normative:  breaks the moral and social code.  While MORAL is typically understood to 
be a normative concept which would mean that CRIME must itself then be a normative 
concept since it is in part constituted by MORAL, one may object that perhaps BREAKS 
THE MORAL CODE is being understood in an anthropological sense where it is merely a 
neutral descriptive thought had by participants of what a culture thinks about a crime.  
While this is a possibility, we will later examine a study on HIGHLY MORAL PERSON.  
While this compound concept also contains the concept MORAL albeit in a different 
context as compared to the case we are presently examining, what constitutes this 
compound concept may help us to inductively infer whether the folk generally understand 
BREAKS THE MORAL CODE to be a normative rather than an anthropological component 
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of CRIME.  The study on HIGHLY MORAL PERSON found that most participants’ concepts 
contained what are usually thought to be normative virtue concepts such as HAS 
INTEGRITY and HONORABLE.  It also contained concepts such as EXEMPLARY and 
RESPECTED that imply that one ought to imitate highly moral individuals because they are 
praiseworthy.  Moreover, if subjects viewed morality to be anthropologically descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, then we should expect their components of HIGHLY MORAL 
PERSON to contain complex concepts such as FOR OUR CULTURE, FOR THIS SOCIETY, or 
something to this effect that qualifies the components this concept may have.  However, 
no such anthropological qualifiers were found.  Based on the fact that most participants’ 
HIGHLY MORAL PERSON concept is constituted by what are typically thought to be 
normative concepts, concepts of or related to ought-to-be-pursuedness, and that there are 
no relevant anthropological qualifications to the components of the compound, it appears 
that a reasonable inductive inference may be made that when simply moving from 
thoughts concerning MORAL PERSONS to MORAL CODES, the thought BREAKS THE 
MORAL CODE may likely be understood to also have like normative components mutatis 
mutandis rather than anthropologically descriptive ones.  Naturally, a stronger inference 
may be made if the same subjects used in Hampton’s CRIME study were also used in the 
HIGHLY MORAL PERSON experiment or if Hampton’s study directly questioned the nature 
of BREAKS THE MORAL CODE.  While such studies have not been conducted, given the 
present circumstances, a moderate inference still may be made that allows us to conclude 
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that it is likely that participants in Hampton’s study for CRIME think of BREAKS THE 
MORAL CODE in a normative rather than anthropological light. 
Therefore, in this fashion, since CRIME may now be shown to be a thick moral 
concept,
17
 Williams’ contention for dual components to thick concepts is to a certain 
extent empirically vindicated.  Given that CRIME is a thick culturally-formed moral 
concept with a component that represents a moral normative feature and that it has 
prototype structure, we may conclude that some moral concepts have prototype structure, 
although it has not been empirically proven nor need it be proven for our purposes that 
the dual components are inextricably linked.  All that needs to be shown is that there is a 
normative component to CRIME which then qualifies it as a thick moral concept in the 
U.S. and most likely in other cultures as well that view crimes in a negative normative 
light.  Nothing need be said here about whether the normative component is in principle 
separable from the descriptive component.  Furthermore, a predictive inference may be 
drawn that if a feature listing task for lie is actually conducted, a statistically frequent 
moral normative feature will most likely be given by subjects since it is the case that such 
a feature has been discovered to exist for crime.   
Also, notice that the given conclusion that the prototype theory is a viable theory 
of moral concepts has remained true to PAC.  By using experimental data on certain 
specific abstract thick concepts that initially appear to refer to only a descriptive class of 
                                                     
17 As will be clarified in the fourth chapter, that moral concepts have prototype and exemplar 
structure is a prima facie claim. 
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acts along with the application of philosophical argument regarding such concepts, we 
have discovered that some moral concepts have prototype structure.   
At this juncture, I will introduce several experiments on specific concepts that are 
more clearly within the moral domain.  Jennifer Frei and Phillip Shaver have run a study 
on the abstract concept RESPECTFUL TO A PARTNER, which may be considered to be more 
directly a moral concept in that it is a compound virtue concept.
18
  This study found that 
this compound concept is constituted by such things as SENSITIVE TO FEELINGS, FOSTERS 
EQUALITY, CARING, and LISTENS TO MY VIEWPOINT.  Typicality effects were discovered 
for this complex concept.  Furthermore, the list of features was not taken by participants 
to be necessary and sufficient conditions for determining whether a potential member 
belonged to the category.  Hence, insofar as RESPECTFUL TO A PARTNER is a moral virtue 
concept with prototype structure, this provides further evidence that prototype theory is a 
viable theory for moral concepts.
19
 
                                                     
18 Jennifer Frei and Phillip Shaver, “Respect in close relationships:  Prototype definition, self-
report assessment, and initial correlates,” Personal Relationships 9: (2002), 121-39. 
19On an aside, since virtues have been found to have prototype structure, such a structure may be 
able to explain why Aristotle believes that some mean virtues appear to lean closer to one 
extreme rather than another.  In providing the doctrine of the mean in the Nichomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle claims that virtues are means that lie between two vices of deficiency and excess.  For 
example, courage lies between the two extremes of cowardice and rashness.  However, some 
virtues appear to be closer to one extreme rather than the other.  For instance, courage appears to 
be closer to rashness than cowardice.  “E.g., since rashness is thought liker and nearer to courage, 
and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further 
from the intermediate are thought more contrary to it.”  Aristotle contends that the mean is 
difficult to hit, so at times we should aim for the excess vice that appears closer to the mean.  
Prototype structure for virtues may explain why one extreme for a particular virtue appears 
closer to it rather than the other extreme because the closer extreme shares more prototypical and 
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Also, in a separate study, Lawrence Walker and Karl Hennig, in a feature-listing 
task, discovered prototype structure for compound concepts that contained virtues.
20
  
Specifically they discovered prototype structure for JUST PERSON, BRAVE PERSON, and 
CARING PERSON.  For instance, for JUST PERSON, they found that some of the statistically 
frequent components were LISTENS TO ALL SIDES, FAIR, MORAL, and TRUTHFUL.  For 
BRAVE PERSON, some of the statistically frequent components were HEROIC, FACES 
DANGER, STANDS UP FOR BELIEFS, and GALLANT.  For CARING PERSON, some of those 
components that passed the production frequency measure to be summary representation 
components were SYMPATHETIC, GOOD-HEARTED, LOVING, and NURTURING.  Common 
to many prototype theories, for all three compound concepts, they discovered that some 
of the components were weighted as more important than others.  Thus, a potential 
member will be categorized in a class if she matches the features represented by the 
heavily weighted components even though she does not match the features represented by 
the lower weighted components.  Given that components of the compounds are weighted 
and do not represent necessary and sufficient features, this lends evidence to the 
conclusion that such moral concepts have prototype structure. 
                                                     
 
more heavily weighted features and is more similar to the mean as compared to the opposing 
extreme.  Whether this is or is not the case will be left for others to decide and examine. 
20 Lawrence Walker and Karl Hennig, “Differing Conceptions of Moral Exemplarity:  Just, Brave, 
and Caring,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86:  (2004), 629-647. 
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Lawrence Walker and Russell Pitts were able to discover prototype structure for a 
complex concept that contains a thin moral concept.
21
  The complex concept in question 
is the aforementioned HIGHLY MORAL PERSON.  They asked participants to freely list any 
attributes members of such a category may have.  Through a production frequency 
measure, they found that some of the statistically frequent features subjects listed were:  
has clear values, self-disciplined, principled, exemplary, maintains high standards, and 
has integrity.  Moreover, they also discovered that of the statistically frequent qualities, 
certain ones were deemed to be more heavily weighted than others.  Moreover, the 
qualities were not taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions in categorization.  
Given that the statistically frequent features are weighted and are not taken to be 
necessary and sufficient conditions, this provides evidence that HIGHLY MORAL PERSON 
has prototype structure. 
Finally, Kyle Smith, et al., in a cross-cultural study, have determined that there is 
prototype structure for GOOD PERSON.
22
  This feature-listing task experiment spanned 
seven different cultures including Chamorro, Filipino, Taiwanese, Turkish, U.S., 
Venezuelan, and Palauan participants in which weighted statistically frequent features 
that are represented by prototypes and that are not necessary and sufficient conditions 
were discovered in all of the cultures.  Here, our experimenters claim that cultures varied 
                                                     
21 Lawrence Walker and Russell Pitts, “Naturalistic Conceptions of Moral Maturity,” 
Developmental Psychology 34:  (1998), 403-418. 
22 K. Smith, S. Smith, and J. Christopher, “What Defines the Good Person?  Cross-Cultural 
Comparisons of Experts’ Models With Lay Prototypes,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 38:  
(2007), 333-360. 
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substantially in terms of which features they have in mind when representing GOOD 
PERSON.  For example, a couple of heavily weighted components generally held for 
people in the U. S. are CARING and HONEST.  These components were not contained 
within the set of heavily weighted components for the GOOD PERSON concept for the 
Taiwanese.  Rather, their respective concept was constituted by heavily weighted 
components such as INDEPENDENT and TOLERANT; components not contained within the 
set of heavily weighted components for the GOOD PERSON concept for people from the 
U.S.  Given all of the above studies that in part contained concepts such as GOOD, 
MORAL, JUST, CRIME, and BRAVE, we now may inductively infer that moral concepts 
generally do have prototype structure. 
The viability of the prototype theory for moral concepts sits well with concept 
acquisition, which is the capacity to acquire concepts.  The concept acquisition and 
categorization desiderata can be thought of as two sides of the same psychological 
phenomenon – our disposition to put individual items into classes.  If we have acquired a 
concept, then we can categorize items as members of the extension of the concept.  
Likewise, if we can use a concept to categorize, then at some point we have acquired the 
concept with its concomitant bodies of knowledge.  We have already discussed numerous 
prototype categorization studies that show that various moral concepts are constituted by 
prototypes.  Such studies may also be used to demonstrate that we acquire prototype 
knowledge at some point in moral education.  The previously discussed prototype 
categorization studies show that we acquire prototype bodies of knowledge.  
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 Also, one may wonder whether the rules and reasons for action we acquire are 
necessary and sufficient conditions or whether they are represented by prototypes.  
However, as previously discussed in this chapter, we have found that there are pervasive 
typicality effects for moral concepts.  As previously shown, such typicality effects along 
with the fact that for well over two thousand years we have yet to reach any consensus on 
the definition of moral terms allows us to infer that the classical view is not 
psychologically real and that the knowledge acquired is prototype rather than definitional 
bodies of knowledge. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter regarding the illustration of the prototype 
view, with the acquisition of things such as rules, one’s prototype BEING GOOD concept 
through moral education may be constituted by DO NOT MAKE OTHERS FEEL BAD, DO 
NOT HIT OTHERS, and DO NOT LIE.  Here, on the prototype view, components will be 
weighted where there will be graded membership.  For example, DO NOT HIT OTHERS 
may weigh more in terms of importance for a child than DO NOT LIE because, for 
example, the child receives more punishment for hitting others than lying or the child’s 
parents and teachers more strongly emphasize that hitting others is bad.  Therefore, in this 
case, the child will judge acts of striking others as more seriously bad than acts of being 
dishonest.   
Also, the components will not represent necessary and sufficient conditions.  For 
example, while there are various formulations of normative ethical theories, a normative 
theorist may claim that a necessary condition for categorizing an act as being good may 
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be that the act must match one of the features represented by the components of one’s 
BEING GOOD concept.  Therefore, when a child witnesses an act of another classmate not 
retaliating against a playmate who hit him, the child may categorize it as an instance of 
being good since the act matches the features do not hit others and do not make others 
feel bad.  This satisfies the necessary condition.  However, ex hypothesi, these features 
are not taken to be sufficient conditions in that the child knows that in certain 
circumstances it is permissible to hit others, such as when being kidnapped by a stranger.  
To note, this example is meant to be just a reminder to the reader from the second chapter 
of how prototype structured concepts may look like and operate.  As previously 
discussed, the primary refutation in this chapter of any kind of classical structured view 
of moral concepts does not come by way of analyzing such a hypothetical case but in part 
by way of experimentally-based typicality effects, such as those found by Smith’s 
aforementioned prototype study for GOOD PERSON that was in part run on adolescents 
and by Strichartz & Burton’s previously discussed prototype study for the thick concept 
LIE that was conducted on nursery school, preschool, and first and fifth graders.  It is 
from such studies as well as a plethora of other prototype experiments that have been 
previously discussed in this chapter that allow us to infer that children and adults do not 
have classically structured moral concepts. 
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3.3  The Prototype-Exemplar Chain Argument for the Exemplar Theory  
A host of philosophers have claimed that moral concepts have exemplar structure.  
For example, Goldman, Stich, and Clark have done so along with suggesting that ethical 
concepts also may have prototype structure.
23
  Wong has gone a little further by explicitly 
claiming that there is a pluralism between exemplar and prototype structures for moral 
concepts.
24
  Prinz, in Furnishing the Mind, has also claimed that there is exemplar 
structure for ethical concepts.
25
  However, the problem with the above thinkers is that 
none have provided evidence consistent with PAC that exemplar theory is a viable theory 
for moral concepts, let alone have the select authors who also have adopted the prototype 
view given such relevant data for it.
26
 
There are no psychology studies explicitly showing exemplar structure for moral 
concepts.  Thus, initially it appears that there is doubt as to whether it may be shown that 
exemplar theory is a viable theory of moral concepts in a manner that is consistent with 
PAC.  Nevertheless, it may still be shown that exemplar theory is a viable theory of moral 
concepts without exemplar studies.  In order to accomplish this feat, we will need to 
introduce a style of argument in the concepts literature that I call chain arguments.  Chain 
                                                     
23 Stephen Stich, “Moral Philosophy and Mental Representation,” The Origin of Values,  Ed. by 
Hechter, M., Nadel, L., and Michod, R.  New York:  Aldine de Gruyer, 1993, pp. 215-228.Alvin 
Goldman, “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” Ethics Vol. 103 (Jan 1993), 337-360.  Andy Clark, 
“Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem Solving,” in Mind and Morals, ed. 
by L. May, M. Friedman, and A. Clark, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1996). 
24Wong, ibid. 
25Prinz, Furnishing the Mind. 
26 Clark supports his prototype contention by citing Johnson, but as we have seen, Johnson’s 
prototype argument is problematic on several accounts. 
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arguments are claims that if one structure of concepts is already established as being 
viable, then based on this fact, a different concept structure may be established as being 
viable.  It is called a chain argument because the established concept structure is linked or 
chained to another concept structure such that this latter concept structure represents a 
viable theory of concepts based on the viable existence of the first established concept 
structure.  The argument at hand is the prototype-exemplar chain argument.   
This argument begins by acknowledging that as previously stated, a prototype is 
an abstracted summary representation of features for a category, and it has been shown in 
the previous section that through empirical tests and philosophical reasoning, some moral 
concepts do have prototype structure.  Remember that it has been established that some 
moral concepts such as CRIME, HIGHLY MORAL PERSON, RESPECT, and JUST PERSON 
have prototype structure. However, given that a prototype is a summary representation of 
features, it takes several experiences with instances of moral actions, cases, or encounters 
with virtuous agents to arrive upon a summary representation of, for example, JUST 
PERSON.  Thus, there is a point in early childhood where we do not have enough 
experiences to form a summary representation.   If we do not have a prototype for JUST 
PERSON yet in early childhood but we will at a later point, then at this earlier time, we 
must be relying on representations of specific agents or, in other words, conceptual 
exemplars for filling out the concept of JUST PERSON.  In this fashion, we can see that 
there is a chain linking prototype theory to exemplar theory because if some moral 
concepts have prototype structure, then it is the case that at some earlier stage, moral 
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concepts such as those examined in the prototype theory section of this chapter, have 
exemplar structure.
27
  Thus, prototype theory, by way of concept acquisition, has built 
into the theory the existence of exemplar structure at some earlier time.
28
 
 
3.4  The Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman Objection 
For the remainder of this chapter, we will entertain two objections to the 
prototype and/or exemplar theories.  A well-known objection against the prototype and 
exemplar views attacks the typicality effects that these theories are built to account for.  
Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman have run experiments on mathematical concepts 
such as EVEN NUMBER that are thought to have classical structure.
29
  However, they 
found that such concepts also showed typicality effects, where participants believed that 
numbers such as 4 and 8 are more typical of the class even number than 34 and 106.  
They argue that since there are typicality effects for concepts that people do have 
definitions for, such effects do not provide evidence concerning the structure of concepts.  
In other words, prototypes and exemplars are posited, in part, to account for typicality 
effects.  Due to typicality effects, prototype and exemplar theorists, in part, have drawn 
                                                     
27This point that prototype theory acknowledges the viability of the exemplar view has been 
anticipated by the likes of Murphy and Wong. Gregory L. Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts, 
(Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press), 2002.  Wong, Ibid. 
28It is also noteworthy to mention that when one has had enough experiences with exemplars to 
form a summary representation, it is highly unlikely that one’s exemplars of a moral category 
will simply disappear.  While there may be a debatable issue in regards to our memory capacity 
for retaining exemplars, when a prototype is formed, it is also the case that we will still have 
exemplars as well.  
29Armstrong, ibid. 
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structural conclusions regarding concepts.  Yet, since EVEN NUMBER has classical 
structure and is composed of DIVISIBLE BY TWO WITHOUT REMAINDER rather than 
having prototype or exemplar structure and it also shows typicality effects, such effects 
are not an indication or pertinent to the determination of the structure of concepts.  
Therefore, typicality effects do not show that concepts have prototype or exemplar 
structure.  This argument attacks one means for showing that the prototype and exemplar 
theory are viable views of concepts. 
The problem with this objection is that Armstrong, et al. have not tested for 
whether EVEN NUMBER indeed does have classical structure or not.  If eternal correct 
mathematical concepts rather than conceptions are really platonic abstract objects, it is 
the case that the platonic correct concept has a definition.  Nevertheless, is it the case that 
the psychological conception of EVEN NUMBER in the minds of fallible human beings has 
classical structure?  They have assumed without evidence that it does.  However, given 
that EVEN NUMBER is an abstract conception, they have not provided evidence consistent 
with PAC that it does have such a structure, nor have they provided relevant data that it 
only has such a constitution.  Therefore, we cannot confidently state that it does, and their 
objection is inconclusive barring further evidence.   
For, it very well could be the case that there is a mathematical concept pluralism, 
where mathematical concepts have several viable structures open to them.  It may be the 
case that there is no one grand theory of concepts in the mathematical domain and several 
concept theories are viable in this realm as well.  For instance, Lakoff and Nunez, in 
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Where Mathematics Comes From, have already argued in a manner consistent with PAC 
that mathematical concepts are constituted by theory-theory metaphorical background 
knowledge.
30
  For instance, Lakoff and Nunez claim that the metaphor, ‘a set is a 
container,’ when mentally represented, may play a role in the higher competences.  Thus, 
they argue that SET is constituted by CONTAINERS, and NUMBERS are constituted by the 
metaphorical background knowledge relation of ARE OBJECT COLLECTIONS AND POINTS 
ON A LINE.  Thus, for example, it may be the case that our concept of EVEN NUMBER may 
have classical, prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory structure.  When given 
categorization tasks that test for typicality effects, our prototype or perhaps exemplar 
concept knowledge is used, but when given other tests, the classical concept knowledge 
may be at play.  Much of this is mere speculation that is not based on evidence consistent 
with PAC, but since Armstrong, et al. have not shown that EVEN NUMBER has classical 
structure nor that it only has such a structure and there is evidence that mathematical 
concepts have a non-classical constitution, I am illustrating a possibility of how an 
overall pluralistic theory of mathematical concepts can account for Armstrong, et al.’s 
particular typicality findings.  The bottom line is that in order for their objection to work, 
they need to provide evidence consistent with PAC that mathematical concepts such as 
EVEN NUMBER have definitional structure and that such concepts also do not have 
prototype or exemplar structure.  So long as this has not been done, their objection cannot 
                                                     
30 George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, Where Mathematics Comes From, (New York:  Basic Books), 
2001. 
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come to fruition, and there is always the possibility that a mathematical pluralism may 
account for their findings and that typicality effects are indeed an indication of prototype 
or exemplar structure.  Therefore, based on PAC, their contention against the prototype 
and exemplar theories and typicality effects is to date unfounded. 
In response, they may claim that in their third series of experiments, they found 
that a different group of participants believed that EVEN NUMBER does have a strict 
definitional structure.  They asked these new participants:  “Does it make sense to rate 
items in this category for degree of membership in the category?”31  The experimenters 
then defined what ‘degree of membership’ means: 
“It makes sense to rate items for degree of membership in a category if the items 
 meet the criteria required for membership to a different degree.  It does not make 
 sense to rate items for degree of membership in a category if all the items meet 
 the criteria required for membership to the same degree; that is, if the items are 
 literally either in or out of the category.”32   
 
They found that most subjects believed that items that are fruits, vegetables, and 
vehicles can be rated by degree of membership, but all participants believed that 
members of the class even number cannot be rated by degree.  This may suggest that all 
participants believed that their concept EVEN NUMBER has classical structure.  Armstrong 
and company may argue that since subjects believe that EVEN NUMBER has a definition, it 
must be the case that it does in fact have a definitional structure.  The problem with this is 
that this third study does not test for whether EVEN NUMBER has classical structure.  For, 
                                                     
31 Armstrong, 242. 
32  Armstrong, 242. 
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one can believe that one’s concept has a particular structure, but it does not then follow 
that one’s concept actually does have this structure.  Empirical tests concretely may show 
that one’s concept really does not have this structure but rather has some other 
constitution.  For example, I can believe my concept of BELIEF has prototype structure, 
but Hampton’s aforementioned test on abstract concepts in the first chapter indicates that 
I may be mistaken and that my BELIEF concept most likely may not have such a 
constitution.  Thus, at most, all their third experiment shows is that participants have the 
belief that their concept EVEN NUMBER has definitional structure.  This third experiment 
does not provide evidence that EVEN NUMBER actually has classical structure.   
 
3.5  The Exemplar Theory Objection to Prototype Theory 
For concrete concepts, several exemplar theorists have claimed the superiority of 
their own view over the prototype theory such that we may discount the latter view.
33
  
For example, the first of two problems, inter alia, for the prototype theory is that old 
familiar particular members are categorized more quickly and accurately than new 
potential members despite the fact that they both are equally typical members based on 
                                                     
33Medin and Schaffer, ibid.  W. Wattenmaker, G. Dewey, T. Murphy, and D. Medin, “Linear 
separability and concept learning:  context, relational properties, and concept naturalness,” 
Cognitive Psychology 18:  (1986), 158-194.  G. Murphy and A. Kaplan, “Feature distribution and 
background knowledge in category learning,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A:  
Human Experimental Psychology 53A:  (2000), 962-982.   
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the prototype view.
34
  For instance, I can more easily classify my Rottweiler as a dog than 
a Dalmatian, Dalmatians being a kind of dog that I have never seen before, even though 
they both are equally typical.  The prototype view claims that categorization is based on 
an item’s similarity to a list of statistically frequent features rather than on previously 
experienced particular instances.  Hence, if two items are equally typical members on the 
prototype view, then the old item should not be more easily categorized than the new 
item on this theory.  However, since the old item is more easily classified as a member, 
then this provides support for the exemplar paradigm since ease of categorization based 
on this view depends on the similarity of an item to a particular stored instance of the 
category.  Since the old item is directly represented by a stored exemplar but the new 
item is not, the exemplar theory can account for these categorization results.   
A second problem is that a less typical member of a category as measured on the 
prototype theory can be more easily classified and can be learned more quickly as a token 
of the category as compared to a more typical member if the less typical member is more 
similar to previously experienced members of a class.
35
  For instance, I can more easily 
classify a Chihuahua as a dog as compared to a St. Bernard because my sister owns a 
Chihuahua and I have never seen a St. Bernard before.  This holds true despite the fact 
that the St. Bernard would be a more typical member of dog for me on the prototype view 
                                                     
34 R. Nosofsky, “Exemplars, prototypes and similarity rules,” in From Learning Theory to 
connectionist Theory:  Essays in Honor of W. K. Estes, ed by A. Healy, S. Kosslyn, and R. Shiffrin, 
(Hillsdale, NJ:  Erlbaum, 1992), p. 149-68. 
35Medin and Schaffer, ibid. 
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than the Chihuahua.  This phenomenon can be explained by the exemplar rather than 
prototype view since such results are influenced by the similarity of an item to a 
previously experienced particular instance of a class.  Given that the exemplar view 
appears to outperform the prototype theory in numerous areas, some exemplar theorists 
then make the leap in categorically believing that our concrete concepts do not have 
prototype structure. 
Thus, likewise for abstract moral concepts, it may be the case that exemplar 
theorists claim that moral concepts do not have prototype structure.  Rather, despite some 
evidence for the prototype view for moral concepts, such mental representations really 
only have exemplar structure.  However, the first problem with this potential objection is 
that although it may be possibly true, as of yet there is no evidence consistent with PAC 
to show that moral concepts have exemplar rather than prototype structure.  While 
experiments in the concrete concept realm may show that such concepts have exemplar 
rather than prototype structure, there is no analogous specific study on moral concepts to 
demonstrate this conclusion.  Such an experiment needs to be conducted in order to 
remain true to PAC and show that the structure of abstract moral concepts, like those of 
concrete concepts, is possibly constituted by exemplars rather than prototypes. 
Second, there is recent evidence that prototype and exemplars both are used in 
cognition in different situations for concrete concepts.  While all the numerous studies 
that attack the exemplar theorist’s claim to dominance over the prototype theory made by 
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psychologists and philosophers cannot be reviewed here,
36
 we will now examine several 
studies that indicate that both prototype and exemplar knowledge is used in cognition at 
different times depending on the circumstances.  To note, it is very difficult to 
empirically distinguish between whether prototype or exemplar knowledge is being used 
since they both broadly speaking make similar predictions in regards to such things as 
there being typicality effects.  Barsalou also has argued that the exemplar theory is more 
powerful than the prototype view since exemplars represent all the observed members of 
a class with their concomitant features, which is larger than a list of summary features.
37
  
Given that the exemplar view can mimic prototype theory since one’s set of prototypes is 
contained within one’s larger set of exemplars and the exemplars’ components, it is 
difficult to distinguish which model is being used in cognition since even if subjects are 
using prototypes, an exemplar model can still account for the data. 
                                                     
36 For further studies not presented in the text that show that both prototypes and exemplars are 
used in cognition, see:  B.W.A. Whittlesea, L.R. Brooks, and C. Westcott, “After the learning is 
over:  Factors controlling the selective application of general and particular knowledge,” Journal 
of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition 20:  (1994), 259-74.  Weiskopf, ibid.  
D. Medin, M. Altom, and T. Murphy, “Given vs. induced category representations:  Use of 
prototype and exemplar information in classification,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:  
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10:  (1984), 333-52.  T. Yamauchi and A.B. Markman, “Category 
learning by inference and classification,” Journal of Memory and Language 39:  (1998), 124-48.  P. 
Juslin, S. Jones, H. Olsson, and A. Winman, “Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in 
categorization,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29:  (2003), 
924-41. 
37 Lawrence Barsalou, “On the indistinguishability of exemplar memory and abstraction in 
category representation,” in Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. III:  Content and process Specificity in 
the Effects of Prior Experiences, ed. by T. Srull and R. Wyer, Jr., (Hillsdale, NJ:  Erlbaum, 1990), pp 
61-88. 
 135 
 However, recall from the second chapter that the exemplar theory is better 
equipped for classifying atypical or odd member items than the prototype view given that 
exemplar theory concepts may actually be constituted by mentally represented atypical 
members of a class.  On the other hand, since prototype theory concepts are only 
constituted by a summary representation of the features of members of a class, subject 
using such concepts will have a difficult time properly classifying odd member items; 
atypical items that generally do not match the summary features of the class.  Common to 
a number of prototype versus exemplar experiments, it is with this fact in mind in which 
such experiments are designed in order to attempt to discern whether participants are 
using prototype or exemplar knowledge.  In other words, one established way to 
distinguish between the uses of the two types of knowledge is by having atypical 
members in one’s experiment that do not share many features represented by prototypes 
but, on the other hand, are highly similar to a particular token of the class.  If subjects can 
classify the atypical items, then this provides evidence that the exemplar knowledge is 
being recruited.   
 One method used to distinguish between the prototype and exemplar theories is to 
use artificial categories.  Artificial categories are usually a string of letters or numbers 
that are completely made up by experimenters, are meaningless, and are not intended to 
refer to any ordinary category used by human beings such as with natural and artifact 
kind concepts.  For example, Rosch and Mervis used strings such as HPNWD and 
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JXPHM in a particular study to examine the prototype theory.
38
  Artificial categories and 
their unusual properties also may allow some experimenters to more easily distinguish 
whether participants are relying on one structure rather than the other.  Now, there are 
concerns of ecological validity for artificial categories, and studies using them may only 
be done with a cautionary note that such findings have not been tested yet for real 
categories.
39
  While artificial category tests have been used for various purposes in 
relation to concepts, stronger inferences may naturally be made if such studies are 
replicated implicating the actual type of category in question.   
Like several exemplar theorists, Smith, et al. have run artificial category studies 
pitting prototypes against exemplars.
40
  However, they made two vital alterations to their 
design as compared to certain exemplar studies that illustrated the purported dominance 
of exemplars over prototypes.
41
  First, Smith, et al. used artificial categories that had 
stronger structures than those used in the exemplar experiments.  What is meant by 
stronger structure is that they used artificial categories with more features than the typical 
                                                     
38Eleanor Roschand Caroline Mervis, “Family resemblances:  Studies in the Internal Structure of 
Categories,” Cognitive Psychology  7:  (1975), 573-605. 
39 For example, there are criticisms on the ecological validity of the numerous artificial category 
studies run by exemplar theorists.  J.D. Smith, M.J. Murray, and J.P. Minda, “Straight Talk About 
Linear Separability,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 23:  (1997), 659-80.  J.D. Smith and J.P. 
Minda, “Prototypes in the mist:  the early epochs of category learning,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition 24:  (1998), 1411-36.   
40Smith, Murray, and Minda, ibid. 
41 D. Medin and P. Schwanenflugel, “Linear separability in classification learning,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology:  Human Learning and Memory 7:  (1981), 241-53.  W.D. Wattenmaker, G.I. 
Dewey, T.D. Murphy, and D.L. Medin, “Linear separability and concept learning:  Context, 
relational properties, and concept naturalness,” Cognitive Psychology 18:  (1986), 158-94. 
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three to five features used in artificial category studies run by those such as Medin and 
Schwanenflugel.  By having more features to an artificial category, such a study is more 
ecologically valid and is closer to ordinary categories in that ordinary categories such as 
birds, dogs, and trees can have a larger number of features.  Second, instead of taking all 
the subject’s data, grouping them together, and then determining whether prototype or 
exemplar theory is more dominant, Smith, et al. determined which concept theory is more 
dominant relative to each individual without pooling all the data together.  In other 
words, they assessed whether prototype or exemplar structure was used on an individual-
to-individual basis.  What they found was that half the subjects utilized prototype 
retrieval in categorization while the other half used exemplar retrieval.  In this study, 
prototype participants were so labeled because they were able to classify items that were 
similar to a summary representation.  However, such subjects performed poorly in 
categorizing atypical items.  On the other hand, exemplar participants performed well 
with atypical items.  Later this study was replicated by Smith and Minda, with the 
additional finding that participants can shift their use of a concept structure to a different 
structure over periods of time.
42
 
There is also experimental data using real categories that confirm the recruitment 
of both prototype and exemplars in different circumstances for categorization.  For 
example, Machery and Weiskopf discuss Barbara Malt’s study in which subjects were 
found to use both prototype and exemplar-based categorization judgments for groupings 
                                                     
42Smith and Minda, ibid. 
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of different animals.
43
  For example, in the third of six experiments, participants were 
taught during a learning stage both the prototype and exemplars of categories by being 
presented with pictures of various animals.  She found that a group a of participants had 
trouble learning the prototypical features of an animal category x during the learning 
phase.  Meanwhile, a group b of participants had no trouble learning the prototypical 
features.  After this learning phase, both groups were presented with categorization tasks 
testing them with new and different animal pictures that belong to x.  She found that this 
categorization task significantly primed for previously learned exemplars of the category 
x in group a rather than group b subjects.  This is so because after this categorization task, 
group a subjects could more quickly categorize the particular animal picture that 
belonged to x that was previously learned during the learning stage as compared to group 
b participants.  This priming suggests that an exemplar categorization strategy was used 
by group a subjects when classifying new pictures.  However, when certain subjects 
could easily learn the prototypical features of a category, the exemplar priming effect was 
much weaker.  This suggests that in these cases, group b subjects were relying on 
prototypes when categorizing new animal pictures.   
Therefore, given the host of studies showing the use of both prototype and 
exemplar knowledge in the concrete domain, the present objection against the viability of 
the prototype theory for moral concepts fails.  Exemplar theorists may want to object that 
                                                     
43 B.C. Malt, “An online investigation of prototype and exemplar strategies in classification,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition 15:  (1989), 539-555.     
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since concrete concepts are made up of exemplars rather than prototypes, it is the case 
that moral concepts are so constituted as well.  However, along with the fact that this 
argument violates PAC, the above studies show that it is not the case that concrete 
concepts are constituted by exemplars rather than prototypes.  Rather, both theories are 
viable for concrete concepts. 
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4.  The Theory-Theory and the Emotion Theory 
In this chapter, I assess the viability of the theory-theory and the emotion theory 
for moral concepts.  As the evidence for these views will rely on studies from moral 
psychology that show that theories and emotions play a causal role in moral cognition, I 
first analyze how one can use such causal studies in order to draw constitution claims on 
moral concepts.  I contend that by relying on functionalism from the philosophy of mind, 
we may use the causal studies in order to draw constitution claims in certain cases.  Then, 
I discuss when the use of causal studies in order to make constitution claims is 
appropriate and inappropriate.  Upon finishing this analysis, I then put forth empirical 
causal evidence that the theory-theory is prima facie a viable theory of moral concepts.  
Next, I criticize Jesse Prinz’s psychopaths-based argument that all moral concepts are 
constituted by sentiments and emotions.  The objections to Prinz’s contention open the 
pathway to show that using causal evidence rather than studies on psychopaths is the 
more successful way to argue for the emotion theory.  After criticizing Prinz’s argument, 
I contend for the prima facie viability of the emotion theory by drawing on causal studies 
from moral psychology.   
 
4.1.  Causal Moral Psychology Studies & the Constitution of Moral Concepts 
As previously mentioned in the first chapter, concepts are functionally defined as 
mental representations that play a causal role in the higher cognitive competences of the 
mind, such as in categorization, induction, deduction, and analogical reasoning.  In 
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arguing for the viability of the theory-theory and the emotion theory for moral concepts, 
such conclusions are motivated by the issue of categorization since given the evidence in 
moral psychology, at times theory-based knowledge and/or emotions play a specified and 
qualified kind of causal role in determining when a is categorized as an F.
1
  In this and 
many other respects, empirical data can be used to show that theory knowledge and 
emotions can play an important qualified role in the relevant higher competences.  
However, Prinz distinguishes between causation and constitution in the causal moral 
judgment literature in empirical moral psychology, where philosophers and psychologists 
examine what factors influence moral judgment.  Prinz warns that we cannot reach any 
constitution conclusions for moral concepts based on causal evidence.  For instance, he 
writes, “The fact that emotions influence moral judgments does not entail that moral 
judgments contain emotions.”2  However, I interpret making moral judgments as acts of 
categorization.  As previously illustrated in Machery’s definition of concepts and as also 
pointed out by Weiskopf, in psychology concepts are thought to play a (specified kind of) 
functional or causal role in categorization and in other relevant higher competences.
3
  
Based on the functional definability of concepts, in certain cases they are constituted by 
those mental representations or structure(s) that best fills or realizes the specified kind of 
causal role.  This is the underlying metaphysics in the concepts literature.  Thus, in some 
                                                     
1 The specified and qualified kind of causal role will be elaborated upon shortly. 
2 Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), 28. 
3Daniel Weiskopf, “The Plurality of Concepts,” Synthese 169:  (2009), 145-173.  “Concept 
empiricism and the vehicles of thought,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:  (2007), 156–183. 
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cases if certain judgments are caused by theories, then the relevant concepts are 
constituted by theories since theories best realize the specified kind of causal role.  
Likewise, in some cases if certain judgments are caused by emotions, then the relevant 
concepts are constituted by emotions since emotions realize the specified kind of causal 
role. 
Mental representations of the statistically frequent features of members of a class 
and mental representations of particular instances of a class causally explain how we may 
classify certain three-dimensional objects.  Thus, the prototype and exemplar theory, 
respectively, may be spawned since prototypes and exemplars best fill the specified 
causal roles.  Folk theoretical beliefs of biological hidden essences and causal laws in a 
specified way influences categorization of whether a biological object falls within a 
certain natural kind.  Thus, the theory-theory of concepts may be a viable view and some 
biological natural kind concepts may be constituted by folk beliefs about hidden essences 
and causal laws.  Theory knowledge can causally influence some classifications in the 
moral domain.  What realizes the specified causal role in these relevant cases of these 
acts of classification are theories, and thus, the relevant concepts may be constituted by 
theories.  Likewise, emotions can also influence moral judgments in an appropriate 
qualified way, so in such cases, the relevant moral concepts may be constituted by 
emotions. 
This functional handling of concepts is analogous to what takes place with 
artifacts and many biological properties.  An engine is functionally defined as playing a 
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causal role in transforming various forms of energy into mechanical force or motion, 
where an engine just is that which realizes the causal role.  Thus, the thing under the hood 
of my car and in my lawnmower, in virtue of realizing the specified causal role of 
transforming energy into mechanical force, is an engine.  A heart is functionally defined 
as an organ that plays a causal role in pumping blood.  Thus, whatever realizes or plays 
the causal role such as my heart, a lizard’s heart, or an artificial heart is a heart because it 
fulfills the causal role.  Once we have functionally defined what a heart is and we have 
determined that what I call “my heart” realizes the causal role of pumping blood, then 
what I call “my heart” is indeed a heart.  Likewise, as concepts are also functionally 
defined, with an eye towards explaining behavior, as that which plays a specified causal 
role in categorization inter alia, once we determine what best realizes the specified causal 
role (e.g., a prototype), a concept may be the relevant realizer.  While many philosophers 
and scientists of the mind are well aware of the below causal studies, to the best of my 
knowledge, no one has been able to see the implications of such studies in light of the 
functionalist metaphysics of some moral conceptual mental states being theories and/or 
emotions. 
However, not any causal influence in the higher competences can be said to 
constitute the relevant concept.  For, this would allow too many different things to 
constitute one’s concept; some mental representations that we ordinarily would not think 
are relevant conceptual components.  For instance, an experimenter may give participants 
drugs before a natural kind categorization task that makes them feel the emotion of 
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sadness.  This sadness may act as an influence at the front end of the categorization 
process temporarily biasing subjects’ responses to be significantly different than if they 
had not been given the drug.  Here, it seems that we would not say that subjects’ LION 
concept is constituted by sadness even though sadness plays a causal role. 
I will now introduce and state an important qualification concerning the fact that a 
causal influence can lead to a constitution claim on concepts.  As I will explain, there are 
several characteristics that will allow us to determine when an influence is or is not 
constitutive of a concept, and a positive account of this will now be offered.  We may 
claim that a causal influence generally leads to a concept constitution claim when the 
influence is knowledge that is used by default in moral reasoning and is at least in part 
inferable, deductively or inductively, from the concept in question’s inferential base.4  
Hence, so long as a mentally represented influence is default knowledge that leads to or, 
in other words, consciously or subconsciously influences a sincere judgment in a certain 
moral situation x and it is at least in part inferable from the concept in question’s 
inferential base, then this generally leads to a constitution claim on concepts.  To note, I 
use the term ‘generally’ in the previous sentence because when it comes to emotions 
being in part inferable from the inferential base, an alteration to the above rule of when 
                                                     
4 This is assuming that the influence is not itself the inferential base.  Also, recall that by 
‘knowledge’ I mean an information carrying mental state.  The knowledge one has stored in a 
concept may be false, and emotions can also be considered to be knowledge so long as they are 
representational. 
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an influence actually constitutes a concept must be made.  This alteration will be 
discussed later in this section.   
Remember from the first chapter that concepts are thought to contain default 
bodies of knowledge rather than all the possible facts we may know about x.  Default 
knowledge is knowledge that preferentially and presumptively is used in most of the 
higher competences.  This allows for a significant reduction in the systematic selection of 
relevant knowledge when we generally reason about x.  Furthermore, as countless 
thoughts and beliefs potentially may be in part inferable from the inferential base, having 
only default knowledge constitute a concept cuts down on the many different pieces of 
knowledge that may potentially constitute a moral concept to only those that play a main 
role in moral deliberation and in how we reach moral conclusions.   
An inferential base is a theory-theory body of knowledge from which other 
mentally represented influences may be thought to be explained.
5
  As illustrated in the 
second chapter, it is theory knowledge of normative ethical theories that explains and 
systematizes other more specific bodies of knowledge.  Insofar as ethical theory 
knowledge provides an explanation for why we hold, for example, the prototype 
                                                     
5 First, recall from the third chapter that the classical view is not viable for moral concepts.  Thus, 
the inferential base is not a classical body of knowledge.  Second, we may think of influences that 
actually do constitute the concept as being criterial in the simple sense that what constitutes a 
concept is what the mind actually uses consciously or subconsciously in a qualified way in 
categorization, reasoning, etc.  A concept is functionally defined as being constituted by that 
which plays the specified role in categorization, reasoning, etc.  In this case, influences need not 
consciously be mentally represented as being criterial.  Things may remain at the subconscious 
level. 
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knowledge that we do, such ethical theory knowledge falls within the confines of the 
theory-theory.  Furthermore, the inferential base is the most firmly held theory belief(s), 
such that it would be the last theory belief to go in case one’s system of knowledge 
required revision.  The inferential base is specifically a theory belief(s) that occupies a 
defeasible placeholder position, where this theory belief(s) is specifically the most firmly 
held out of the set of theory beliefs one may have.
6
  The inferential base contains the 
most firmly held theory belief because we want to be sure that the causal influence can 
lead to a constitution claim for the relevant concept.  If whether an influence constitutes a 
concept generally and in part turns on whether it may be in part inferable from theory 
knowledge since theory knowledge systematizes and explains other kinds of knowledge, 
it generally should be in part inferable from the most firmly held and stable theory belief 
in order to be certain that the influence may be said to constitute the concept.  This is why 
the inferential base only contains the most firmly held theory belief.  The theoretical 
work that the inferential base performs is that if a default influence is in part inferable 
from the base, then the influence constitutes the relevant concept. 
Now, I make the qualification that the influence generally must be at least in part 
inferable rather than just merely inferable from the inferential base because there may be 
many subsidiary assumptions needed along with the inferential base in order to draw the 
                                                     
6 It may be the case that a theory belief may be the first to go under certain pressures and 
epistemic contexts, but it is the last to go under different pressures and contexts.  If this is the 
case, then the inferential base is theory knowledge that holds up in more contexts than other 
theory knowledge.  If there is an even split between two theories where they hold up in relation 
to different but an equal number of contexts, then both theories are part of the inferential base.   
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relevant inferences.  If one claims that an influence constitutes the concept when it 
generally is inferable from the inferential base, then this means that the inferential base 
must also contain all of these subsidiary assumptions, which may lead to the inferential 
base having to contain an overwhelming amount of one’s knowledge.  We obviously do 
not want the inferential base to contain all of this knowledge, so we must find a way to 
delimit what knowledge is in the inferential base.  This specifically is a variation of the 
holism problem for the theory-theory in that the theory knowledge that constitutes one’s 
relevant concept unreasonably may balloon out to inevitably include all of one’s total 
knowledge.  The claim that an influence must be inferable from the inferential base will 
run into the problem of holism.  However, we may escape this holism problem by 
claiming that the inferential base contains only theory knowledge that is the last to go in 
case one’s system of knowledge requires revision.  It does not contain all of one’s 
knowledge.  Moreover, an influence need not be inferable from only what is contained in 
the inferential base in order to constitute the relevant moral concept, but rather, an 
influence generally need only be in part inferable from the inferential base, where 
subsidiary assumptions also may play a role in the relevant inference, but such ancillary 
assumptions need not themselves constitute the inferential base.  This is due to the 
qualification that one criterion for constituting a concept is that an influence generally 
need be only in part inferable from the inferential base, an inferential base that only 
contains the most firmly held theory knowledge, but other ancillary knowledge that does 
not lie in the base may also play a role in the inference.  Only when an influence is 
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default knowledge and generally is in part inferable from the inferential base, a base that 
only contains the most firmly held theory knowledge, can we then say that the influence 
constitutes the concept. 
As an example of an inferential base, let us assume there is an agent named 
Christian whose inferential base belief is OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD.  This is theory-
theory knowledge of divine command theory, where his moral prototype and exemplar 
knowledge, such as DO NOT STEAL, JESUS HELPING MARY MAGDALENE, and DO NOT LIE, 
may be thought to be in part inferred from this inferential base.  To be sure, there are 
subsidiary assumptions needed along with the inferential base in order to reach the 
inferences that, for instance, one should not steal and lie.  For example, one may need 
premises like ‘Moses led his people out of Egypt and came upon a burning bush,’ ‘the 
burning bush was God,’ ‘God spoke to Moses through divine revelation,’ and ‘God gave 
Moses the Ten Commandments.’  However, such subsidiary premises need not be 
represented in Christian’s inferential base for his theory-theory MORAL concept since 
inferential base knowledge only contains the most firmly held ethical theory knowledge 
and generally, in order to constitute the relevant moral concept, one criterion is that 
inferences such as DO NOT STEAL need not be inferred solely from what is contained in 
the inferential base.  Rather, in order to constitute the concept, an influence used by 
default need only be at least in part inferable from the inferential base.  In other words, an 
influence generally needs to in part be inferred from the inferential base, but ancillary 
premises not contained in the inferential base can also play a role in the inference.  Being 
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in part inferred does not mean that an influence must be solely inferred from the 
inferential base.  Here, the above subsidiary assumptions regarding the story of Moses 
can be mentally represented constituents of Christian’s BOOK OF EXODUS or STORY OF 
MOSES AND GOD compound concepts rather than being a part of his firmly held theory 
knowledge contained in his MORAL concept.  This is how one may handle the holism 
problem for the inferential base. 
As it will be demonstrated later in this chapter that emotions can also at times 
constitute our moral concepts, it may initially be thought that emotions may be at least in 
part inferable from the inferential base when emotions work jointly with or perhaps in 
some cases are in part constituted by relevant cognitive bodies of knowledge; normative 
cognitive knowledge that helps to specify that a judgment that is in part constituted by an 
emotion is a moral judgment rather than a non-moral judgment.
7
  As examples of how 
certain emotions may be thought to be in part inferred from the inferential base, feeling 
joy when given the opportunity to help others and feeling guilt when one has done 
something unethical may be thought to all be in part inferable from the inferential base 
OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD.  Moreover, this inferential base would be the last belief 
to go when Christian’s system of knowledge requires revision.  For example, by 
hypothesis, since his inferential base is constituted by OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD, 
                                                     
7 Recall from the second chapter that I leave open the possibility that some but not all emotions in 
part may be constituted by cognitive constituents. 
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when questioned by a skeptic to revise his beliefs, the last belief Christian would let go of 
is OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD. 
However, strictly speaking, emotions that play a causal role, completely as such, 
are not in part inferable from the inferential base.  Rather, in our above examples, 
something like mentally represented prototype rules that merely talk about emotions 
rather than actually being an experience of an emotion, such as ONE POTENTIAL FACTOR 
FOR SEEING SOMETHING AS A WRONG ACT WOULD BE IF THE PERFORMING OF THE ACT 
ELICITS GUILT, is in part inferable from the inferential base since the Bible at least 
implicitly says that the feeling of guilt in many cases influences people to make 
judgments that their act in a situation is wrong.  The emotion, completely as such, is not 
in part inferable from the base.  For example, if the emotion of guilt contains a cognitive 
component such as HARMING OTHERS DECREASES THEIR WELL-BEING along with other 
components such as qualia, the cognitive component may be in part inferable from the 
base, but the quale is not.  The raw feel of a quale cannot be deductively or inductively in 
part inferred from the base.  Rather, strictly speaking, only cognitive aspects of the 
emotion can be so inferred from a cognitive base since the base only contains cognitive 
mental states from which inferences may in part be drawn.  Therefore, the emotion, 
completely as such, is not in part inferable from the base.  If the emotion of joy is non-
cognitive, then strictly speaking, it also is not in part inferable from the base since it is 
non-cognitive.   
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In order to resolve this issue of when an emotional influence is a correct or 
appropriate influence that actually constitutes the relevant concept, we may state that 
only for emotional influences, an emotional influence constitutes a concept when 1) the 
emotion is used by default and 2a) for an emotion with a cognitive constituent, at least 
one of the cognitive constituents is in part inferable from the inferential base.  For 
instance, since Christian’s cognitive emotion of guilt is used by default when 
categorizing things under WRONG ACT and this emotion’s constituent HARMING OTHERS 
DECREASES THEIR WELL-BEING is in part inferable from Christian’s inferential base 
OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD, guilt actually constitutes Christian’s concept WRONG 
ACT.  2b) For a cognitive or non-cognitive emotion, a corresponding cognitive prototype 
rule must be held consciously or subconsciously by the agent, such as ONE POTENTIAL 
FACTOR FOR SEEING SOMETHING AS A WRONG ACT WOULD BE IF THE PERFORMING OF 
THE ACT ELICITS GUILT, that states that the expression of the influencing emotion in the 
type of moral circumstance at hand is a potential factor that may lead one to make the 
relevant categorization.  Furthermore, this rule must be able to be in part inferable from 
the inferential base.  Notice that this cognitive rule does not itself contain the feeling of 
the emotion, but it merely talks about the emotion.  For instance, the feeling of guilt 
constitutes Christian’s WRONG ACT concept in the relevant scenario since it is used by 
default when he categorizes acts as being wrong and his corresponding rule ONE 
POTENTIAL FACTOR FOR SEEING SOMETHING AS A WRONG ACT WOULD BE IF THE 
PERFORMING OF THE ACT ELICITS GUILT is in part inferable from his inferential base.  
The influence of guilt appears to be an appropriate or correct influence for constituting 
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the concept in this particular circumstance for Christian in significant part due to the fact 
that his corresponding cognitive rule about guilt is in part inferable from the inferential 
base.  This is somewhat similar but not exactly similar to how one significant criterion for 
prototypes and exemplars is that they must be in part inferable from the inferential base 
in order to be proper influences that really do constitute the relevant concept.   
Thus, the actual non-cognitive emotional influence of guilt in part constitutes 
Christian’s concept WRONG ACT because for Christian, the emotion itself is used by 
default when categorizing things as wrong acts and his corresponding cognitive rule ONE 
POTENTIAL FACTOR FOR SEEING SOMETHING AS A WRONG ACT WOULD BE IF THE 
PERFORMING OF THE ACT ELICITS GUILT that talks about the emotion of guilt and that 
states that the expression of the influencing emotion in the type of moral circumstance at 
hand is a potential factor that may lead one to make the relevant categorization is in part 
inferable from Christian’s inferential base OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD.  Therefore, the 
actual emotion of guilt constitutes Christian’s WRONG ACT concept.  To note, cognitive 
emotions need to only satisfy either 2a) or 2b), along with 1), in order to be a proper 
influence.  It does not have to satisfy both 2a) and 2b).  However, it is perfectly possible 
that there are cases where a cognitive emotion may indeed satisfy both 2a) and 2b). 
In what follows, purely for ease of linguistic expression, when referencing the 
overall general conditions for when an influence actually constitutes a concept, I will 
state the above original conditions for when non-emotion influences constitute a concept.  
However, this is not meant to in any way abnegate the special conditions just discussed 
 153 
particularly for emotions.  I will discuss and rely on the alternate emotion-based 
conditions when only emotional influences are being discussed.    
Now that we have stated the characterizations of when an influence does 
constitute the relevant concept, we now will discuss several tests that may be used to help 
us make stronger inferences as to whether an influence actually constitutes the concept.  
These additional tests may be run after one has already conducted initial studies 
determining that a particular influence(s) may constitute the concept in question.  For 
example, these tests may be conducted after a theory-theory study is run in which a 
particular ethical theory knowledge that systematically explains one’s prototype and 
exemplar knowledge is initially shown to influence a categorization judgment.  One such 
additional test is seeing whether an agent does not retract a judgment that was issued 
from a particular influence.  If the judgment is not retracted, then this suggests that the 
relevant influence may constitute the concept.  Call this the retraction test.  Here, it is 
vital that the retraction test be conducted in normal conditions when the experimenters 
are not attempting to in some way manipulate the participant by trying to get the agent to 
make a mental error during the test.  For instance, the participants should not be 
hypnotized or be induced with mood altering drugs.  Based on the retraction test, if the 
influence is later retracted, then it is suggestive that the influence does not constitute the 
relevant concept.  It is important to emphasize that the retraction test is not meant to be a 
decisive method for determining whether a particular influence is in fact the constituent 
of a concept or not.  It is only a test that provides merely suggestive evidence that an 
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influence may be a constituent of a concept.  Notice that it may not necessarily be the 
case that if the retraction test is passed, then the influence must be a constituent of the 
relevant concept.  For, it may be the case that an individual is frequently prone to some 
kind of mental error and never retracts a judgment or mostly does not retract a judgment 
that issues from an influence that does not really constitute the relevant concept.  One 
may wonder how to tell the difference between whether an unretracted judgment or a 
mostly unretracted judgment is a reflection of mental error or is a reflection of being 
influenced by a mental representation that is legitimately a constituent of the relevant 
concept.  An unretracted or mostly unretracted judgment may be a result of mental error 
if there is a plausible causal explanation for why the judgment may be an error, such as 
when a doctor states that a patient is constantly making delusional judgments because the 
patient is under the influence of medication.   
It is also important to make sure whether or not the influence in question or even 
judgment itself is actually part of the inferential base.  For, if the influence is a part of the 
inferential base, then we may understand the ensuing judgment to not be a result of 
mental error because such a judgment was influenced by the inferential base knowledge.  
Also, if in the appropriate moral context, a judgment itself is merely a statement of one’s 
most firmly held theory belief, then it also is not a result of mental error.  One may 
determine whether a mental representation is a part of the inferential base or not by 
uncovering what someone’s inferential base is.  One may run theory-theory studies, 
which will be discussed in the next section, to see what ethical theory knowledge an 
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individual possesses and then also see what theory knowledge will be the last to go in 
case the individual’s system of beliefs requires revision.  If an individual maintains more 
than one ethical theory, then objections can be presented against these various theories 
and against the rules, reasons, virtues, etc. that may be in part inferred from these theories 
in order to see which ethical theory knowledge will be most firmly held when the 
subject’s set of beliefs may require revision.  Upon finding out what the inferential base 
is, one may then see whether or not the influence or judgment is a part of the base.  All in 
all, even though the passing of the retraction test may not prove to be definitive, the 
passing of this test may be said to still provide a degree of suggestive evidence for an 
influence constituting a concept. 
Some factors that may be at play for why an influence is still used in cognition 
even though, for example, it is not in part inferable from the concept in question’s 
inferential base are various kinds of mental error or various causal routes to mental error 
such as: being hit on the head, mistaken reasoning, mental fatigue, being under the 
influence of drugs, etc.  This appears to be a grab bag of factors, but they are all grounded 
in the fact that they are various forms of mental error or causal routes to such error.  
Moreover, such factors may potentially lead one to use a particular mentally represented 
influence that is really not a part of one’s relevant concept.    
As an example of a retraction, Christian may be momentarily influenced by the 
thought PROTECT MY LIFE AT ALL COSTS when deciding to retaliate against a random 
murderer who has intruded his home.  However, Christian is Amish and believes in a life 
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of non-violence.  Given Christian’s fundamentally held theory beliefs such as OBEY THE 
COMMANDS OF GOD, we can understand why Christian later retracts his judgment to 
retaliate against the murderer because his inferential base or fundamental beliefs from 
which some of his other beliefs may be in part inferred and explained indicate that 
PROTECT MY LIFE AT ALL COSTS is not supported by them.  This provides a deeper 
explanation for why retractions occur.  For instance, Christian’s later thought ALWAYS 
ABSTAIN FROM VIOLENCE influences his judgment to actually not physically defend himself 
against the intruder.  Since this principle is at least in part inferentially supported by OBEY 
THE COMMANDS OF GOD and by hypothesis, it is default knowledge, this means that it in 
part constitutes Christian’s concept MORALLY OUGHT. 
As a qualification, when dealing with the retraction or unretraction of sincere 
judgments for constitution claims for only prototype, exemplar, and emotion theory 
knowledge,
8
 we must state that the test for retraction is based on what constitutes 
Christian’s relevant moral concept(s) as the inferential base at the time period the 
judgment is made t1, where there is no change or additions to his inferential base for his 
relevant moral concept(s) during time periods.  For it is always possible that at a later 
time period t2, Christian may receive some kind of new moral education or go through 
some kind of radical moral conversion that changes what constitutes his relevant 
inferential base, even though the inferential base knowledge was previously the most 
                                                     
8 The theory-theory is excluded because if inserted, it would lead to a circular statement:  we 
apply the retraction test to determine what is part of the inferential base, but here we appeal to 
what is in the inferential base to decide how to apply the test. 
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firmly held theory knowledge.  For example, at t2, Christian is influenced by an atheist 
book he reads and becomes an atheist.  This effectively changes his inferential base for 
his concept MORALLY OUGHT.  At t2, he has the principle USE FORCE TO DEFEND ONE’S OWN 
LIFE which leads him to retract the relevant previous judgments made in t1 in which he 
decides not to protect himself against violent intruders.  Due to the event that kicks off t2, 
many previous moral judgments would be retracted, but it seems odd to say that during 
t1, Christian’s concept MORALLY OUGHT is not constituted by ALWAYS ABSTAIN FROM 
VIOLENCE.  For, this influence leads to continuous unretracted judgments until his moral 
conversion decades later such that there is suggestive evidence that it was in part 
inferable from the inferential base and it was used by default.  So long as Christian’s 
concept MORALLY OUGHT has the same inferential base constitution during a time period, 
his moral concept, generally speaking, is constituted by influences that are supported, 
explained, and systematized at least in part by the inferential base and that are used by 
default within that period of time but not outside that time period.  Once there are 
additions or alterations to the inferential base of Christian’s concept MORALLY OUGHT at 
the later period of time t2, this does not impugn the concept constitution claims that were 
made during t1. 
Furthermore, a second possible test for figuring out whether a stronger 
constitution claim may be made in these types of cases is to see what a subject’s 
inferential base is.  Recall that I have already described above one possible way for 
determining what one’s inferential base is.  In finding what the fundamental and most 
 158 
firmly held beliefs are, we may examine generally whether or not a given influence is in 
part inferable from them and whether it potentially constitutes the concept.  If it generally 
is in part inferable from the inferential base, then this provides some suggestive evidence 
that the influence in question may constitute the relevant moral concept.  Call this the 
inferential base test.  This second test may show whether an influence in question, 
generally speaking, is at least in part inferable from an inferential base by first 
discovering what the inferential base is, but notice that it does not necessarily 
demonstrate that an influence is used by default.  The inferential base test is not meant to 
provide definitive evidence that an influence in fact constitutes a moral concept.  Rather, 
it is merely a suggestive test for concept constitution.  For, it is possible that this test can 
show, in general terms, that an influence in question is at least in part inferable from the 
inferential base, but this influence still may not be used by default.  Although not 
definitive, the inferential base test still lends some evidential support for drawing a 
stronger conclusion for when an influence actually constitutes a concept. 
Knowledge of an agent’s inferential base can also at times eliminate contradictory 
judgments.  Let us return to Christian being attacked by the murderer before his 
conversion to atheism.  Christian may at one point judge both that he should defend 
himself against the murderer and it is not the case that he should do so.  However, the fact 
that one of his fundamental and most strongly held thoughts is OBEY THE COMMANDS OF 
GOD, this provides reason to believe that he does not really hold contradictory judgments 
in this particular case because the influence PROTECT MY LIFE AT ALL COSTS most likely is 
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not used by default given that PROTECT MY LIFE AT ALL COSTS is not at least in part 
inferable from the inferential base.  Rather, he really believes that he should not defend 
himself against his assailant.  Nevertheless, as one example of how an agent may really 
maintain contradictory beliefs, sometimes it may be possible that an agent maintains two 
opposing beliefs in his inferential base that are held with equally strong conviction.  For 
instance, Christian* sincerely holds OBEY THE COMMANDS OF GOD as well as a kind of 
virtue ethical theory, in which one must exemplify the virtues of virtuous agents or 
perform those actions virtuous agents would perform, where one of the primary virtuous 
agents for Christian* is Malcolm X.  Both theories for Christian* are equally important 
fundamentally basic beliefs.  Due to this fact, Christian* judges that he should defend 
himself against the murderer, and he also judges that it is not the case that he should do 
so.  Beliefs that are held with the same strong conviction within the inferential base 
leaves open the possibility for contradictions in that what directly influences his 
contradictory judgment is the equally weighted principles ALWAYS ABSTAIN FROM 
VIOLENCE and USE FORCE TO DEFEND ONE’S OWN LIFE.  Here, we may say that Christian’s 
concept MORALLY OUGHT is constituted by both of these equally weighted mentally 
represented principles since they are in part inferable by the equally firmly held 
inferential base beliefs and by hypothesis, they are used by default. 
Moreover, a third test is to see whether the ensuing judgment from an influence 
still holds after the influence or the influence’s informational value is made aware to the 
agent.  If the judgment still holds, then this may also provide additional support for the 
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fact that the relevant influence constitutes the concept in question.  Call this the 
informational value test.  For example, in a study with eighty-four participants, most test 
subjects will give lower life satisfaction ratings when there is rainy weather, reflecting the 
impact of the weather on their current moods.
9
  However, the negative effect of mood on 
life satisfaction ratings is generally eliminated when experimenters inquire about the 
weather to participants, which draws respondents’ attention to this extraneous source of 
their mood.  In these kinds of cases, the informational value test is a further suggestive 
way to see whether the influence actually constitutes the concept, although it may not 
necessarily show that this is the case.  For example, a participant in the above study may 
still be influenced by the weather even when made aware of the weather by the 
experimenter.  In a completely different example in which the informational value test 
also does not work, one may have a subconscious influence that does not really constitute 
the concept at hand, but this subconscious influence still persists and plays the relevant 
functional role even when the subject is made aware of the informational value of this 
faulty subconscious influence.  As we can see, the informational value test is a mere test 
that may provide stronger suggestive evidence as to whether an influence may constitute 
the relevant concept.  It is not meant to be a definitive means for determining whether an 
influence in fact constitutes the relevant moral concept.  The participants’ reflective 
access that is involved in the informational value test is not meant to be a definitive way 
                                                     
9 N. Schwarz and G. Clore, “Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being:  informative and 
directive functions of affective states,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45:  (1983), 513-
523. 
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of seeing whether a given mentally represented influence in fact constitutes a concept.  
Rather, as can be seen in some instances of the above life satisfaction/rainy weather 
experiment, it provides defeasible suggestive evidence regarding concept constitution. 
Hence, we can see that there are several suggestive ways to test for and make a 
stronger claim that an influence constitutes a concept, where an influence generally 
constitutes a concept based on the fact that it is default knowledge and it is at least in part 
inferable from the inferential base.  To note, as merely a descriptive developmental point, 
influences that do constitute one’s concept are usually arrived upon through intense social 
learning, childhood development, moral education, cultural influence, and interaction 
with one’s family, friends, and peers.  Through such external factors, others can 
influence, correct, and shape our moral concepts, and within a community, due to such 
interaction, it is the case that many members to a certain extent share some components 
of their moral concepts.  It is important to note that social and environmental factors can 
play an important role in developing one’s moral concepts and in determining what 
actually constitutes one’s moral concepts.   
Furthermore, so long as a participant in a study is not initially thought to be 
experiencing a possible state – such as being hypnotized, being hit on the head, being in 
stormy weather, or being under the influence of drugs – that may lead to mental error and 
the use of an influence that is not really a part of the relevant concept, a successful causal 
influence experiment has the strength to allow for an initial or prima facie positive claim 
that the influence in question does constitute the relevant concept.  It will be understood 
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that such successful studies will allow for prima facie concept constitution claims.  This 
may be the case even though the three retraction, inferential base, and informational 
value tests have not been conducted on the influence and corresponding judgment in 
question.  However, the actual running of these three tests provides the additional support 
for making a stronger claim that the influence in question makes up the relevant concept.  
While the passing of the inferential base test provides the most certainty, the three tests 
along with the other possible various combinations of them can provide more support for 
making a stronger constitution claim as compared to making a prima facie claim.  The 
strength of a claim is determined on a case by case basis taking into account the nature 
and design of the experiment in question as well as taking into account which of the three 
tests are and are not run.  To note, most concept constitution conclusions drawn from 
particular experiments in the concrete concepts domain are prima facie claims.   
 
4.2  The Arguments for the Theory-Theory 
Now that we have clarified when we may rely on appropriate causal studies to 
draw constitution claims on moral concepts, we eventually will rely on causal evidence in 
order to demonstrate that the theory-theory is prima facie a viable theory of moral 
concepts.  Goodwin and Darley ran experiments asking subjects to make judgments on a 
number of moral cases.
10
  For example, subjects were asked whether they agreed or 
                                                     
10 Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley, “The psychology of meta-ethics:  Exploring objectivism,” 
Cognition (2007). 
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disagreed with the statement:  Before the 3
rd
 month of pregnancy, abortion for any reason 
(of the mother’s) is morally permissible.  Subsequently, participants were asked to 
identify the reason or justification for why they held the moral beliefs that they do.  Close 
to a third of the subjects chose a supreme being or divine command theory as ordaining 
and grounding their own moral systems.  Given that divine command theory is an ethical 
theory, this provides at least correlational evidence that there is a link between moral 
judgment and divine command theory for some people.  While there is the possibility that 
such a potential theory-theory justification may be a post-hoc rationalization, where 
further studies need to be conducted in order to ascertain whether actual causation in the 
appropriate direction is involved, such an experiment does establish correlation.
11
  Such 
correlational evidence needs to be coupled with relevant causal studies in order to make a 
sufficient claim for the viability of the theory-theory. 
Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development also provides correlational support 
for a kind of folk consequentialism ethical theory, amongst others, that many individuals 
                                                     
11 Jonathan Haidt has run a study asking participants if it is morally permissible for a brother and 
sister to secretly have protected sex on a one-time basis.  While some participants stated that it 
was morally permissible, most claimed that it was morally wrong.  When asked for the 
justification for their negative response, some said that it would lead to a deformed child.  
However, experimenters then reminded them that there was no chance to have a child given that 
they took the necessary precautionary measures.  Some said that it may cause problems in their 
family, but experimenters reminded them that the sexual encounter was kept as a secret and the 
siblings even grew closer together as a result of the act even though they never had sex again.  
Haidt found that most of those who said the act was morally impermissible still held on to their 
judgment even though all the false non-moral facts they held in regard to the case were corrected.  
This study as well as others indicate that at many times reasons as well as non-moral factual 
justifications for belief, whether they may be true or false, may be post-hoc.  Jonathan Haidt, “The 
Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail,” Psychological Review 108:  (2001), pp. 814-34. 
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may mentally represent.  It provides only correlational support because Kohlberg 
gathered his evidence by interviewing his participants and asking them what justified 
their moral judgments when given hypothetical scenarios.  Such purported justifications 
only may be post hoc rationalizations rather than being what causes participants to make 
judgments.  Now, as it has already been argued in the third chapter that the classical view 
of concepts is not viable due to pervasive typicality effects for moral concepts as well as 
due to other reasons, we may, as has been pointed out in the second chapter, infer that if 
folk consequentialism knowledge does indeed constitute moral concepts, in this 
circumstance they are theory rather than definitional bodies of knowledge that occupy 
defeasible placeholder positions.   
For Kohlberg, the first and second stage of pre-conventional morality is where 
children are egoistically concerned and influenced with rules in relation to punishment 
and self-interest.  This supposedly provides evidence for a correlational link between 
moral judgments and a kind of ethical egoism theory knowledge.  The third stage is 
where individuals are concerned about other people and their feelings.  Moreover, agents 
are motivated to follow rules and expectations.  Stage four of development is the folk 
consequentialism stage and is described as where the right is upholding the social order 
and maintaining the overall welfare of society or the group.
12
  Here what duties and rules 
one must obey are determined by what the best overall consequences are for the group 
and by what upholds the social order, where each member’s welfare is counted equally.  
                                                     
12 Kohlberg, ibid, 410. 
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Each group member cannot egoistically do as they please.  For, this may lead to chaos 
and disorder.  The last two stages are post-conventional in that for individuals it is right 
to uphold the basic tenets and obligations stemming from the idea of a social contract and 
finally, in the last stage, to be guided by universal ethical principles that everyone should 
follow.  Now, Kohlberg’s stage theory has been heavily criticized, where, for examples, 
studies by the likes of Shweder and colleagues have shown that folk consequentialism is 
the most prevalent ethical theory knowledge that adults pervasively supposedly use 
across cultures.
13
  Here, we may utilize these critical studies to conclude that there is a 
strong correlation between moral judgment and such a folk consequentialist theory 
knowledge. 
We may understand the possible use of this consequentialism ethical theory as 
being one of folk consequentialism in that philosophers who are consequentialists tend to 
view this theory as a criterion of rightness rather than being a decision procedure that 
actually must be used in everyday circumstances.  In other words, a consequentialist 
calculation is for determining which acts actually are right or wrong, but it should not be 
used to make everyday decision in all cases.  For example, consequentialists generally 
believe that one should visit one’s mother in the hospital not for the reason that it leads to 
the best overall consequences but because one love’s one’s mother.  A consequentialist 
calculation is a criterion for determining that visiting one’s mother is ethically right, but 
                                                     
13 R. Shweder, M. Mahapatra, and J. Miller, “Culture and Moral Development,” in The Emergence 
of Morality in Young Children, ed. by J. Kagan and S. Lamb, (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press), 1987. 
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in real life, one must justify such an action by using alternative reasons.  However, folk 
consequentialism will be understood as where the folk actually do use a consequentialist 
calculation as a decision procedure. 
There are other experiments that actually may support the underlying causal 
influence of folk consequentialism on individuals’ moral judgments, although this 
support is of a somewhat tentative nature.  Joshua Greene, et al. ran a recent cognitive 
load study where subjects were filling out moral questionnaires on a computer.
14
  They 
were presented with “high conflict” moral dilemmas in which subjects were asked 
whether it is appropriate to harm another individual in order to save several lives.  One 
example of a high conflict dilemma that was used is the crying baby case: 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village.  They have orders to kill all 
 remaining civilians.  You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in 
 the cellar of a large house.  Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have 
 come to search the house for valuables. 
  
Your baby begins to cry loudly.  You cover his mouth to block the sound.  If you 
 remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the 
 soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar.  To 
 save yourself and the others you must smother your child to death. 
 
Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the 
 other townspeople?
15
 
 
While answering such questions on moral dilemmas, numbers continually stream 
across the bottom of the screen and participants have to press a button when they see the 
                                                     
14 J. Greene, S. Morelli, K. Lowenber, L. Nystrom, J. Cohen, “Cognitive load selectively interferes 
with utilitarian moral judgment,” Cognition 107:  (2008), 1144-54. 
15 Ibid. 
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number five.  The result is that subjects selectively had a longer reaction time when 
making apparent folk consequentialism judgments – judgments that are based on taking 
into account the overall consequences for the group rather than only the welfare or rights 
of a single individual – under the cognitive load as opposed to having no cognitive load, 
but there was no increase in reaction time for supposed non-consequentialism-like 
judgments under cognitive load.  This study provides causal rather than correlational 
support that purported folk consequentialism knowledge influences some moral 
judgments for some people because the longer reaction time suggests that the cognitive 
load of having to press a button when seeing the number five interferes with a controlled 
cognitive process, such as some kind of cost-benefit analysis reasoning process, whereas 
the cognitive load should have no effect on a fast automatic process.  This conclusion is 
further buttressed by neuroimaging studies that show a strong correlation between the 
making of supposed folk consequentialism judgments and activation in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe.
16
  These brain regions are known for such 
things as complex planning, deductive/inductive reasoning, and long-term economic 
decision-making.  In addition, in the next section on the emotion theory, we will examine 
several replicated trolley experiments that demonstrate that supposed folk 
consequentialism reasoning influences many participants’ judgments.   
                                                     
16 J. Greene, L.E. Nystrom, A.D. Engell, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen, “The Neural Bases of 
Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment,” Neuron 44:  (2004), 387-400.   
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Now, it may not be clear that Greene’s study as well as the others definitively 
show that some individuals have supposed folk consequentialism knowledge.  For, it very 
well could be the case that individual’s might be relying on some other principle such as:  
Bring about the best overall consequences so long as there is no self-interested cost to 
oneself.   This differs from folk consequentialism because the consideration of 
consequences is restricted by a self-interest clause, whereas folk consequentialism is not 
so restricted.  Notice that this alternative principle also requires some calculation and is 
consistent with the greater reaction time that is indicative of a cognitive cost-benefit 
analysis process.  Therefore, taken alone, it cannot be definitively stated that some 
people’s moral concepts are prima facie constituted by folk consequentialism knowledge.  
Although there is somewhat unclear causal evidence for a kind of folk 
consequentialism in this cognitive load study as well as in several other replicated studies 
to be discussed in the following section, these studies coupled with the cross-cultural 
correlational study on Kohlberg’s folk consequentialism and the aforementioned 
neuroimaging studies allows us to prima facie infer that a kind of Kohlbergian folk 
consequentialist theory generally influences and at least in part constitutes adult moral 
judgments at times.  Recall that a Kohlbergian folk consequentialist theory is where one 
must choose those actions that best maximize the overall welfare of the group or society, 
and the best overall welfare for a group is cashed out in terms of what best maintains 
societal or group order and functioning, where each member’s welfare is counted equally.  
Moreover, on this view, individuals cannot do as they please or do what is in their best 
 169 
interest in spite of the group or social order because this may lead to chaos and the 
potential destruction of the group.  Since there is causal evidence in Greene’s study as 
well as in others that some kind of apparent cost/benefit calculation at times influences 
moral judgment, this demonstrates that this kind of unspecified overall cost/benefit 
calculation influences judgment and is not a post hoc rationalization.  Given that this is 
now on the table, recall that there is a correlation between the making of such judgments 
with activation in parts of the brain associated with planning and long-term economic 
decision-making, and there is a strong and unambiguous correlation between adult moral 
decision-making in a number of instances and a Kohlbergian folk consequentialism.  
With the correlational evidence in hand, we can now draw a conclusion that since some 
kind of cost/benefit analysis at times prima facie causally influences moral decision-
making in a qualified way, this kind of cost/benefit analysis in many instances may be a 
Kohlbergian folk consequentialism knowledge.  Moreover, as this kind of knowledge 
appears to be at work in a variety of moral situations as instanced by the given 
psychology experiments, it appears that this knowledge is used by default.  Thus, there is 
a prima facie case that Kohlbergian folk consequentialism knowledge constitutes some 
moral concepts.  Combining all the evidence allows us to make a novel prima facie claim 
that the theory-theory is a viable view for moral concepts and that some moral concepts 
for many people are constituted by a Kohlbergian folk consequentialist theory 
knowledge.   
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Regarding concept acquisition, recall from the third chapter that the concept 
acquisition and categorization desiderata can be thought of as two sides of the same 
psychological phenomenon – our disposition to put individual items into classes.  If we 
have acquired a concept, then we can categorize items as members of the extension of the 
concept.  Likewise, if we can use a concept to categorize, then at some point the concept 
has been phylogentically or ontogenetically acquired.  Hence, we may infer that we 
generally acquire folk consequentialist theory concepts due to the above evidence for folk 
consequentialist theory knowledge.  However, there does not appear to be explicit 
specified kinds of causal studies indicating that children are influenced by some kind of 
ethical theory knowledge.  However, in a correlational study pertaining to folk 
consequentialism, Korean children appear to justify their moral beliefs based on social 
status, social roles, and the overall welfare of society as well; justifications that are not 
commonly observed in children in the United States.
17
  Although we may infer that 
theory-theory folk consequentialist concepts are acquired by many individuals, to make a 
stronger case for concept acquisition, it must be admitted that explicit specified kinds of 
causal studies need to be run on children and adolescents regarding whether they are 
influenced in the appropriate qualified way by some kind of ethical theory knowledge 
when making moral judgments.   
 
 
                                                     
17 Song, J. Smetana, Kim, 1987. 
 171 
4.3  Prinz’s Psychopath Argument for Epistemic Emotionism. 
Before arguing that the emotion theory prima facie is a viable view of moral 
concepts based on causal evidence, we will criticize Prinz’s psychopaths-based argument 
for the emotion theory.  The objections to Prinz’s contention open the pathway to show in 
the next section of this chapter that using appropriate causal evidence rather than studies 
on psychopaths is the more successful way to argue for the emotion theory.  We now will 
examine what I take to be the strongest argument by Prinz that supports his epistemic 
emotionism, where as discussed in the second chapter, this view states that all moral 
concepts are constituted by sentiments and at times by emotions.  Sentiments are 
dispositions to feel emotions.  The criticisms against this argument can be taken to help 
show that using causal studies in a qualified manner perhaps may be the best empirical 
means for supporting the viability of an emotion-based theory for moral concepts.
18
    
                                                     
18 One may think that Jonathan Haidt offers an empirical argument that may be read as claiming 
that all moral concepts are constituted by emotions.  One may think that his Social Intuitionist 
Model (SIM) claims that moral judgments are influenced by emotions and that all reasoning is 
post hoc.  Thus, all moral concepts are constituted by emotions.  However, this is an incorrect 
understanding of his view in that he believes that emotions only causally influence judgment.  
They do not constitute judgment.  He fails to see that a specified kind of causation can lead to 
concept constitution claims (this also holds for Nichols).  Furthermore, he allows for reasoning to 
influence judgment in some cases.  Moreover, he claims that judgments are mostly influenced by 
intuitions; intuitions which may or may not be generated by emotions.  “While some critics 
erroneously reduce the SIM to the claim that moral reasoning doesn’t happen or doesn’t matter, 
we point out that the SIM says that reasoning happens between people quite often, and within 
individuals occasionally.  Furthermore, the SIM is not about “cognition” and “emotion”; it is 
about two kinds of cognition:  fast intuition (which is sometimes but not always a part of an 
emotional response) and slow reasoning.”  Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, “Social 
Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology,” in Moral Psychology, Vol 2, ed. by 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press), 2008, p. 200.  Jonathan Haidt, “The 
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Prinz provides an empirical-based argument for his epistemic emotionism view 
based on the recent studies and interest in psychopaths in moral psychology.  Prinz turns 
to moral psychology studies on psychopathic individuals who have severe deficiencies in 
the emotions.  Psychopaths appear to make sincere moral judgments, but they seem to 
lack the emotion-backed motivation to act upon their judgments.  Psychopaths are known 
for their deficiencies in affect as well as their participation in heinous crimes.  At face 
value, they appear intelligent and able to make sincere moral judgments, but they fail to 
act upon such judgments and may lack the moral motivation to so act based on their lack 
of emotions.
19
  Thus, at first glance, it does seem like psychopaths do provide evidence 
against epistemic emotionism.  To note, psychopaths differ from frontotemporal dementia 
patients in that although they are both emotionally shallow, psychopaths display more 
deliberate deceitfulness and have the need for constant stimulation.
20
   
However, Prinz as well as James Blair and Shaun Nichols have pointed out that 
psychopaths apparently cannot distinguish between supposed moral versus conventional 
norms.
21
  Thus, it does not appear to be the case that psychopaths make sincere moral 
                                                     
 
emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment,” 
Psychological Review, 108:  (2001), 814-834. 
19 H.M. Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity:  An Attempt to Reinterpret the So-Called Psychopathic 
Personality, (St. Louis, MO:  The C.V. Mosby Company), 1941.   
20 Mario Mendez, “What frontotemporal dementia reveals about the neurobiological basis of 
morality,” Medical Hypothesis 67:  (2006), 411-418. 
21 I use the terms ‘apparent’ and ‘supposed’ because I will later present evidence that 
psychopaths can make the moral/conventional distinction and that Prinz’s moral/conventional 
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judgments.  If they are incapable of making sincere moral judgments, then they do not 
provide empirical evidence against epistemic emotionism.  To note, we will shortly 
discuss how Prinz also uses the psychopath studies to make a positive argument for his 
epistemic emotionism.  Numerous contemporary philosophers have attempted to make 
the distinction between the ethical and the conventional.  For example, in the edited 
volume The Definition of Morality, Alasdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa 
Foot, Peter Strawson, and others attempt to draw such a distinction a priori.
22
  However, 
all the philosophers reach different conclusions and fail to reach any consensus.  On the 
other hand, recently psychologists have begun positing that there supposedly are 
respective properties to the moral and the conventional domains that may distinguish the 
two and that also are relevant to scientific induction and explanation.  Such properties are 
psychologically real and psychologically important.  In other words, psychologists have 
argued by drawing on empirical data rather than by relying on a priori intuitions that 
morality is a purported natural kind and has a set of related properties in which scientific 
inductive generalizations may be drawn.   
                                                     
 
distinction is not legitimate.  R. Blair, “A cognitive developmental approach to morality:  
Investigating the psychopath,” Cognition 57:  (1995), 1-29.  Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules, 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004). 
22 In the final chapter of this dissertation, we will attack the method of conceptual analysis that is 
commonly used to draw an a priori distinction between the moral and the conventional.  Ed. by 
G. Wallace and A. Walker, The Definition of Morality, (London: Methuen & Co., 1970).   
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Prinz slightly strays from the work done by Turiel, Smetana, Nucci, and other 
psychologists on the supposed moral/conventional task by providing a more narrow list 
of what the properties are for moral versus conventional violations and norms.
23
  Prinz 
may be read as claiming that that there is a robust scientifically significant consensus on 
the ostensible moral/conventional task in that cross-culturally, harm norms such as those 
against killing, stealing, and lying involve a moral rather than conventional response 
pattern that is characterized by the property of being a grounding norm or being justified 
in terms of a grounding norm.  Here a grounding norm is a norm that does not require any 
further explanation or justification.  For example, norms against killing and stealing 
supposedly do not require any further justification.  They are foundational norms in that 
normal folk, for example, purportedly do not ask for and do not require a further 
justification as to why killing in cold blood is wrong.  Harm norms fall within the domain 
of morality because they supposedly are grounding norms or justified in terms of 
grounding norms, and they are not necessarily justified by appeal to local customs.  As 
we can see, this grounding norm property is intimately linked to the property of authority 
independence or scope objectivity in applying equally across location and time, where 
having scope objectivity means that the rule in question has the broad scope of applying 
                                                     
23 Unlike the psychologists, Prinz does not maintain that morality and the conventional are 
supposed homeostatically clustered natural kinds.  However, the arguments presented here 
against Prinz’s moral/conventional task can also be used against a homeostatically clustered 
natural kinds theory of the moral and conventional.  The standard list of properties for harm 
transgressions in the homeostatically clustered natural kind moral/conventional task literature is:  
scope objectivity, authority independence, justification by appeal to rights or harm, serious harm 
or injustice. 
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across cultures and time.  For, if a harm norm has the grounding norm property and is not 
justified by appeal to custom, then it will be taken to have scope objectivity rather than 
being limited to a particular culture or period of time.   
On the other hand, as a different scientific generalization, non-harm norms such 
as those against failing to take off one’s hat while eating, drinking soup from a bowl, and 
speaking in class without raising one’s hand purportedly evoke the conventional response 
pattern in children and adults of being justified by appeal to customs.  For example, we 
supposedly will say that the reason why we take off our hats when eating is due to the 
fact that this is the way we do things around here.  Moreover, this generalization 
purportedly holds across cultures.  Notice the intimate link between this property and that 
of authority dependence or lack of scope objectivity.  For, if we justify a non-harm norm 
by way of custom, then we will take the norm to be authority dependent or lacking in 
scope objectivity.    
All in all, Prinz writes: 
If I am right (and the literature on the moral/conventional distinction bears this 
 out), people do not ordinarily appeal to local customs when justifying harm 
 norms.  They don’t say that it’s wrong to whip [humans] because people don’t 
 whip around here.  In contrast, if you asked people why it’s wrong to wear a hat 
 while eating, they would be more likely to mention local customs.
24
 
 
However, psychopaths apparently treat both harm and non-harm norms as 
authority independent.  For example, even if the teacher says that one may speak out in 
class, psychopaths still replied that it is wrong to speak out in class.  Blair hypothesizes 
                                                     
24 Prinz, Emotional, p. 128. 
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that since he examined imprisoned psychopaths, such subjects have an interest in 
pleasing their interviewers in the hopes of receiving an early release.
25
  Thus, 
psychopaths apparently claim that all rules, moral or conventional, are inviolable at all 
times, which stands in opposition to normal prisoners who are able to successfully 
complete the supposed moral/conventional task.  Psychopaths appear to be able to get a 
few of the questions right on the task, but they do significantly worse than normal 
prisoners on the task.  Prisoners who truly understand the ostensible moral/conventional 
distinction and desire to show their moral competence supposedly will be able to draw 
the distinction.  Thus, Blair claims that psychopaths really cannot distinguish between the 
supposed moral and the conventional because they would have done so if asked.  Rather, 
it apparently is the case that they really view morality as equivalent to conventional 
norms and merely pay lip service to morality.  This hypothesis supposedly is further 
backed by Blair’s ostensible moral/conventional task study on children with psychopathic 
tendencies.
26
  Due to these findings, Prinz claims that it is not the case that psychopaths 
have proper moral concepts and can make sincere moral judgments.  Thus, Prinz argues 
that psychopaths cannot be used as evidential support against epistemic emotionism. 
Prinz takes this a step further and adds that there appears to be a necessary link 
between emotions and moral competence.  Psychopaths have an emotional deficit which 
co-occurs with the fact that they supposedly cannot make the apparent 
                                                     
25 Blair, ibid. 
26 R. Blair, “Moral Reasoning and the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies,” Personality and 
Individual Differences 25:  (1997), 731-9. 
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moral/conventional distinction.  This suggests that one must have moral sentiments in 
order to comprehend morality.  In other words, for Prinz, to have a correct moral 
conception in order to make a sincere moral judgment, one’s concept must be essentially 
related to emotions.  Thus, Prinz believes that the case of psychopaths does not provide 
evidence against epistemic emotionism, but rather, it actually supports the case for 
epistemic emotionism.   
At this point, I will present arguments against Prinz’s naturalistically supported 
view of epistemic emotionism.  First, psychopaths apparently are not completely bereft of 
sentiments, so it may not be the case that a deficiency of sentiments is responsible for 
their apparent inability to perform well on the supposed moral/conventional task.  For 
example, although at a more reduced level as compared to non-psychopathic subjects, 
psychopaths can still show significant galvanic skin responses to pictures of individuals 
who are under distress and crying.
27
  This is suggestive of a reduced but still present 
empathy response.  It may be the case that the sentiments psychopaths apparently do have 
are all that is needed to make the supposed distinction or it may be the case that 
absolutely no sentiments are required at all to complete the task, and some other mental 
deficiency is responsible for their supposed inability to distinguish between the purported 
moral and conventional.  Research on psychopaths is still in its developing stages, and 
there are several studies indicating that psychopaths have some cognitive deficiencies as 
                                                     
27J. Blair, J. Morris, C. Frith, et al.,“Dissociable neural responses to facial expressions of sadness 
and anger,”Brain, 122, 1999, 883 -893. 
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well.
28
  For example, in one study, Ethan Gorenstein has shown that psychopaths do 
worse than controls in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) and the Sequential 
Matching Memory Task (SMMT).
29
  The WCST asks participants to sort or categorize a 
stack of cards into various piles based on certain qualities that the pictures on the cards 
contain.  The WCST then tests to see how well subjects are able to flexibly adapt to the 
categorization process once the rules of categorization have changed.  The SMMT is a 
cognitive memory test in which participants are shown a series of cards one by one that 
either have a plus or minus sign on them.  Subjects are tested as to whether they can 
recall the sign of the card two cards previous to the one currently displayed.  While these 
studies suggest there are cognitive deficiencies in psychopaths related to categorization 
and memory, I contend that they also open up the possibility that psychopaths may also 
have deficiencies in moral categorization and moral reasoning.  Without any evidence to 
the contrary, this possibility remains open, and at this point in the study of psychopaths, I 
argue that Prinz’s reliance on psychopaths to contend for epistemic emotionism may be 
put in some doubt, and it is too premature to absolutely conclude that blunted emotions 
are responsible for psychopaths having apparent problems with the purported task.  It is 
possible that the sentiments they supposedly do have may be enough to adequately 
                                                     
28 See D. Schalling and A. Rosen, “Porteus maze differences between psychopathic and Non-
psychopathic criminals,” British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 7:  (1968), pp. 224-8.  
Joshua Zeier, Arielle Baskin-Sommers, Kristina Racer, and Joseph Newman, “Cognitive Control 
Deficits Associated with Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy,” Personality Disorder:  
Theory, Research, and Treatment, forthcoming, advanced on-line publication (July 4, 2011).   
29 E. E. Gorenstein, “Frontal Lobe Functions in Psychopaths,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 91:  
(1982), p.  368-379. 
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perform the ostensible task or that absolutely no sentiments are required at all to complete 
the purported task, and it may be deficits in moral cognitive functions that really are 
responsible for their apparent failure in the supposed task. 
Second, since psychopaths can still experience emotions on a limited basis, they 
are still conceivably disposed to feel emotions, although such a disposition does not 
manifest itself occurrently on a normal basis.  Recall that sentiments are dispositions to 
feel emotions.  For example, psychopaths at times can feel the moral emotion of anger 
when they have been rejected by other people, especially those close to them such as by 
family and friends.
30
  They can also at times have a hypersensitivity to anger when others 
refuse to cooperate with them.
31
  Death of a loved one can also spur psychopaths to 
                                                     
30 Willem Martens, “Antisocial and psychopathic personality disorders: causes, course and 
remission,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 44(4):  (2000), 
406-430. 
31 While some may perceive the disposition to feel anger to be less important than the disposition 
to feel the pain and suffering of others when making moral judgments, I list this study here 
(along with other studies suggesting that psychopaths also may have the disposition to feel the 
pain and suffering of others) because the disposition to feel anger is still thought to influence 
moral judgments even though it may play a lesser role as compared to other dispositions.  The 
sentiment of anger is still commonly considered to be a moral sentiment.  For a study on the 
importance of anger to moral judgments, see E. Fehr and S. Gachter, “Altruistic punishment in 
humans,” Nature 415:  (2002), 137-140.  For studies indicating that psychopaths have a 
hypersensitivity to anger, see H. Kohut, The analysis of the self, (New York: International 
Universities Press), 1971.  O. Kernberg, “A Psychoanalytic classification of character pathology,” 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association 18:  1970, pp. 800-822. O. Kernberg, “Early ego 
integration and object relations,” Annals of the New York Academy of  Sciences 193:  1972, pp. 233-
247.  O. Kernberg, Aggression in personality disorders and perversions, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press), 1992. 
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experience guilt for their previous criminal activities.
32
  Moreover, psychopaths can feel 
the pain and suffering of others in that they can feel empathy and sympathy towards those 
with whom they have a long-lasting and warm relationship.
33
  Recall that we have 
previously discussed how psychopaths still have an empathy response when shown 
pictures of individuals who are in distress or crying.  Experiencing a string of good luck 
or occupational success can also at times elicit pro-social emotions such as caring.
34
  Skin 
conductance response and cardiac deceleration tests have suggested that psychopaths 
have delayed emotional reactions to unpleasant emotionally charged pictures.
35
  
Moreover, blood pressure, pulse, and self-report tests indicate that psychopaths feel anger 
in the performer evaluator paradigm.
36
  In this experiment, participants witness a person 
adequately performing a given task then being unjustly criticized on his performance by a 
confederate or actor.  Indeed, the University of Wisconsin psychologist Joseph Newman 
and others controversially hypothesize that although psychopaths generally do have 
blunted emotions as compared to normal subjects, at numerous times psychopaths do 
                                                     
32 Willem Martens, Psychopathy and Maturation, PhD-thesis, Tilburg University, The 
Netherlands, (Maastricht:  Shaker Publishing), 1997.  Willem Martens, “Emotional Capacities and 
sensitivity in Psychopaths,” Dynamical Psychology:  2003. 
33 Ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 Steven Sutton, Jennifer Vitale, and Joseph Newman, “Emotion Among Women With 
Psychopathy During Picture Perception,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 111:  2002, pp. 610-619. 
36 Brian Lee Steuerwald, Anger Following Provocation in Individuals with Psychopathic Characteristics, 
(Greensboro, NC:  University of North Carolina Greensboro Press), 1996. 
 181 
experience emotions in social interpersonal settings, but they generally do not selectively 
pay attention to their emotions.
37
 
Therefore, it appears that psychopaths may have sentiments or dispositions to feel 
emotions in relations to certain moral emotions such as anger and empathy.
38
  Although 
this may be the case, whether psychopaths truly have any sentiments or not may still be a 
controversial issue in the psychopaths literature given that there are many studies also 
suggesting that at times they have blunted affect in relation to emotions such as anger and 
empathy.
39
  However, we may still embrace this controversial topic and use it to provide 
a new objection to Prinz.  For, at minimum, at this stage it seems that it is at least highly 
controversial whether psychopaths have sentiments or not.  Perhaps more studies are 
needed to make a decisive claim on this matter.  Thus, at minimum and assuming that 
psychopaths cannot successfully complete the supposed moral/conventional task,
40
 I 
contend that Prinz’s initial epistemic emotionism thesis cannot be adequately justified 
based on psychopath studies since we are not sure whether psychopaths are disposed to 
feel emotions or not.  It may be, for example, an inability to pay attention to one’s 
                                                     
37 A. Baskin-Sommers, J. Curtin, J. Newman, “Specifying the attentional selection that moderates 
the fearlessness of psychopathic offenders,” Psychological Science 22(2):  2011, pp. 226–234. 
38 Empathy is commonly understood as the feeling of another’s emotions and realizing that one’s 
feelings result from theirs.  Insofar as it involves the feeling of an emotion, empathy is typically 
understood as being an emotion. 
39 One issue in particular that makes this a controversial topic is that further psychological 
theorizing will be required to distinguish between a psychopaths only sometimes being 
associated with experiencing emotions versus psychopaths actually having a disposition to feel 
emotions which is not always realized.    
40 It will later be shown that psychopaths can successfully complete the moral/conventional task. 
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emotions that psychopaths are disposed to feeling that explains psychopaths’ apparent 
inability to perform the supposed moral/conventional task, or perhaps it may be a lack of 
emotional dispositions that is responsible.  Since we are unsure of this matter, I argue that 
Prinz cannot conclude with the requisite certainty that all moral concepts are constituted 
by sentiments; a conclusion he draws that is based in part on the questionable fact that 
psychopaths lack moral sentiments. 
Third, a recent study has shown that psychopaths can successfully complete the 
supposed moral/conventional task.  In order to eliminate the possible design flaw in 
previous experiments that incarcerated psychopaths can really distinguish between the 
purported moral and the conventional but they do not do so because they want to impress 
the parole board by inflating conventional harms to that of moral ones, Aharoni, et al. 
gave the supposed moral conventional task to groups of psychopathic inmates and non-
psychopathic inmates.
41
  However, before answering the sixteen questions, subjects were 
told in advance that eight of the acts were pre-rated to be morally wrong, or, in other 
words, wrong even if there were no conventions or laws against them.  Moreover, they 
were told that eight were pre-rated to be conventionally wrong, or, in other words, not 
wrong if there were no conventions or laws against them.  In this fashion, our 
experimenters attempt to eliminate the possibility that psychopaths are attempting to 
impress others with their answers.  Participants were asked to label each violation 
                                                     
41 E. Aharoni, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, and K. Kiehl, “Can Psychopathic Offenders Discern Moral 
Wrongs? A New Look at the Moral/Conventional Distinction,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
forthcoming. 
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according to whether or not the act would be wrong if there were no conventions or laws 
against it.  Notice that Prinz’s supposed moral/conventional distinction predicts that if 
psychopaths cannot really distinguish between the moral and the conventional, then they 
should do rather poorly on this test since they do not understand that harm norms are not 
justified by appeal to custom but non-harm norms are so justified.  The results of the 
experiment were that psychopaths indeed were able to distinguish between purported 
moral and conventional norms comparable to the non-psychopathic inmates.  Aharoni et 
al. ran their experiments in order to challenge the fact that psychopaths cannot 
successfully complete the moral/conventional task.  Hence, we now can use their tests 
and apply them to Prinz and his claim on moral concepts.  Given that there is evidence 
that psychopaths do actually properly make the supposed moral/conventional distinction, 
it appears to not be the case that all moral concepts must be constituted by sentiments and 
at times by emotions based on psychopath studies.
42
  While surely more studies must be 
                                                     
42 One may object to this study in that the number of conventional versus moral harms is already 
given to subjects and this may provide weak cues to make it easier for participants to make the 
supposed distinctions.  This may be analogous to how color-blind persons can guess which colors 
are which based on the weak cues of lightness and contextual appropriateness.  However, one 
must ask what the weak cues may be in the apparent moral/conventional case.  If there are cues, 
they allow for psychopaths to do just as well as non-psychopathic inmates.  I see no other 
possibility but that it must be some features of the situations that allow psychopaths to 
successfully complete the ostensible task.  However, if this is the case, then emotionally blunted 
psychopaths must be relying on some kind of conscious or subconscious knowledge of a 
purported moral/conventional distinction as it is certain features of the situation that are 
supposed to allow normal subjects to differentiate between the moral and the conventional.  
Unlike the color-blind case, there does not appear to be some weak or intermediate cue, such as 
contextual appropriateness, in the supposed moral/conventional case that allows one to tell the 
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conducted in order to fully determine whether psychopaths can make the supposed 
moral/conventional distinction, this study at hand places enough doubt on previous 
conclusions that psychopaths cannot make the purported moral/conventional distinction, 
that Prinz’s reliance on such previous conclusions in order to support epistemic 
emotionism is unjustified.   
Fourth, I will now attack Prinz’s moral/conventional task.  If successful, this will 
show that the premise that ‘psychopaths cannot distinguish between the moral and the 
conventional’ may be significantly doubted since Prinz’s moral/conventional distinction 
is not legitimate.  Given that this is the case, the premise cannot be said to support 
epistemic emotionism.  It must be stated that there may not be enough evidence to 
completely discount Prinz’s moral/conventional task, but what will be attempted here is 
to demonstrate that there is enough evidence to cast significant doubt on it; a significant 
                                                     
 
difference between the moral and the conventional without actually knowing the difference 
between the moral and the conventional.   
  Telling subjects how many moral and conventional violations there are is beneficial in that it 
eliminates the possibility that psychopaths claim that all violations are moral in order to impress 
the parole board.  Nevertheless, this may create problems in that it makes it easier for subjects to 
perform the task given that they know the number of situations that belong in each category.  
While it may make it easier in this respect, if psychopaths really do not know how to make the 
supposed distinction, then we should still expect them to do worse than non-psychopathic 
inmates.  However, they do just as well as non-psychopathic inmates, and this must be due to the 
fact that it is based on certain features of the situations that allows them to successfully complete 
the study.  Yet if this is the case, then it appears that they really do know how to distinguish 
between the purported moral and the conventional because it is thought that such a distinction is 
usually made based on situational features.   
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doubt that may also be placed on any larger conclusions such as epistemic emotionism 
that in this particular argument crucially relies on the legitimacy of this task.   
A host of philosophers and psychologists have run experiments in order to 
explicitly or implicitly challenge the moral/conventional task.  For example, Jonathan 
Haidt, et al. ran an experiment where they discovered that lower socio-economic subjects 
in the United States and in Brazil judged non-harmful transgressions to be authority 
independent and to have scope objectivity.
43
  For example, when such participants were 
asked to make judgments on a man who privately has sexual intercourse with a dead 
chicken before cooking and eating it or on a woman who privately cleans her toilet bowl 
with the national flag, they answered that these cases are universally wrong even though 
they perceived such transgressions to be harmless.  On the other hand, higher socio-
economic participants did not hold such cases to be universally wrong.  Thus, this study 
indicates that perceived harmless transgressions that should elicit an opposing 
conventional response pattern can actually elicit the moral response pattern of authority 
independence and scope objectivity.  Hence, whether or not one perceives certain 
harmless transgressions to have scope objectivity and authority independence may be 
relative to one’s socio-economic status.  This study suggests that justifications that do not 
appeal to local custom are being used in non-harm cases.  Additionally, Korean children 
also claimed that the non-harmful transgression of not appropriately greeting one’s elders 
                                                     
43 J. Haidt, S. Koller, M. Dias, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:  (1993), 613-28. 
 186 
as having the moral response pattern properties of scope objectivity and authority 
independence.
44
   
Shaun Nichols has run studies on disgusting and non-disgusting violations of 
etiquette norms.
45
  For example, a disgusting non-harm transgression is when a dinner 
guest snorts then spits into his water glass and drinks from it.  A non-disgusting non-harm 
violation is when a dinner guest drinks soup directly out of his bowl.  He found that 
children believed disgusting transgressions to be authority independent and as having 
scope objectivity.  Meanwhile, adults also took such disgust violations to be authority 
independent.  The above studies provide evidence against the scientific generalization 
that cross-culturally, violations that do not involve stereotypical harm transgressions 
evoke the conventional response pattern.   
Moving in the opposite direction where we will be discussing participants’ 
reactions to violations that do involve prototypical harm transgressions, Hagop Sarkissian 
and his collaborators have suggested in a cross-cultural study with participants in the U.S. 
and Singapore that clear harm violations can elicit aspects of a conventional response 
pattern.
46
  For example, participants are given scenarios in which an individual kills 
                                                     
44 M. Song, J. Smetana, S. Kim, ibid. 
45 Shaun Nichols, “Norms with feeling:  Toward a psychological account of moral judgment,” 
Cognition 84:  (2002), 223-236.  Nichols, Sentimental Rules. 
46 The findings from this study contravene the Goodwin and Darley study that suggests that there 
is a general underlying objectivity to ordinary moral discourse (Goodwin & Darley, ibid.).  For, 
the interlocutors in the Goodwin and Darley studies were all in the same culture, and subjects 
may have assumed that the interlocutors have generally the same values even though they may 
reach different conclusion on certain ethical matters.  However, once individuals from different 
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random innocent bystanders.  In each case, the participant is told that one’s classmate 
believes such random acts of violence are morally wrong but a member of a hypothetical 
alien culture holds the opposite view.  Subjects are then asked about these conflicting 
judgments and whether they believe it is the case that only one of the disputants may be 
right or that both of them can be right.  If participants believe that both of them can be 
right, then this shows evidence that they believe in an underlying cultural moral 
relativism concerning certain instances when interlocutors have differing moral views, 
and that such harm transgressions in question do not have scope objectivity.  This study 
found that a majority of participants thought that both disputants could be right in a 
number of cases and that they did not believe that such harm transgressions are 
characterized by scope objectivity.  This study implies that beliefs about local customs 
factor into judgments about paradigmatic harm norms.
47
   
                                                     
 
cultures with a significantly different set of values is introduced as in the Sarkissian, et al. 
experiments, an underlying relativism is drawn out from subjects.  H. Sarkissian, J. Park, D. Tien, 
J. C. Wright, J. Knobe, “Folk Moral Relativism,” Mind & Language 26:  (2011), pp. 482-505. 
47 Daniel Kelly and company have run studies attempting to challenge whether harm violations 
are characterized by the moral response pattern.  For example, they found that participants 
believed a ship captain whipping his derelict and drunken sailor 300 years ago lacks authority 
independence.  However, I do not put forth this study as evidence against the supposed 
moral/conventional task due to objections given by Prinz.  For example, Prinz argues that 
subjects state that it is permissible for the historical captain to whip his sailor because there are 
historical factors that allow for the moral permissibility of the act – e.g., that sailors in the past 
were more prone to unruly behavior and mutiny than the professional sailors of today’s age.  To 
note, through verbal communication, Stich has said that he now has the data from running 
moral/conventional task studies in twelve different cultures.  The results suggest that Prinz’s 
moral/conventional distinction is not legitimate.  Kelly, et al., ibid.  Prinz, Emotional, 127-8.   
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Likewise, Nichols ran a series of experiments where in one test, subjects are 
asked to imagine two people from different cultures debating whether it is permissible to 
hit another person just for the fun of it.
48
  One person is from a culture where it is not 
permissible while the other interlocutor is from a culture in which it is permissible.  
Nichols found that 66% of the subjects believed that the moral transgression of hitting 
others for fun lacks scope objectivity.
49
   This study also implies that beliefs about local 
customs factor into judgments about paradigmatic harm norms.  Moreover, in a different 
study in Israel, traditional Arab children differed from urban Jewish children in that their 
justification of why harm transgressions are wrong is based on an appeal to customs.
50
  
While many more studies need to be conducted in order to make a complete case, these 
above studies regarding subjects’ reactions to harm transgressions begin to suggest that 
cross-culturally, such transgressions do not evoke the typical moral response pattern.  
                                                     
48 Shaun Nichols, “After Objectivity:  An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment,” Philosophical 
Psychology 17:  (2004), 5-28. 
49 Several of the other studies in Nichols’ experiments contrarily showed that a majority of 
subjects were objectivists, but there was still a significant group of non-objectivists in these cases.  
For example, 17 of the 40 participants in one of the experiments were non-objectivists while 23 
were objectivists.  However, in the Sarkissian, et al. studies, they ran six experiments in which 
they received consistent results where most subjects were non-objectivists.  Perhaps one 
explanation for the consistency in the Sarkissian, et al. test results as opposed to the Nichols 
experiments is that Sarkissian and company gave a one page detailed description of the alien 
culture while Nichols did not and merely stated that the two interlocuters are from different 
cultures without providing further details.  The greater detail perhaps drove home the point that 
the debaters were from different cultures with vastly different ways of life.  This factor may have 
led to the consistency in Sarkissian, et al.’s various experiments where a majority of participants 
were non-objectivists in all six studies. 
50 M. Nisan, “Moral norms and social conventions: A cross-cultural comparison,” Developmental 
Psychology , 23 :  (1987), 719 – 725 . 
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While it is also admitted that more work needs to be done overall on the supposed 
moral/conventional task to reach a decisive conclusion whether Prinz’s 
moral/conventional distinction holds, what has been attempted here is to show that 
enough doubt can be placed on this task that any concepts conclusion that is based on 
Prinz’s moral/conventional distinction – or for that matter, any such universal distinction, 
however based – is unwarranted barring further evidence.  Given that this is the case 
along with the other three previously given arguments, we cannot draw a strong 
conclusion from Prinz’s psychopaths-based argument that all moral concepts are 
dispositionally and at times constitutionally related to emotions. 
 
4.4  The Arguments for the Emotion Theory 
Now that we have seen how Prinz’s psychopaths-based argument for the emotion 
theory does not work, we will explore how appropriate causal studies in moral 
psychology can be used to argue for the emotion theory.  In order to understand 
experiments that may be used to make a prima facie viability claim for the emotion 
theory for moral concepts, a basic understanding of the trolley problems is required.
51
  In 
the trolley cases, imagine there is a lever case in which a train is about to run over five 
people, but you may pull a lever to divert the train on a side track in order to save the five 
                                                     
51J. Greene, R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen, “An fmri investigation 
of emotional engagement in moral judgment,” Science 293, (2001), 2105-8.  J. Greene, L.E. 
Nystrom, A.D. Engell, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen,  “The Neural Bases of Cognitive conflict and 
Control in Moral Judgment,” Neuron 44:  2004, 387-400. 
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people.  However, it just so happens that there is one person who is on the side track who 
will be killed if you pull the lever to save the five.   89% of participants agree that one 
ought to pull the lever in this scenario.  Now, in the footbridge case, imagine that the 
same train is heading towards the same five people, but now you are on a footbridge that 
hovers over the track.  In your company is a heavyset man whose body mass is large 
enough to stop the train if you kill him by pushing him over the bridge on to the track in 
order to save the five.  In this case, 89% of participants state that one should not push the 
heavyset man.  Greene interprets the trolley cases as a matter between consequentialism 
and deontology.
52
  Studies have shown that the lever case is one in which most 
participants make supposed folk consequentialist judgments in which it is permissible to 
pull the lever in order to save a greater number of lives while the footbridge case is one in 
which most subjects make supposed Kantian deontological judgments in which the 
heavyset man has an individual right not to be pushed regardless of the greater 
consequences that will arise in pushing him.  In these trolley studies, when stating that 
subjects make deontological judgments, what is meant is that they draw conclusions that 
                                                     
52 Some interpret this set of trolley problems as a matter of the Doctrine of Double Effect.  The 
Doctrine states that at times it is permissible to harm others as a side effect of attaining a good 
end, but it is not permissible to harm others as a means of attaining a good end.  However, as we 
will later see, I interpret the set of trolley problems as primarily being between folk 
consequentialism and emotions.   It is doubtful that the Doctrine is being used in the lever and 
footbridge circumstances because if this is the case, then the same brain region(s) should be in 
play for the two trolley problems in the set since the Doctrine supposedly is at work in both these 
cases.  However, this is not the case.  The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is primarily active for the 
lever trolley case, but the ventromedial prefrontal cortex region is primarily active for the 
footbridge case.  This provides suggestive yet not quite conclusive evidence that the Doctrine is 
not being used in these particular trolley problems. 
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would be thought to be made by deontological normative theory.  It is not meant to 
necessarily mean that deontological reasoning is actually used to arrive upon a moral 
conclusion.  However, concerning folk consequentialist reasoning, it will later be argued 
with additional evidence that such reasoning is being used by normal subjects in the lever 
case.  Now, as with Greene, et al.’s, cognitive load study, taken by itself, it is not decisive 
that subjects are truly making folk consequentialist or, for that matter, deontological 
judgments, but as a matter of convenience, we shall abide by these classifications for the 
two different types of judgments for now.   
Mendez, et al. have run trolley studies on patients with frontotemporal dementia 
which involves a deterioration of the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and 
anterior temporal emotion areas of the brain.
53
  Although they are thought to have normal 
reasoning processes, these patients have been found to not only show diminished concern 
for others but they also exhibit emotional blunting or severely diminished emotions such 
as having a lack of empathy.  Due to emotional blunting, such patients are prone to 
committing transgressions such as stealing and inducing violent physical harm to others.  
They do not respond to the needs of others nor acknowledge them, and they also display 
inappropriate sexual behavior such as pedophilia.  Mendez, et al.’s study has been 
                                                     
53 M.F. Mendez, E. Anderson, & J.S. Shapria, “An investigation of moral judgment in 
frontotemporal dementia,” Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18: 4 (2005), 193-7. 
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successfully replicated by Koenigs & Young, et al. and Ciaramelli, et al. on patients that 
also have lesions in the VMPFC.
54
   
Relatedly, in Descartes’ Error, Antonio Damasio has similarly concluded that 
patients with lesions to the VMPFC have intact reasoning capacities but are considered to 
have deficiencies in affect.
55
  For instance, Damasio describes the case of one of his 
patients who scores normally and at times above normal on intelligence and reasoning 
tests, but exhibits diminished emotions.  When discussing the many tragic hardships of 
his life, the subject displays an unusual emotional detachment from such events with no 
sign of frustration or sadness.  Moreover, when shown visually stimulating and 
emotionally charged pictures of people drowning and individuals being in gory accidents, 
the patient showed no emotional response and remained emotionally neutral.  This 
patient’s everyday life was generally characterized as one of disaffection, which is 
opposite from the time period in his life before he suffered damage to the VMPFC.   
In Mendez, et al.’s work, patients with frontotemporal dementia were given the 
lever case and footbridge case.  In the lever case, patients’ responses matched that of 
normal subjects.  For example, in the lever scenario most patients stated that it is 
permissible to pull the lever.  However, in the footbridge case, patients significantly 
                                                     
54 M. Koenigs, L. Young, R. Adolphs, D. Tranel, F. Cushman, M. Hauser, A. Damasio, “Damage to 
the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments,” Nature 446:  (2007), 908-911.  E. 
Ciaramelli, M. Muccioli, E. Ladavas, and G. di Pellgrino, “Selective deficit in personal moral 
judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex,” Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience 2:  (2007), 84-92. 
55 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error, (New York:  Penguin Books), 1994. 
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diverged from the answers from normal subjects by allowing for the pushing of the 
heavyset man onto the track.  With blunted emotions, frontotemporal dementia patients 
were more inclined to make apparent folk consequentialist judgments in this situation, 
while those with normal emotions tended to believe that pushing the heavyset man is not 
permissible.  This study provides causal evidence that in certain cases such as the lever 
case, some kind of folk consequentialist reasoning influences moral judgment.  After all, 
the patients who have blunted emotions made the same judgments as normal subjects in 
such cases, and normal subjects displayed activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
as in Greene’s cognitive load study.56  Along with the evidence presented in the theory-
theory section of this chapter concerning Greene’s cognitive load study, neuroimaging 
studies, and cross-cultural evidence for a Kohlbergian folk consequentialism, this 
suggests that normal subjects prima facie may primarily be using a Kohlbergian folk 
consequentialism knowledge in making such decisions.
57
  Here, the possibility is left 
open that emotions can still have some influence on judgment, but regardless of whether 
this is so, from this study we still may infer that a Kohlbergian folk consequentialism 
plays a prima facie role.   
However, since the emotionally blunted patients diverged in judgments from 
normal participants in the footbridge case by making apparent folk consequentialist rather 
                                                     
56 Greene, ibid. 
57 In The Emotional Construction of Morals, Prinz states that it is really the emotions driving 
judgments in the lever case since there is a small activation of emotion regions of the brain when 
subjects make such categorizations.  However, Prinz mistakenly uses only correlational fmri data 
to draw a causal conclusion.  Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals. 
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than deontological categorizations, this and other replication studies suggest that 
emotions do play a causal role in making judgments for normal subjects in the footbridge 
case.  In that emotionally blunted patients did not make the same judgments as normal 
subjects did in the footbridge case, this suggests that normal participants are influenced 
by emotions when making such categorizations.  Likewise, some kind of reasoning may 
also play a role alongside emotions in footbridge case categorizations for normal 
subjects, but whether or not this is the case, we still may infer that emotions play a prima 
facie specified causal role, and for our purposes, this is important.  This replicated study 
provides prima facie evidence that the emotion theory is a viable view of moral 
concepts.
58
  To note, the retraction, inferential base, and informational value tests have 
                                                     
58 There is an apparently contradictory ultimatum game study run by Koenigs and Daniel Tranel.  
In typical ultimatum games, two players can split a sum of money, where the first player makes 
an offer, and the second can either accept or reject the offer.  For example, a fair offer would be to 
split ten dollars equally, and an unfair offer would be an $8/$2 split.  A convergence of studies 
suggest that rejections of unjust offers are influenced by emotional reactions of frustration and 
anger.  However, Koenigs and Tramel discovered that VMPFC patients had a higher rejection 
rate of the most unfair offers ($7/$3, $8/$2, $9/$1) as compared to normal subjects.  They conclude 
that VMPFC subjects experience anger and frustration which causes them to have a higher 
rejection rate of unfair offers and that damage to the VMPFC disrupts the ability to regulate the 
emotions such that one may harness one’s anger and accept unfair offers in order to “rationally” 
attain at least some financial gain for one’ self-interest.  This particular study apparently 
contradicts the previous VMPFC studies related to the trolley problems in that VMPFC subjects, 
despite generally having blunted emotions, are known to experience emotions such as anger and 
irritability in certain situations, and such emotions influence judgment.  For example, even 
Damasio notes how VMPFC patients, in rare instances, may lose their temper (Descartes’ 45).  
However, when they do so, the outburst is swift, and patients quickly return to their calm 
detached states without bearing any grudges.  This seems to put into question or to contradict the 
fact that in the lever and footbridge case it is thought that for VMPFC patients, emotions play 
little to no role in affecting such moral categorizations. 
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not been run on the normal subjects in this study.  However, remember that so long as the 
normal subjects do not appear to be experiencing some kind of mental error or a potential 
causal factor to such error, such as being hypnotized or being manipulated by 
experimenters by being placed in a dirty room that elicits a disgust affect, then a prima 
facie constitution claim may be made for the concepts of normal participants.  The 
normal subjects in the above studies do not appear to be experiencing some kind of 
mental error or a potential causal factor to such error when undergoing the tests.  Thus, a 
prima facie conclusion for the emotion theory may be drawn for normal subjects.  
Concerning concept acquisition, we already know that there is a prima facie 
constitution claim for the viability of the emotion theory for adults based on 
categorization studies, so if this is the case, emotion theory moral concepts must have 
                                                     
 
     However, Koenigs & Young, et al., note that the emotional effects of VMPFC damage are 
context dependent.  VMPFC subjects may exhibit emotions such as anger and frustration when 
being directly and personally provoked such as in the ultimatum game when frustration is 
triggered due to unfair take-it-or-leave-it offers that also involves an element of self-interest and 
direct involvement.  On the other hand, such subjects are generally characterized as having 
severely diminished social emotions related to such feelings as empathy and a concern for others, 
where such an emotionally detached state is manifested, inter alia, in hypothetical scenarios such 
as the trolley problems where the patient is not directly and personally involved in a real life 
situation.  Thus, in the context of the VMPFC studies that include the trolley cases, VMPFC 
patients have blunted social emotions, and such a context is not a case in which the subject is 
personally and directly involved such that the emotions of anger and frustration may potentially 
manifest themselves and play a causal role.  Therefore, we may infer that reasoning is the 
primary causal influence in moral categorizations by VMPFC patients in the lever and footbridge 
cases.  Michael Koenigs and Daniel Tranel, “Irrational Economic Decision-Making after 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage:  Evidence from the Ultimatum Game,” The Journal of 
Neuroscience 27:  (2007), 951-956.  Koenigs & Young, ibid. 
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been acquired in some way.  However, for concept acquisition, there are no studies 
explicitly showing that emotions in the specified kind of way influence rather than are 
correlated with children’s moral judgments.  However, it may be demonstrated here that 
there is a strong possibility that in future tests on children, the emotion theory may be 
shown to be viable.  This strong possibility later will be inferred based on combining 
several facts such as that children do experience moral emotions and that developmental 
psychologists observe children to be influenced by emotions when making moral 
decisions.    
While it is widely understood in folk psychology that children can experience 
emotions such as anger, there are studies showing that children do experience moral 
emotions.  For instance, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian along with Nichols hypothesize that 
four year-olds do not comprehend the moral emotion of guilt yet, but such a 
comprehension is attained in later years.
59
  However, this is controversial in that a 
number of studies have shown that children younger than four can comprehend guilt.
60
  
                                                     
59 Nichols also uses this fact to mount a criticism against Allan Gibbard’s metaethical view which 
in part states that an action is morally wrong if one accepts norms that obligates one to feel guilt 
when performing the action.  Gibbard’s view requires us to be able to form judgments about 
moral emotions such as guilt, but Nichols argues that four-year olds cannot form such judgments 
about guilt yet even though they have mastered the moral/convention task.  In other words, such 
children moralize without the comprehension of guilt.  Nichols, Sentimental.  Allan Gibbard, Wise 
Choices, Apt Feelings, (Oxford:  Clarendon Press), 1991. 
60 Michael Lewis, “Emotional Competence and Development,” in Improving Competence across the 
Lifespan, ed. by D. Pushkar, W. M. Bukowski, A. E. Schwartzman, D.M. Stack and D. R. White, 
(New York:  Plenum), 1998, 27-36.  K. Barrett, C. Zahn-Waxler, and P. Cole, “Avoiders Versus 
Amenders:  Implication for the Investigation of Guilt and Shame During Toddlerhood?”  
Cognition and Emotion 7:  (1993), 481-505.  Kagan, ibid. 
 197 
For instance, Kochanska and company gave two-years-old children a doll that is said to 
be of special value to its owner.
61
  The children are warned to be extremely careful with 
it, but the experiment is set up such that the doll eventually will end up breaking or ink 
will be spilled on it.  The experimenters found that when this occurred, children showed 
signs of guilt by avoiding the experimenters gaze, squirming, or covering their faces with 
their hands.  Such a study suggests that children may experience the moral emotion of 
guilt at a very young age.  
Also, while not based on direct experimental causal evidence where emotions are 
shown to influence judgments in the appropriate qualified way, empathy is usually 
thought by developmental psychologists to be at work at times when adolescents reason 
about moral situations by placing themselves in others’ shoes.62  It is common for 
childhood psychologists to personally observe and then hypothesize that emotions at 
times influence and motivate certain judgments and actions in children and adolescents.  
For example, the Cornell psychologist Kenneth Barish claims that the emotion of shame 
is a powerful emotion that has more lasting power than most other emotions.
 63
  For 
example, if a child feels a strong sense of shame for seriously letting down her father on a 
moral matter, then this shame will tend to stick with the child, at times in suppressed 
                                                     
61 G. Kochanska, J. Gross, M. Lin, and K. Nichols, “Guilt in Young Children:  Development, 
Determinants, and Relations With A Broader System of Standards, Child Development 73:  (2002), 
461-82. 
62 Abigail Baird, “Adolescent Moral Reasoning,” Moral Psychology Vol. 3, ed. by Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press), 2008. 
63 Kenneth Barish, Pride and Joy, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 2012. 
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form, even through adolescent years, where it can in part later motivate her in certain 
relevant moral circumstances to do the right thing.  
Despite the fact that all of the above studies do not directly and experimentally 
support concept acquisition for the emotion theory in children, such studies at least 
provide some optimism for a hypothesis on future studies on children and moral emotions 
that children will at times be influenced by emotions in the appropriate qualified way 
when making moral judgments.  In this circumstance, recall that the appropriate qualified 
way for emotions is when 1) the emotion is used by default and 2a) for an emotion with a 
cognitive constituent, at least one of the cognitive constituents is in part inferable from 
the inferential base or; 2b) For a cognitive or non-cognitive emotion, a corresponding 
cognitive prototype rule must be held consciously or subconsciously by the agent that 
states that the expression of the influencing emotion in the type of moral circumstance at 
hand is a potential factor that may lead one to make the relevant categorization.  
Furthermore, this rule must be able to be in part inferable from the inferential base.   If i) 
children can experience moral emotions such as guilt and anger that are typically thought 
to influence moral judgment in certain cases, ii) developmental psychologists hypothesize 
that emotions at times influence children’s and adolescents’ moral judgments, iii) it prima 
facie experimentally has been shown that emotions can at times influence adult moral 
decision-making, then an inference may be made that there is a strong possibility that 
future studies on children will demonstrate that at times they may be influenced by 
emotions in the appropriate qualified way when making moral judgments.   
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5.  Induction, Concept Combination, & Strong Pluralism 
In this chapter, we will tie up the remaining loose ends by examining the 
prototype, exemplar, theory, and emotion theories of moral concepts in light of the 
induction and concept combination desiderata.  For these desiderata, the specified 
qualifications from the previous chapter still hold.  Recall that the general appropriate 
qualified way in which a mental representation influence can be said to constitute the 
concept at hand is when the influence is knowledge that is used by default in moral 
cognition and is at least in part inferable from the concept in question’s inferential base.  
Also, remember that if the three retraction, inferential base, and informational value tests 
are not run on participants to examine this specification, a prima facie concept 
constitution claim may still be made so long as participants do not appear to be 
experiencing a mental error; a mental error that itself may be caused by various things 
such as being hit on the head, mistaken reasoning, mental fatigue, being under the 
influence of drugs, etc.  Recall that most concept constitution studies in the concrete and 
moral concepts literature do not run the above three tests.  However, the enormous 
number of such studies need not therefore be discarded.  Rather, such studies can be said 
to provide initial positive evidence, where most constitution claims in the overall 
concepts literature are prima facie ones.  Next, Fodor’s concept combination objections 
against the prototype view will be addressed.  Fodor provides several objections 
primarily against the prototype theory that prototype concepts do not combine such that 
they can account for compound thoughts.  I will attempt to address Fodor’s objections by 
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relying on my tetrad view of moral concepts.  Then we will discuss how my overall 
theory of moral concepts puts forth a quadruple process theory of moral judgment, where 
there are four different kinds of cognitive processes each respectively associated with the 
four different types of moral concept structures.  This is contrasted with, for example, 
Joshua Greene’s dual process view in which moral cognition is underwritten by reasoning 
and emotions-based processes.  Finally, by drawing on Weiskopf, we will see why a 
strong pluralism rather than a hybridism or a weak pluralism applies to the four viable 
theories of moral concepts, where strong pluralism, hybridism, and weak pluralism were 
initially introduced in the first chapter.   
 
5.1  Category Induction 
Recall from the first chapter that the induction criterion is where theories of 
concepts apparently must have a structure that allows and can explain how we make 
inductive inferences about the world.  As induction is a higher cognitive competence that 
is reliant on concepts, an ability to account for this criterion initially appears to be 
important for any theory.  While there are various kinds of induction, what is meant by 
“category induction” in the concepts literature is the broadening of information from an 
already known given category to a new action or object that falls within that category, or 
it may also involve such broadening from a previously known given class to a known but 
different or target category.  An instance of the former is that if one has knowledge about 
right action, where acts that fall under this class are ones that a person should perform, 
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and I give you new advice on a moral matter that a particular action is right, such as 
stopping global warming, one may infer through induction that this act is the act that one 
ought to perform.  An example of the latter is where if I am told that those classified 
under humble person have the property of being soft spoken, then I may induce that those 
under the target class meek person also have this property.  Category induction will be the 
sole type of induction examined in this dissertation, and any use of the term ‘induction’ 
will mean only category induction. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies on moral concepts specifically 
attempting to account for the induction desideratum.  Even though this is the case, we 
may still mount enough evidence to infer that the prototype/exemplar and theory views 
are most likely responsible in the specified way for many instances of induction.  By 
drawing on previously discussed moral categorization studies as well as on induction test 
results taken from the concrete concepts literature, a prima facie case will be made that 
the prototype/exemplar and theory views satisfy the induction desideratum for theories of 
moral concepts. 
In the concrete concepts domain, similarity-based accounts have been shown to be 
responsible in the qualified way for induction in many instances.
1
  While most of such 
induction studies have presupposed that the prototype theory is qualifiedly at work and 
                                                     
1 For similarity-based inductions studies, see Lance Rips, “Inductive judgments about natural 
categories,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 14:  (1975), 665-581.  D. Osherson, E. 
Smith, O. Wilkie, A. Lopez, and E. Shafir, “Category-based induction,” Psychological Review 97:  
(1990), 185-200.  S. Sloman, “Feature-based induction,” Cognitive Psychology 25:  (1993), 231-280. 
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there have been very little experiments as of yet explicitly testing for the applicability of 
the exemplar theory,
2
 recall from the third chapter that it is very difficult to differentiate 
whether one’s results show the influence in the appropriate specified way of prototypes 
or exemplars since one’s complete set of exemplars will also contain representations of 
all the statistically frequent general features that are represented by one’s prototypes.  
Thus, even though psychologists have presupposed the prototype theory in their induction 
models, this does not necessarily mean that exemplars are not being used in the qualified 
way.  Given the uncertain state of the current induction literature for concrete concepts 
for prototypes and exemplars, any results showing the qualified influence of some kind of 
similarity-based account for concrete concepts could be evidence for the use of 
prototypes or exemplars.  To mark this uncertainty, I state that the ‘prototype/exemplar’ 
theory prima facie may be shown to satisfy the induction desideratum. 
In order to first make our case, we will examine induction studies in the concrete 
concepts literature.  In Lance Rips’ classic induction studies, he used blank predicates.3  
Blank predicates are predicates that subjects will most likely be unfamiliar with, 
attributes that most people will not have any strong feelings about, or qualities that are 
made up.  Using blank predicates, such as ‘sesamoid bones,’ allows experimenters to test 
for induction without any influence of previous knowledge about the attribute.  In one 
test, participants were asked how strong the induction is that if robins have sesamoid 
                                                     
2 Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts. 
3 Rips, ibid. 
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bones, then all birds have sesamoid bones.  Another proposed induction was that if 
penguins have sesamoid bones then all birds have sesamoid bones.  Rips found that an 
induction is considered to be stronger to the extent that the given category is judged to be 
more similar to the target category.  Since the given category of robins is more similar to 
the target category of birds than penguins are to birds, subjects judged that the induction 
from robins to birds is stronger than the induction from penguins to birds.  Moreover, 
another factor that influences induction in the specified way is typicality.  If the given 
category is a more typical member of the target category as compared to a different given 
category, then this will lead to a stronger inductive inference.  Since robins are more 
typical birds than penguins, the induction involving robins is stronger than that which 
involves penguins.  Insofar as the prototype and exemplar theory can account for 
similarity and typicality effects, this study prima facie suggests that prototypes/exemplars 
are at work in the specified way in certain cases of category induction. 
While demonstrating that similarity plays a role in inductions, Osherson and 
company have further shown that coverage can also influence induction judgments in the 
appropriate specified way.
4
  The notion of coverage is dependent on how well the objects 
in the premises cover the smallest category that includes all the items in the induction 
problem; the greater the level of coverage of the smallest inclusive category, the stronger 
the perceived induction.  Take for example: 
 
                                                     
4 Osherson, ibid. 
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1) Foxes have sesamoid bones. 
 Pigs have sesamoid bones   
 Gorillas have sesamoid bones 
 
2) Foxes have sesamoid bones. 
 Pigs have sesamoid bones 
 Wolves have sesamoid bones.  
 Gorillas have sesamoid bones. 
 
In both 1) and 2), the smallest inclusive category is mammals.  2) has a larger 
coverage of the mammal category than 1), so this explains why participants generally 
understand 2) to be a stronger induction than 1). 
Regarding the theory-theory, Proffitt and company have demonstrated that at 
times underlying causal explanatory knowledge may in the specified way be responsible 
for inductions rather than superficial similarity, typicality, or coverage.
5
  For instance, 
tree experts were told that a blank predicate disease A affects a tree species x, while 
disease B affects a different tree species y.  The experts then were asked which of the two 
diseases would most likely affect the other kinds of trees found in their local area.  Our 
experimenters discovered that tree experts were more likely to base their judgments in a 
qualified way on knowledge of causal explanations rather than superficial similarity, 
typicality, or coverage.  Experts surprisingly would draw conclusions that at times went 
counter to the conclusions that would be drawn if participants were relying on superficial 
similarity, typicality, or coverage.  Rather, they would base their inductions on theory 
                                                     
5 J. Proffitt, J. Coley, D. Medin, “Expertise and category-based induction,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition 26:  (2000), 811-828.  Also see A. Lopez, S. Atran, J. 
Coley, D Medin, and E. Smith, “The tree of life:  Universal and cultural features of folkbiological 
taxonomies and inductions,” Cognitive Psychology 32:  (1997), 251-295. 
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knowledge.  For example, tree experts would in the specified way use knowledge of the 
root systems of trees and whether certain trees had root systems that were more likely to 
spread diseases.  This provides prima facie evidence for the theory-theory in induction.  
Rehder has found that whether similarity or theory knowledge is qualifiedly used 
in induction can at times be dependent upon the learning circumstances and the 
individual.
6
  Subjects were told of an imaginary object called a ‘Romanian Rogos,’ and 
they were told four properties that seventy-five percent of Romanian Rogos have, such as 
having an engine.  Participants were then told of a new Romanian Rogo that possesses a 
new property.  Half the subjects were told of an underlying explanation to the new 
property.  For instance, the Rogo was said to have the new property of melted wiring, but 
this was due to the fact that the Rogo has a really hot engine.  The other half of the 
participants were not told this explanatory theory knowledge.  The experimenters also 
varied the typicality of the new Rogo on different vignettes by varying the number of the 
four common Rogo properties the new Rogo has.  Subjects were then asked that in light 
of the new Rogo with the new property, how likely was it on a scale that all the other 
Rogos would have the new property.  Rehder found that typicality qualifiedly influenced 
induction judgments made by those who were not told the underlying causal explanation.  
However, for those subjects who were informed of the theory knowledge, half of them 
qualifiedly used such knowledge in their inductions.  The other half used similarity 
                                                     
6 B. Rehder, “When causality and similarity compete in category-based property induction,” 
Memory & Cognition 34:  (2006), 3-16. 
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knowledge in the specified way when making their judgments regardless of the fact that 
they were told about the causal explanation.  This demonstrates that factors such as 
learning conditions and the subjective tendencies of the particular individual may prima 
facie determine whether similarity or theory knowledge is qualifiedly used. 
The above studies prima facie establish that prototype/exemplars and theory 
knowledge are at work in the specified way at various times in the higher competence of 
drawing inductions for concrete concepts.  Previous chapters of this dissertation have also 
established that based on categorization studies there is prima facie empirical evidence 
that moral concepts can have prototype, exemplar, or theory structures, amongst others.  
Moreover, humans do in fact make moral inductions all the time.  Remember our 
previous example of one type of category induction that if one has knowledge about right 
action, where acts that fall under this class are ones that a person should perform and I 
give you advice in a moral matter that a particular action that is new to me, such as 
stopping global warming, is right, one may induce that this act is the act that one ought to 
perform.  Since we do draw moral inductions, the knowledge stored in our concepts must 
be doing the work in these cases.  As it has been prima facie shown that 
prototypes/exemplars and theories in varying circumstances qualifiedly do the work for 
concrete concepts in induction cases and there is prima facie evidence that moral 
concepts can have prototype, exemplar, or theory structures from categorization studies, 
we may draw an inference based on theoretical simplicity that at least 
prototypes/exemplars and theories in various circumstances also do the specified work 
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for moral concepts in moral inductions.  Given the available evidence that such structures 
are responsible for induction for concrete concepts, there is no reason to complicate the 
story by supposing that things are different for the moral concepts cases.  Notice that this 
inference from simplicity is based on empirical evidence from moral and concrete 
concepts.  Since such structures do the induction work in the specified way for concrete 
concepts and there is evidence for such structures in moral concepts, this presents the 
prima facie case that such structures at least are also qualifiedly responsible for moral 
inductions.   
For example, using blank predicates like ‘property x,’ one may be presented with 
the problem of judging on a scale how strong the induction is from ‘brave people have 
property x, so therefore, good people have property x.’  Another case may be ‘just people 
have property x, so therefore, good people have property x.’  When presented with these 
problems, a subject may judge the second to be a stronger induction, and the explanation 
for this may be that the participant was in large part qualifiedly using similarity-based 
knowledge, such as prototypes.  For, just people are more similar to, typical of, and have 
a greater degree of coverage of good people as compared to brave people for this subject.   
On the other hand, another participant may draw the same conclusion, but this participant 
may have qualifiedly used folk consequentialism theory knowledge.  When given the 
vignette, this participant may have reasoned that just people will bring about better 
consequences for society than persons who are only brave.  Due to this inference and the 
fact that this subject maintains that good people bring about the best consequences for 
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society, this participant judges that the induction involving just people is stronger than the 
one involving brave people. 
There is the further issue of whether prototypes or exemplars are qualifiedly used 
in moral inductions.  As it is unclear which of these structures are so used in inductions in 
the concrete concepts domain and I use induction studies for concrete concepts in order to 
in part draw conclusions for moral concepts and moral inductions, the above ambiguity 
must also hold in the moral concepts domain as well.  Resolution of this ambiguity may 
be important because induction is a moral concept theory desideratum that any moral 
concept theory purportedly must attempt to satisfy.  If, for instance, prototypes rather 
than exemplars are really responsible, in the specified way, for moral inductions, then this 
appears to be problematic for the exemplar theory.  Likewise, for the emotion theory, 
remember from the second chapter that within constraints, I do not make a definitive 
claim as to what emotions are, and I allow for the possibility that emotions may be non-
cognitive, where emotions are not constituted by appraisal judgments related to one’s 
well-being.  If emotions are cognitive and constituted by appraisal judgments, then 
emotion theory moral concepts may be able to handle the induction desideratum since the 
satisfaction of this desideratum requires that moral concepts decompose into further 
concepts that, for example, allows for the measurement of such things as similarity and 
typicality effects.  However, if some emotions may be non-cognitive, then it is wholly 
unclear how such emotion theory moral concepts may be qualifiedly responsible for 
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moral induction.  Since emotion theory concepts may not satisfy the induction 
desideratum, this potentially may be problematic for the emotion theory as well.   
What we have here is the problem that it may be the case that some theories of 
moral concepts, such as the exemplar and emotion theories, may not be able to handle the 
induction criterion.  For, given the ambiguity in the current data between the prototype 
and exemplar theories, it may turn out in the future that really prototypes rather than 
exemplars satisfy this desideratum.  Moreover, some emotions may be non-cognitive.  As 
we shall see in the next section, a similar potential problem may also hold for the 
desideratum of concept combination.  The response to this worry is that we should relax 
the desiderata for theories of moral and concrete concepts.  The idea that a single theory 
of concepts needs to satisfy all the desiderata of a theory of concepts is a by-product of 
the days when philosophers and psychologists thought that there could only be one viable 
theory of concepts.  For example, the British Empiricists generally believed that all 
concepts are pictorial images.  As discussed in previous chapters, now that there is strong 
empirical evidence that there may be a multiplicity of viable conceptual structures in the 
moral and concrete domains that may be qualifiedly used in different circumstances and 
times, we no longer have to perceive the concept theory desiderata as being inert edifices 
marking the guidelines for determining what single theory of concepts is correct.  Some 
concept structures may be responsible in the specified way for competences such as 
induction while different structures qualifiedly may be at work in different higher 
competences and in different situations.  Relaxing the desiderata where a theory of 
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concepts need only satisfy some rather than all of the desiderata is more appropriate, and, 
in light of the prima facie empirical evidence where there is a multiplicity of conceptual 
structures at work in the specified way in higher cognition in different circumstances and 
times, it brings a coherence to our meta-theory of how we should theorize about theories 
of moral and concrete concepts.  To note, this may begin to sound like an implicit 
statement of strong pluralism.
7
  However, I will contend for strong pluralism at the end of 
this chapter.  Now, even if the emotion theory and, for example, the exemplar theory 
cannot handle the induction criterion, this does not necessarily mean the demise of such 
views.  Emotion and exemplar knowledge still participate in the specified way in moral 
categorization and in potentially other competences, while prototypes and theories are 
qualifiedly responsible for moral inductions, inter alia.  In these respects, my overall 
theory of moral concepts still stands.  As concepts are mental representations that play a 
qualified functional role in some of the higher competences, it has already been prima 
facie shown that emotion and exemplar bodies of knowledge do play such a role in 
making moral categorization judgments.  To contrarily conclude that the emotion and 
                                                     
7 Strong pluralism allows it to be contingently true that if one type of knowledge of x is used in a 
particular competence, then another body of knowledge of x may be used in a different 
competence.  However, the fact that different bodies of knowledge may partake in some 
competences rather than in others may not necessarily lead to strong pluralism, although it may 
begin to sound like strong pluralism.  One reason why it does not necessarily lead to strong 
pluralism is that even if emotion and exemplar knowledge participate in categorization rather 
than induction, it could be the case that some other body of knowledge, such as theory 
knowledge, may partake in all the various higher competences, and theory knowledge is the 
competently mastered criterion of correctness in all the higher competences.  Therefore, 
hybridism is still a live possibility. 
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exemplar theories for moral concepts are not viable because they potentially cannot 
handle the induction desideratum would be to conclude that none of our moral concepts 
are constituted by such knowledge and therefore, such knowledge does not partake in 
moral cognition at all; a gross misrepresentation of the empirical facts.  Given the 
relaxation of the desiderata, we may understand Machery’s previously given definition of 
a concept to be altered such that concepts are bodies of knowledge that need only be used 
by default in some rather than in most of the higher cognitive competences. 
 
5.2  Concept Combination 
Recall from the first chapter that concepts purportedly must respect productivity 
and systematicity.
8
  Productivity is where with a finite set of concepts and rules of 
combination, we can have an infinite amount of new thoughts.  For example, if we have 
the concept AND with the letters of the alphabet, we can have A AND B, A AND B AND C, 
AA AND B AND BCC, etc. ad infinitum.  Systematicity is where if one understands the 
given concepts and combination rules, one may understand variations on a thought.  An 
example of this is where if one can understand JACK KISSED JILL, then one may also 
understand the idea JILL KISSED JACK.    
Concept combination is the desideratum that attempts to explain how lexical or 
even compound concepts in many cases combine with each other in order to form even 
more complex concepts or ideas.  It examines how certain mental representations in many 
                                                     
8 Fodor and Pylyshyn, ibid.  
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cases play the specified causal role in how we are able to understand at times new 
compound thoughts.  Combination apparently must respect the productivity and 
systematicity of thought.  If the constituent thoughts of a compound concept come from 
the constituent thoughts of the lexical concepts that make up the compound, then, along 
with the rules of combination, productivity and systematicity will be respected.  Concept 
combination apparently must also account for emergent features, or supposed new 
components of a compound concept that represent features that apparently “emerge” 
from a complex class that are not ordinarily thought to be contained within the 
constituent classes.  As an example of prototype concepts accounting for concept 
combination, in Smith, et al.’s classic selective modification model for concept 
combination as well as in some of the other models that can be viewed as advancements 
upon it in that, for example, these advanced models account for emergent features, 
prototype components of the constituent concepts qualifiedly combine in certain cases to 
account for the components of the complex concept.
9
  For instance, in the adjective-noun 
phrase SMOOTH APPLE, the prototype components of SMOOTH and APPLE combine with each 
other in the specified way to account for the components that make up the compound 
SMOOTH APPLE.  In order to account for concept combination, most lexical concepts 
                                                     
9 E. Smith and D. Osherson, “Conceptual combination with prototype concepts,” Cognitive 
Science, 8:  (1984), pp. 337-61.  J. Hampton, “Inheritance of attributes in natural concept 
conjunctions,” Memory & Cognition, 9:  (1987), pp. 55-71.  D. Medin and E. Shoben, “Context and 
structure in conceptual combination,” Cognitive Psychology, 20:  (1988), pp. 158-90.  G. Murphy, 
“Comprehending complex concepts,” Cognitive Science, 12:  (1988), pp. 529-62.  E. Smith, D. 
Osherson, L. Rips, and M. Keane, “Combining prototypes:  A selective modification model,” 
Cognitive Science, 12:  (1988), pp. 485-527.  J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind. 
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apparently should have a structure of being constituted by further concepts so that the 
structures of lexical concepts qualifiedly combine with each other when their respective 
lexical concepts are joined together to form a compound.  This allows us in certain cases 
to understand new compound thoughts.  As an example of concept combination, since 
SMOOTH is made up of SURFACE and NO ROUGH SPOTS while APPLE is constituted by FRUIT, 
RED, MEDIUM SIZED, and PICKED FROM TREES, the components of SMOOTH and APPLE 
causally combine in the specified way in order to account for the compound thought 
SMOOTH APPLE.  To the best of my knowledge, there are no direct studies on concept 
combination and moral concepts.  However, a like argument will be made as with the 
above induction desideratum in order to prima facie show that at least some of the viable 
theories of moral concepts can account for this desideratum.  The first step in being able 
to show this is to examine concrete concepts and concept combination. 
Hampton found that the typical features of the members of the individual 
categories that are represented by the constituent concepts in a compound are also the 
typical features found in the members of the compound category that are represented by 
the compound concept itself.
10
  For instance, the typical feature of no rough spots for 
smooth and the typical features fruit, red, and picked from trees for apple for me are also 
the typical features of what I think belong to smooth apple.  As the exemplar theory can 
also be qualifiedly responsible for these results of conceptual combination, Hampton’s 
                                                     
10 Hampton, ibid. 
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study provides prima facie evidence that prototypes/exemplars are responsible in the 
specified way for concept combination. 
 Smith and Osherson discovered a conjunction effect in participants in concept 
combination.
11
  This is where a compound item such as a red apple is deemed to be more 
typical of the corresponding compound category than the relevant individual component 
categories.  For example, a red apple is more typical of red apples than of redness or 
apples.  A brown apple is generally categorized as being somewhat typical of browness 
but not typical of apples.  However, it is judged to be very typical of brown apples.  The 
interesting question with the brown apples case is how something not typical of apples 
can be very typical of a subtype of apples. 
 To explain this, Smith and company used a schema or prototype structure in their 
selective modification model.  Once again, however, exemplars could be used in the 
specified way in this model and produce the same results, although for now, we will 
explain this model in terms of the prototype theory.  A schema concept contains 
representations of dimensions and features for those dimensions.  For instance, APPLE 
may contain the dimensions COLOR, SHAPE, and TEXTURE.  These represented dimensions 
are weighted in terms of importance.  In our example, COLOR may carry more weight for 
me than SHAPE and TEXTURE.  However, the weight for the dimension representations may 
change based on context.  For instance, if our discussion solely focuses on the shape of 
apples and not on its color or texture, where I token my CIRCULAR APPLE compound, then 
                                                     
11 Smith and Osherson, ibid. 
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the represented dimension of SHAPE now carries more weight than COLOR for the 
compound concept CIRCULAR APPLE.  Under the dimensions, such as COLOR, there will be 
representations of features, such as RED, GREEN, and BROWN.  These feature 
representations also carry weights, and the weights can change based on the context.  For 
example, RED and GREEN may carry significant weight for me, but BROWN carries little 
weight for my APPLE concept.  However, if our conversation is about brown apples, where 
I token my BROWN APPLES compound, then the weight for BROWN sharply increases in my 
compound concept BROWN APPLES.   
 When we have a conversation about red apples, more weight for RED APPLES will 
be shifted to the dimension representation COLOR given the context of our discussion on 
red apples.  Also, the feature representation RED will further dramatically increase in its 
weight for my RED APPLES compound given the focus of our conversation.  This explains 
the conjunction effect in that the weight increase for the relevant dimension and feature 
for the compound concept partially accounts for why a red apple is considered to be more 
typical of red apples than of apples.  First, since REDNESS does not contain many or any 
mental representations related to fruit but RED APPLES do, the similarity score of a red 
apple to RED APPLES is greater than the score of a red apple to REDNESS.  Therefore, a red 
apple is considered to be more typical of red apples than of redness.  Moreover, since 
there is the matching of colors between red apples and RED APPLES and there is added 
weight to COLOR and RED in RED APPLES, where unlike the APPLES concept, all the weight in 
the COLOR dimension gets placed on RED for RED APPLES due to the combination of RED 
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with APPLES, a red apple has a higher similarity score for RED APPLES than just for APPLES.  
This is why a red apple is considered to be more typical of red apples than apples.  This 
likewise holds for why a brown apple is considered to be a more typical brown apple than 
an apple.  There is the matching of colors between brown apples and BROWN APPLES.  
Furthermore, the drastic weight increase for the represented dimension COLOR and the 
represented feature BROWN in BROWN APPLES when we discuss brown apples creates a 
higher similarity score of a brown apple to BROWN APPLES than to APPLES.   
 A virtue of the selective modification model is that it can account for this 
conjunction effect.  Empirical confirmation of its ability to account for this effect 
provides prima facie evidence for the prototype/exemplar theory in concept combination.  
However, there are problems with this model when assumed to being a prototype model 
in that, for instance, it cannot properly account for emergent features.
12
  We soon will 
discuss newer concept combination models that can account for emergent features in 
certain instances, but broadly speaking, the newer models still have had to implement 
Smith and company’s general idea of advancing weights in order to account for the 
conjunction effect.  In this respect, the selective modification model has longevity. 
 There are prima facie studies showing the qualified influence of exemplars in 
concept combination in order to account for emergent features, such as by Hampton and 
Medin & Shoben.
13
  For example, PET FISH for many people has the component TROPICAL 
                                                     
12 For objections to the selective modification model, see:  Murphy, ibid.  Medin and Shoben, ibid. 
13 Hampton, ibid.  Medin and Shoben, ibid. 
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COLORED.  However, based on a prototype view, this component may not appear to be a 
constituent of PET or FISH when taken individually.  The feature may not be in a summary 
or general representation of features for me for pet or fish.  It somehow appears to 
mysteriously emerge from the combination of the concepts, but this cannot be the case if 
concepts combine through strict compositionality.  Nevertheless, the exemplar theory can 
qualifiedly account for the apparent emergent feature.  For, one has stored exemplars of 
pets or of fish that are of tropical colored fish.  For instance, I’ve seen a tropical colored 
fish in a fish tank at the dentist’s office.  I have not seen enough tropical colored fish for 
TROPICAL COLORED to be a part of a relevant summary representation of features, but I still 
have a stored exemplar of such a fish or of such a pet.  The corresponding representation 
of this particular instance is stored as an exemplar of a particular pet or of a particular 
fish.  Since the exemplar itself is constituted by representations of features such as 
TROPICAL COLORED, the apparent emergent component of the compound concept does 
actually come in the qualified way from the relevant constituent concepts of the 
compound. 
 Likewise, for WOODEN SPOON, LARGE may appear to be an emergent component 
not contained within the relevant prototype bodies of knowledge.  However, I have seen a 
limited number of large wooden spoons in kitchens so I have exemplar mental 
representations of particular wooden things or of spoons that are about particular large 
wooden spoons I have encountered in my life.  As the relevant exemplar is itself 
constituted by components that represent features such as large, the apparent emergent 
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component of the compound WOODEN SPOON does come in the specified way from the 
relevant constituent concepts. 
 There are also prima facie studies on concrete concepts showing the work of 
theory knowledge in the specified way in concept combination.  On Johnson and Keil’s 
theory knowledge model, they found that participants listed many apparent emergent 
features for certain compounds.
14
  For instance, for arctic bicycle, subjects listed the 
feature spiked tires even though they did not list this feature for arctic or bicycle.  Upon 
finding these results, they then ran other studies asking participants to fill in the blanks 
of, for example: 
 Since the ARCTIC _________________________________ 
 and since BICYCLES_______________________________ 
 then arctic bicycles have spiked tires. 
 
They found that participants filled in the blanks generally with longer phrases that were 
not included in the prototype feature-listing task and that contained causal background 
theory knowledge.  For example, one participant said that bicycles “require traction to 
move.”  Then the experimenters asked the subjects to rate how likely supposed emergent 
features would belong to a compound category before and after the removal or denial of 
the relevant theory knowledge.  For instance, subjects were asked to rate how likely arctic 
bicycles would have spiked tires.  Then they would be informed that arctic bicycles are 
jet propelled.  Subsequently, they would be re-asked to rate how likely arctic bicycles 
                                                     
14 C. Johnson and F. Keil, “Explanatory understanding and conceptual combination,” in 
Explanation and Cognition, ed. By F. Keil and R. Wilson, (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press), 2000, 328-
359. 
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would have spiked tires.  They found that participants substantially lowered the likely-
hood that the compound category would still contain the supposed emergent feature.  
This study provides prima facie evidence that at times, theory knowledge is qualifiedly at 
work in concept combination for concrete concepts.   
The above studies establish the prima facie claim that depending on the 
circumstances, exemplars and theory knowledge are at work in the specified way in 
concept combination for concrete concepts and perhaps prototypes are as well.
15
  
Previous chapters of this dissertation have also prima facie established that based on 
categorization studies, there is empirical evidence that moral concepts can have 
prototype, exemplar, or theory structures, amongst others.  Moreover, humans do in fact 
combine moral concepts all the time.  There are compound moral concepts in which two 
constituent concepts are moral or thick moral concepts, such as:  MORAL SAINT, 
CHIVALROUS GENTLEMAN, VIRTUOUS LADY, DEVIOUS CROOK, HONOR AMONGST 
                                                     
15 Murphy argues that the empirical fact that compounds like TYPEWRITER TABLE and 
CORPORATE STATIONARY combine based on a similarity view shows the working of 
prototypes rather than exemplars because such compounds are not the intersection of thoughts 
about, for example, representations of a particular typewriter and a particular table or 
representations of a particular corporation and a particular stationary.  However, I believe that 
there is still the possibility that the exemplar theory can account for combination in the above 
cases.  For TYPEWRITER TABLE, I have exemplars stored in my TABLE concept that refer to 
particular typewriter tables.  These exemplars will be contextually triggered by the combination 
of TABLE with TYPEWRITER.  The exemplars each have components that are responsible for the 
component thoughts I have concerning TYPEWRITER TABLE.  An analogous story may be told 
for CORPORATE STATIONARY as well.  This demonstrates that until there are definitive 
discriminating studies between the prototype and exemplar theories for conceptual combination, 
positive prima facie similarity-based findings in combination studies suggest the qualified use of 
prototypes/exemplars.  Gregory Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts. 
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THIEVES, KIND BENEFACTOR, and MALICIOUS CRIME.  Moreover, there are compounds 
that contain only one moral concept, such as:  SENSIBLE KNAVE, BRAVE WOMAN, JUST 
STATEMENT, IMMORAL CHILD, and GENEROUS MAN.  Since we frequently do combine 
moral concepts, the knowledge stored in our concepts must be doing the specified work 
in these cases for how we understand complex thoughts.  As it has been prima facie 
shown that exemplars, theories, and perhaps prototypes in varying circumstances do the 
qualified work for concrete concepts in concept combination cases and there is prima 
facie empirical evidence that moral concepts can have prototype, exemplar, or theory 
structures from categorization studies, we may draw an inference based on theoretical 
simplicity that at least exemplars, theories, and perhaps prototypes prima facie also do the 
specified work for moral concepts in moral concept combination.  Given the available 
evidence that such structures may be at work in concept combination for concrete 
concepts, there is no reason to complicate the story by supposing that things are different 
in the moral concepts case.  Notice that this inference from simplicity is based on 
empirical evidence from moral and concrete concepts.  Since such structures prima facie 
do or (for prototypes) may do the specified combination work for concrete concepts and 
there is evidence for such structures at work in moral categorization, this presents the 
case that such structures at least prima facie are or may be also responsible in the 
specified way for moral concept combination.   
For example, for MORAL SAINT, the typical features I may list are kind, honest, 
perfect, and beneficent.  However, the corresponding prototype components qualifiedly 
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are combined from either of the components of my two relevant constituent concepts.  
For VIRTUOUS LADY, VIRTUOUS contains exemplars such as MY BROTHER HELPING THE 
POOR YESTERDAY, MY SISTER BEING KIND TO THE STRANGER LAST WINTER, and 
MOTHER THERESA.  LADY is constituted by exemplars of females who are considered to 
be lady-like, like MY MOTHER and QUEEN ELIZABETH.  The constituent exemplars are 
qualifiedly responsible for why when I token my VIRTUOUS LADY concept, I have the 
thoughts MOTHER THERESA and MY MOTHER.  For JUST STATEMENT, JUST for me is 
constituted by utilitarian theory knowledge.  This knowledge is causally responsible in 
the specified way for the thought MAXIMIZE THE GREATEST HAPPINESS FOR THE 
GREATEST NUMBER when understanding the complex idea JUST STATEMENT and when 
bringing forth this compound into working memory.        
Concerning the emotion theory and concept combination, there may be a problem 
with some concepts being constituted by emotions in that it may be the case that some 
emotions at times may not be made up of appraisal judgments.  Thus, as combination is 
seemingly dependent upon concepts decomposing into further concepts, where cognitive 
emotions may be candidates for concept combination, there is the issue of whether 
concepts constituted by non-cognitive emotions may actually combine and fulfill this 
concept combination desideratum for theories of moral concepts.  This is especially a 
very serious potential problem for the emotion theory since if emotions are non-
cognitive, then it is difficult to see how emotion theory concepts can have the satisfaction 
conditions or the formal properties that allow for concept combination.  The response to 
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this worry in relation to emotions that may be non-cognitive is that once again, a theory 
of concepts need not account for all the desiderata.  We have seen how there are several 
different viable conceptual structures generally at work in the specified way in the human 
mind in the relevant higher competences in moral cognition; various kinds of knowledge 
whose recruitment may be context sensitive.  However, an interesting facet of having a 
multitude of different structures of a class is that at many times in cognition, several 
different kinds of knowledge of a particular category may qualifiedly work together in 
cognition.  For example, Frank Keil and company show that prototype and theory types 
of knowledge frequently work together in the specified way in the classification of 
particular natural kinds.
16
  Given that different kinds of knowledge frequently can so 
work together, for emotions that may be non-cognitive, the emotion body of knowledge 
and another type of knowledge one has of kindness may qualifiedly work together in 
tandem in cognition.  To note, while a hybridist and strong/weak pluralist may potentially 
make this claim, I will discuss these views at the end of this chapter.  Since it has been 
prima facie inferred that at least the exemplar and theory structures work in the specified 
way in concept combination, the concept combination objection against the emotion 
theory may at least be initially handled in that the potentially non-cognitive emotion-
based knowledge and some other kind of knowledge such as exemplars of the same 
particular category x may work together in the specified way in a single act of reasoning, 
                                                     
16 F. Keil, W., Smith, D., Simons, D., Levin, “Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism:  implications 
for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge,” Cognition, 65:  (1988), pp. 103-135. 
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where in such cases, the exemplars can account for the concept combination desideratum 
and the emotion-based knowledge can simultaneously still play a qualified role in, for 
example, categorization or planning.  The potential non-cognitive emotion theory 
knowledge need not take part in the specified way in concept combination and possibly 
not in other higher competences as well.  Furthermore, if it is later shown that prototypes 
do not play the qualified role in combination, then this same move may be made for the 
prototype theory.  Prototypes and, for instance, exemplars may work in the specified way 
in tandem in cognition, where exemplars account for combination, and prototypes are 
responsible for categorization in certain cases.   
 
5.3  Fodor’s Concept Combination Objections Against the Prototype Theory 
Jerry Fodor argues that lexical concepts rarely decompose into components that 
represent non-defining features, such as prototypes.
17
  His justification that lexical 
concepts usually do not decompose into representations of non-defining features is a 
series of objections primarily against the prototype theory that it cannot handle concept 
combination.   
The first objection claims that the prototype theory cannot account for special 
phrasal concepts such as:  AMERICAN CITIES SITUATED ON THE EAST COAST JUST A 
LITTLE SOUTH OF TENNESSEE, GRANDMOTHERS MOST OF WHOSE GRANDCHILDREN ARE 
                                                     
17 Jerry Fodor, “The Current Status of the Innateness Controversy,” Representations, (Cambridge, 
MA:  The MIT Press), 1981.  Fodor, Concepts.   
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DENTISTS, and NOT A CAT.  Fodor states that the component concepts of the compounds 
supposedly do have prototype structure, but the compound concepts themselves do not.  
Prototypes do not combine.  Constructing analogous Fodorian examples that in part use 
moral concepts, we may have:  SIN CITIES SITUATED ON THE EAST COAST JUST A LITTLE 
SOUTH OF TENNESSEE, HIGHLY MORAL GRANDMOTHER MOST OF WHOSE 
GRANDCHILDREN ARE DENTISTS HELPING THIRD WORLD CHILDREN, and NOT A CRIME.    
Whether or not moral and concrete prototype concepts can combine with each 
other is ultimately an empirical question.  Although there is no experimental data on the 
Fodorian moral compounds I have just constructed above as well as on other Fodorian 
moral compounds we will discuss later, we have seen evidence in which a prima facie 
inference may be made that prototypes may combine in the specified way in particular 
circumstances.  Furthermore, there is support for the prima facie inference that exemplars 
and theories do combine in the qualified way in certain cases.  Since there are no studies 
on my constructed Fodorian moral compounds, we may attempt to address Fodor in a 
more speculative manner in this chapter section, although it is not completely speculative 
since I prima facie have already shown based on categorization studies that moral 
concepts can have prototype, exemplar, theory, or emotion structures and that the 
aforementioned four bodies of knowledge prima facie do or may potentially partake in 
concept combination in the specified way depending on the situation.  Furthermore, the 
somewhat speculative manner is warranted in that Fodor just assumes that his special 
phrasal concepts do not have prototypes without any empirical support. 
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The first line of response is motivated by Prinz in his work on concrete 
concepts.
18
  If the phrasal concepts are candidates for typicality effects, where some 
members of the corresponding category are taken to be more typical than others, then this 
provides suggestive evidence that the phrasal concepts do have prototypes or, in other 
words, are constituted by a summary or general representation of features.  To note, 
exemplars can also account for typicality effects.  However, either way, whether 
prototypes or exemplars account for typicality effects, since my overall theory of moral 
concepts includes both theories and I have already established that different bodies of 
knowledge may be at work in the specified way in different circumstances, the perceived 
existence of typicality effects still supports my overall theory of moral concepts.  My 
overall theory of moral concepts can handle Fodor’s objections if there are perceived 
typicality effects since my overall view includes both prototypes and exemplars.  Since 
my overall view includes the prototype and exemplar theories, where either one of these 
bodies of knowledge qualifiedly may be at work in cognition in particular contexts, it 
does not matter whether it is prototypes or exemplars that account for the perceived 
typicality effects.  If, for example, it is prototypes rather than exemplars that qualifiedly 
account for the perceived typicality effects, then my overall theory of moral concepts 
allows for prototypes to causally be at work in the specified way in the relevant special 
cases for such Fodorian phrasal compounds.  This same story holds if it is determined 
                                                     
18 Prinz, Furnishing the Mind. 
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that exemplars rather than prototypes qualifiedly account for the perceived typicality 
effects or if it is found that both so account for the perceived typicality effects.   
For SIN CITIES SITUATED ON THE EAST COAST JUST A LITTLE SOUTH OF 
TENNESSEE, it is plausible that there can be a typicality scale.  For example, 
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA may be low on the typicality scale since I perceive it to 
generally be a sin city on the east coast but it has some conservative and religious 
elements.  MYRTLE BEACH, SOUTH CAROLINA is high on the scale since it is a well-
known beach party destination.  What accounts for the typicality scale for SIN CITIES 
SITUATED ON THE EAST COAST JUST A LITTLE SOUTH OF TENNESSEE may be prototype 
components such as HAS MANY BARS, HAS GAMBLING, HAS BEACH PARTIES, WARM, etc.  
The perceived existence of typicality effects for this phrasal concept suggests that this 
compound is constituted by prototypes/exemplars. 
For HIGHLY MORAL GRANDMOTHER MOST OF WHOSE GRANDCHILDREN ARE 
DENTISTS HELPING THIRD WORLD CHILDREN, a highly moral grandmother who has ten 
grandchildren with nine of them being dentists who help third world children is more 
typical than a highly moral grandmother who has ten grandchildren with six of them 
being dentists who help third world children.  This typicality scale may be accounted for 
by prototypes for the compound concept such as GENEROUS, HAS CHILDREN WHO HAVE 
CHILDREN, MORAL EDUCATOR, KIND, HONEST, etc.  For NOT A CRIME, there are many 
acts that are not crimes, such as: cooking breakfast, helping the poor, walking the dog, 
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and driving to work.  However, as crimes are usually perceived as being immoral acts,
19
 I 
may have a typicality scale where the most typical acts that are not crimes are the most 
moral ones.  For instance, helping the poor and keeping an important promise are highly 
typical of not being a crime.  Cooking breakfast and driving to work are only moderately 
typical as they are not necessarily moral acts, while telling white lies – kinds of lies that I 
do not hold to be crimes – is least typical.  The typicality scale for NOT A CRIME may be 
accounted for by prototypes such as VIRTUOUS ACT, JUST ACT, KIND ACT, HELPFUL, etc.  
The perceived existence of a typicality scale in the above examples counters Fodor’s 
objection and suggests that my overall theory of moral concepts can handle his 
contention. 
Furthermore, we may add to Prinz’s work on concrete concept combination in 
that theory knowledge at times can also play a specified role in concept combination for 
the Fodorian compounds related to Fodor’s first objection.  My overall theory of moral 
concepts allows for different bodies of knowledge to qualifiedly be at work in different 
circumstance, and such bodies of knowledge may also work conjointly with other kinds 
of knowledge.  This can also be a potential response to Fodor in some cases.  For 
instance, for NOT A CRIME, I perceive crimes to be immoral and I am a folk 
consequentialist.  The typicality effects I have for this compound are directly accounted 
for in the specified way in cognition by my ethical theory knowledge that one must 
                                                     
19 Hampton, “An Investigation of the Nature of Abstract Concepts.” 
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perform those acts that bring about the best consequences for society.  Acts that bring 
about better consequences are deemed to be more typical acts that are not crimes. 
Another addition to Prinz is that as mentioned in the second chapter, the prototype 
theory predicts that there will be ambiguous cases of membership, whereas the classical 
view does not.  Since the summary representation of features are not taken to refer to 
necessary and sufficient conditions, we should expect subjects to be unsure at times about 
whether some items should be classified in one particular category or another.  If it is 
expected that there are ambiguous cases of membership, then this provides some further 
support that the phrasal concepts in question may have prototype structure since 
prototype theory predicts and explains ambiguous cases of membership.
20
  With our 
particular phrasal concepts, we do see the possibility and likelihood of ambiguous cases 
of membership, which provides a counter to Fodor.   For SIN CITIES SITUATED ON THE 
EAST COAST JUST A LITTLE SOUTH OF TENNESSEE, I may not be sure whether 
Wilmington, North Carolina falls within the corresponding category.  For, it is a 
reasonably sized beach city and it has many beach parties which could mean that it is a 
sin city, but at the same time, from my personal experience, I know there are significant 
charitable activities occurring in the city.  Therefore, I am not sure if it falls in the 
relevant class or not.  Also, recall that in the third chapter it was inferred that moral 
concepts as a class generally do have prototype structure and do produce concomitant 
                                                     
20 Exemplars also may be able to account for ambiguous cases of membership.  However, once 
again, it does not matter here whether it is prototypes or exemplars that account for the 
phenomenon since my overall theory of moral concepts includes both views. 
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typicality effects that provide evidence against the classical view.  Thus, the above 
ambiguity for SIN CITIES SITUATED ON THE EAST COAST JUST A LITTLE SOUTH OF 
TENNESSEE coupled with the fact that SIN has prototype structure that allows for 
ambiguous cases of membership, puts forth a case that the compound concept at hand 
does have prototype structure.  For HIGHLY MORAL GRANDMOTHER MOST OF WHOSE 
GRANDCHILDREN ARE DENTISTS HELPING THIRD WORLD CHILDREN, I may know a 
grandmother, most of whose grandchildren are the relevant dentists, but I am not sure if 
she is a highly moral person or not.  She has some noble qualities but also some 
malicious one’s as well.  Therefore, I am not sure whether or not she falls in the 
corresponding compound category.  Also, as further support that this ambiguity may be 
the case, recall from the third chapter that we examined a study that demonstrated that 
HIGHLY MORAL PERSON does have prototype structure and does produce typicality 
effects.  For NOT A CRIME, many people appear to be uncertain about whether things like 
abortion are not a crime regardless of what the law in their state may say.  Also, recall 
from the third chapter that we examined an experiment that demonstrated that CRIME 
does have prototype structure and does produce typicality effects such that there may be 
ambiguous cases of membership for this concept.  While ambiguous cases of membership 
do reinforce the plausibility of a prototype analysis as opposed to a classical definitional 
analysis, insofar as the prototype theory predicts and explains the existence of ambiguous 
cases of membership, the strong possible existence of ambiguous cases of membership 
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provides a counter to Fodor’s first concept combination objection that certain compound 
concepts do not have prototype structure. 
Fodor’s second objection is that there are the previously discussed emergent 
components to certain compound concepts such as PET FISH.
21  Another example Fodor 
and Ernest Lepore like to use is BROWN COW.
22
  A brown cow has the property of being 
dangerous or charging at red capes.  However, these prototypical properties are not 
thought by people to be properties of brown or cow when considered individually.  They 
are apparent emergent features, but how can the existence of such features be the case if 
the prototypes of lexical concepts supposedly qualifiedly combine to account for the 
represented features of compound concepts?  For moral concepts, the compound 
SENSIBLE KNAVE has the component prototype feature KNOWING WHEN ONE WILL NOT 
GET CAUGHT.  However, this component feature does not appear to be contained within 
SENSIBLE or within KNAVE when considered individually.  Thus, it appears that there is a 
problem of concept combination in certain cases for the prototype theory in the domain of 
moral concepts as well.  
The first response that is available for my overall theory of moral concepts is that 
we may have stored exemplars that may qualifiedly account for the supposed emergent 
components.  We have already discussed how Hampton and Medin & Shoben have 
shown that exemplars can account for apparent emergent components in certain instances 
                                                     
21 Fodor, Concepts, 102. 
22 Fodor, ibid.  Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, Holism:  A Shopper’s Guide, (Oxford:  Blackwell), 
1992. 
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such as in PET FISH.  This may also work for our particular compound moral concept 
SENSIBLE KNAVE.  I have met a few knaves in my life or seen actors play them in movies, 
some of whom have had good foresight into knowing whether or not they would get 
caught.  However, I have not had enough experiences with such knaves such that the 
apparent emergent feature knowing when one will not get caught is part of the general 
features I think belong to knaves.  Nevertheless, such individuals, when understood as 
exemplar mental representations of particular knaves, can qualifiedly account for the 
apparent emergent component of the respective compound in that such exemplars are 
themselves constituted by concepts such as KNOWING WHEN ONE WILL NOT GET 
CAUGHT.  This may potentially handle the emergent features objection in certain cases.   
However, Fodor and Lepore anticipate this exemplar theory move and contend 
that there are still compounds in which one will not have an exemplar.
23
  Even if there are 
exemplars that can handle the pet fish problem, most people do not have the proper 
experiences to have relevant exemplars that can in some way handle compounds like PET 
FISH LIVING IN ARMENIA THAT HAVE RECENTLY SWALLOWED THEIR OWNERS.  This 
particular compound has supposed emergent components such as LARGE and 
VORACIOUS.  Likewise, Fodor and Lepore may claim that the exemplar theory cannot 
account for apparent emergent components contained in certain compounds that contain 
moral concepts such as SENSIBLE KNAVE LIVING IN ARMENIA THAT HAS RECENTLY 
                                                     
23 Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, “The Red Herring and the Pet Fish:  Why Concepts Still Can’t 
be Prototypes,” Cognition 58:  253-270. 
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SWALLOWED A NEW YORK STRIP STEAK WHOLE.  This compound has the supposed 
emergent component of LARGE and VORACIOUS that does not appear to be contained 
within the lexical concepts that make up the compound and where we do not have 
relevant exemplars of this particular kind of represented individual.    
In response to this, we can bring in the theory-theory model of combination and 
the appropriate use of theory background knowledge.  For example, in order to address 
the BROWN COW problem, Ned Block claims that we may store the background 
conditional knowledge in COW that DANGEROUS IF BROWN.
24
  This kind of knowledge is 
consistent with the theory-theory in that it is explanatory knowledge about cows that if a 
cow is brown, then the reason why it is dangerous is that it is most likely an aggressive 
male.  In this fashion, Block claims that we can appropriately address the apparent 
emergent qualities in certain cases.  Furthermore, Prinz also argues that in certain cases 
background explanatory theory knowledge can play the specified role in conceptual 
combination for concrete concepts.
25
  For instance, he argues that it is background 
explanatory knowledge of the world and what it takes for something to swallow a grown 
human being that qualifiedly accounts for the supposed emergent components to PET FISH 
LIVING IN ARMENIA THAT HAVE RECENTLY SWALLOWED THEIR OWNERS.  Here, Prinz 
posits his Retrieval, Composition, and Analysis (RCA) model of concept combination for 
concrete concepts in which the first stage of combination involves the retrieval of 
                                                     
24 Ned Block, “Holism, Hyper-analyticity and Hyper-compositionality,” Mind & Language 8, 1-26. 
25 Prinz, ibid. 
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relevant exemplars.
26
  If this stage is unsuccessful at qualifiedly accounting for apparent 
emergent features, then in the second composition stage, we primarily causally combine 
in the specified way the prototype bodies of knowledge for the relevant lexical concepts.  
In the final analysis stage, we bring in background explanatory theory knowledge to 
analyze the compound in the specified way and resolve the apparent conflicts and gaps in 
the composition stage. 
Likewise, for SENSIBLE KNAVE LIVING IN ARMENIA THAT HAS RECENTLY 
SWALLOWED A NEW YORK STRIP STEAK WHOLE, although the exemplar theory may not 
work for this instance, KNAVE is a thick concept that has a descriptive and a normative 
component.  A descriptive prototypical feature that knaves have is that of being human.  
We have background explanatory theory knowledge of human beings that if one can 
swallow things like a steak whole, this individual must be large and have a large mouth.  
Moreover, this person must have also been voracious.  It is the inclusion of background 
explanatory theory knowledge that can qualifiedly account for concept combination and 
supposed emergent features in certain cases.
27
  As my overall theory of concepts allows 
                                                     
26 Ibid. 
27 Concerning the use of non-default knowledge in order to account for complex thoughts, as we 
have seen, regarding the combination desideratum, some theories of concepts need not even 
account for this desideratum at all.  Furthermore, for those theories of concepts that posit 
knowledge that does partake in combination, they need to only show that they can account for 
compound thoughts in some cases and not all the time.  Leaving the concept combination 
desideratum loose, where some concept theories only need to show that they can account for 
compound thoughts in some but not all cases, opens the door and allows for combination to not 
be invariably compositional, where non-concept-constitutive knowledge also can play a role in 
combination.  It ought to be flagged that this really does mean giving up on compositionality as 
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for the four various bodies of knowledge to work in the specified way in cognition 
individually or conjointly on different occasions and in different circumstances, my view 
has the resources to account for apparent emergent qualities even in circumstances where 
it appears that certain bodies of knowledge, such as prototypes, relevantly fail. 
 
5.4  The Quadruple Process Theory of Moral Judgment 
Joshua Greene posits his well-known dual process theory of moral judgment, 
where moral judgments can be influenced by reasoning and emotion-based processes.
28
  
Similarly, Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model is also a dual process view, where 
affectively-valenced intuitions in many cases influence moral judgment, but Haidt also 
acknowledges that sometimes reasoning can influence judgment.
29
  Shaun Nichols also 
puts forth a dual process theory he calls the sentimental rules view.  He believes we have 
what he calls a ‘Normative theory’ or a set of rules that prohibit certain behaviors.  We 
also have an emotional system that is relevant to moral judgment.  To note, his use of the 
term ‘Normative theory’ is not to be confused with the theory-theory of moral concepts in 
                                                     
 
Fodor et al. have understood it.  Not all of our compound thoughts come from the combining of 
concepts. 
28 Joshua Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” Moral Psychology Volume 3, ed. by Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 2008).  “Dual-process Morality and the 
Personal/Impersonal Distinction:  A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie,” 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009. 
29 Jonathan Haidt, “The emotional dog and its rational tail:  The social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment,” Psychological Review 108:  (2001), 814-834. 
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which ethical theory knowledge constitutes concepts.  Although both of these aspects for 
Nichols of ‘Normative theory’ and of an emotional system are dissociable, sentimental 
rules involve both of these mechanisms, where ‘Normative theories’ become “affect-
backed” when adjoined with the emotional system.  Nichols maintains that in most cases 
the dual processes of ‘Normative theory’ and emotions causally influence judgments.   
While the above theorists fail to draw the link with functionalism in the 
philosophy of mind in order to see that in certain specified cases, causal influence studies 
can lead to constitution claims on concepts, the overall view of moral concepts I have 
propounded will beneficially add to the work put forth in providing the dual process 
views by giving a more fine-grained account of the reasoning processes involved in 
moral cognition.  This will result in a quadruple process theory.  I have shown that there 
are four different kinds of bodies of knowledge that potentially may constitute a moral 
concept and that are at work in some of the higher cognitive competences:  the prototype, 
exemplar, theory, and emotion structures.  Concepts psychologically are not only in 
significant part responsible for higher acts of cognition such as decision-making, 
induction, deduction, categorization, planning, and analogical reasoning, but the 
knowledge stored in concepts are in part significantly responsible for the kinds of 
cognitive processes that underwrite the performance of the higher cognitive competences.  
Here, cognitive processes for the higher competences are a series of operations that 
access knowledge in long-term memory in order to perform the functions of higher acts 
of cognition. 
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As fully discussed in previous chapters, prototypes are bodies of knowledge of a 
summary representation of things like rules and virtues generally found in moral acts and 
persons, exemplars are bodies of knowledge of particular acts and persons, theories are 
bodies of knowledge of ethical theories, and emotion-based knowledge at least in part 
contains different mental states from the above views.  Furthermore, they rely on 
different cognitive processing, where different cognitive processes may be used 
individually or conjointly in divergent situations in moral cognition.  Recall that the use 
of prototypes is underwritten by a linear similarity-based model, but exemplars are 
grounded on a non-linear similarity-based computation.  The use of theory knowledge is 
underwritten by non-similarity-based algorithms, while emotion knowledge is founded on 
emotion-based processing. 
The overall theory of moral concepts I have provided demonstrates that since 
there are four viable structures of moral concepts that may be used individually or 
conjointly in disparate acts of cognition, there are four distinct kinds of viable cognitive 
processes that underwrite moral judgments and moral cognition.  While Greene, Haidt, 
and Nichols are generally on the right track with their dual process models in that they 
generally say that reasoning and emotions-based processes are at work in moral 
judgments, we can see that their theories are not fine-grained enough to account for the 
four discussed moral concept structures with their four distinct kinds of processing that 
lie at the very heart of moral cognition.  A more accurate description of the cognitive 
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processes, in terms of scientific explanation and prediction, that underlie moral 
judgments is a quadruple rather than a dual process theory.   
The above theorists in question may object that their notion of a ‘reasoning 
process’ is a more abstracted category that is at a higher level of generality in which the 
prototype, exemplar, and theory views are nested.  This is just like how apes, dogs, and 
cats are nested under the more general mammal category.  Prototypes, exemplars, and 
theories are a subset of some abstracted reasoning-based category.  Therefore, it is still 
fine to say that moral cognition is underwritten by a dual process view. 
However, as we are discussing cognitive processing for moral cognition and it is 
concepts that are in significant part responsible for the kinds of cognitive processing that 
underwrite moral cognition, the more appropriate level of generality for talking about and 
distinguishing cognitive processing in terms of scientific explanation and prediction is at 
the more fundamental level of the four moral concept structures.  We have seen 
throughout this dissertation that the four different bodies of knowledge with their four 
different kinds of cognitive processing can lead to different outcomes in categorization, 
induction, and concept combination.  Even though, for example, prototypes and 
exemplars are reasoning-based kinds of knowledge, they can lead to different outcomes 
in, for instance, concept combination.  They explain cognition differently and at times 
provide disparate predictions that are born out.  Thus, a quadruple process theory, in 
accounting for finer distinctions, has a more accurate explanatory power and predictive 
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success as compared to a general dual process theory that does not differentiate between 
the disparate kinds of reasoning-based processes.   
Relatedly, mathematical psychologists who work on cognitive processing and 
constructing mathematical cognitive models discuss their subject matter at a more fine-
grained level than with the above theorists’ rather general description of a reasoning and 
an emotion-based process.  For instance, whether a similarity model is mathematically 
linear or non-linear is an important difference that can lead to disparate acts in cognition.  
This is widely understood by mathematical psychologists.  Discussing cognitive 
processing at the supposed higher level of abstraction does not adequately account for 
explanation and prediction in cognition in the eyes of mathematical psychologists, and it 
also is not at the same level of accuracy as used by those working on cognitive 
processing.  It is somewhat analogous to a lion and leopard biologist in sub-Saharan 
Africa always referring to a lion as a ‘cat’ to her colleagues even though the area also 
contains many leopards, which are also cats.  This leaves her colleagues confused and 
unclear about her statements.  Talk at such a level of generality lacks the requisite degree 
of accuracy given the specialized biological context.  Likewise, the more accurate 
description of moral cognitive processing in terms of explanation and prediction is the 
new quadruple process theory entailed by my overall theory of moral concepts.  If one is 
to provide a theory of moral cognitive processing, then one should do so at the 
appropriate level in terms of explanatory power and predictive success.  My quadruple 
process theory is fine-grained enough to account for important distinctions in the 
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cognitive processing literature, and for the above reasons, I suggest that it supplant the 
dual process theories in moral psychology concerning the nature of moral judgment.   
 
5.5  Strong Moral Concept Pluralism 
In this final section, we will contend for strong moral concept pluralism rather 
than hybridism or weak pluralism.  Recall from the first chapter that strong pluralism 
states that we do not have one universal structure for all moral concepts that mentally 
represent the various moral categories.  Rather, for all moral categories, one may have 
several different concepts of each moral category, where each concept contains a 
different structure from the others.  For instance, I may have four concepts of VIRTUOUS 
that each contains the different bodies of knowledge of prototypes, exemplars, theories, 
and emotions, respectively.  Hybridism likewise states that there is not one universal 
structure for all moral concepts.  However, hybridism differs from strong pluralism in 
that for all moral categories, all the different bodies of knowledge of a single moral 
category are parts of the same concept.  Thus, in the example, if VIRTUOUS is a hybrid, 
then there is only one concept VIRTUOUS that contains four parts that correspond to the 
four viable structures.  Remember that hybridists maintain that concepts are super-
structured if and only if 1) when one of the parts is used in a higher cognitive 
competence, then it is necessarily the case that the other parts of the concept may be used 
in other cognitive competences; 2) there is a competently mastered criterion of 
correctness where the parts of a given concept do not produce inconsistent outcomes such 
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as inconsistent categorization judgments.  Strong  pluralism denies 1) and/or 2).  Recall 
that there is also an intermediate view or weak pluralism in which one may have several 
concepts of a single moral category in a particular moral concept subdomain, such as for 
thin moral concepts like GOOD, BAD, and RIGHT.  However, one may have super-
structured concepts in another subdomain such as for thick concepts like LIE, CRIME, and 
PUSILLANIMITY.    
One method that is used by Weiskopf to argue for strong pluralism over 
hybridism and resultantly, the intermediate view is to attack the organization and super-
structure of hybrid concepts.
30
  Recall in the third chapter that we have discussed many 
studies prima facie demonstrating that people generally do have prototype knowledge of 
moral categories.  Moreover, in this chapter, the prototype-exemplar chain argument was 
presented contending that if people have moral prototypes, then they must also have 
moral exemplars.  Also, from our discussion of the theory-theory in the fourth chapter, a 
prima facie argument for the viability of a folk consequentialism theory knowledge was 
put forth, where supporting cross-cultural evidence in part suggested that most people 
have such knowledge about certain moral categories; knowledge that provides the 
underlying explanation for and systematization of the relevant prototype and exemplar 
knowledge.   
                                                     
30 To note, an argument against hybridism and weak pluralism is also an argument against multi-
hybridism and multi-weak pluralism.  Daniel Weiskopf, “The Plurality of Concepts,” Synthese 
169:  (2009), 145-173. 
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Furthermore, there is also a prototype-theory-theory chain argument that is in play 
for moral concepts.  Nelson Goodman points out that to say that two things are similar is 
to roughly say that they share a certain number of features in common.
31
  However, the 
problem with this is that any two objects can have many properties in common.  For 
instance, two apparently dissimilar things like a hammer and a laptop computer both 
weigh less than ten million pounds, they did not exist ten billion years ago, they did not 
exist nine billion years ago, they take up space, they both have functions, they both can 
be dropped, they can fit in my trunk, they can fit in my house, they can fit in a garbage 
bag, etc.  Due to this fact, Goodman points out that to say that two things are similar 
requires a theoretical frame of reference in order to delimit and specify what kinds of 
properties are relevant for determining similarity in a particular instance.  Likewise, as 
suggested by Murphy and Medin, some of our concepts may contain similarity-based 
knowledge, but there must be at least implicit theoretical constraints on what kinds of 
similarity-based knowledge gets stored in our relevant concepts such that certain of our 
mental representations can be said to be similar to objects and things in the world.
32
  
There must be some kind of mentally represented frame of reference for why constituents 
like HAS KEYS, HAS A SCREEN, and HAS A HARD DRIVE are similarity-based knowledge I 
associate with the category laptop rather than WEIGHS LESS THAN TEN MILLION POUNDS 
and DID NOT EXIST TEN BILLION YEARS AGO.  Murphy and Medin claim that it is theory 
                                                     
31 Nelson Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” in Problems and Projects, (Indianapolis:  
Bobbs-Merrill, 1972). 
32 Murphy and Medin, ibid. 
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knowledge, such as the knowledge of what a computer’s function is, that provides the 
requisite theoretical constraints.  Likewise, for moral concepts, why do I have similarity-
based knowledge such as HONEST, KIND, and JUST that I associate with the class good 
person rather than A QUALITY HELD BY SOME PEOPLE IN IRELAND, IS NOT EXEMPLIFIED 
ON SATURN, and IS NOT EXEMPLIFIED ON VENUS?  The answer is that there are 
theoretical constraints that reign in what kinds of similarity-based knowledge get stored 
in our relevant concepts.  More precisely, it is theory knowledge, such as of virtue ethical 
theory, which provides the reference point for what kinds of similarity-based knowledge 
is relevant and irrelevant.  Virtue ethical theory generally claims that good individuals 
have and exemplify the virtues; virtues that lead to a flourishing life.  Furthermore, we 
may look to certain highly moral individuals to see what acts should be performed and 
which virtues should be developed.  It is knowledge of this ethical theory that for me may 
constrain my similarity-based knowledge for GOOD PERSON such that my GOOD PERSON 
concept is in part constituted by the prototypes HONEST, KIND, and JUST rather than by A 
QUALITY HELD BY SOME PEOPLE IN IRELAND, IS NOT EXEMPLIFIED ON SATURN, and IS 
NOT EXEMPLIFIED ON VENUS.  For, I believe that being honest, kind, and just will lead 
one to live a flourishing life.  Therefore, we have on our hands a prototype-theory-theory 
chain argument that if one has prototypes of a moral category, then it follows that one has 
theories of the moral category as well.  The previously detailed evidence for the 
prototype theory in a variety of moral concepts also provides evidence for the existence 
of theory knowledge of such corresponding moral categories.  This chain argument for 
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the viability of the theory-theory of moral concepts is consistent with PAC in that it is in 
part reliant on prototype experimental studies on abstract moral concepts. 
In a word, the evidence prima facie demonstrates that most people have at least 
prototype, exemplar, and theory knowledge of a variety of moral categories such as 
moral.  To note, recall that the current evidence for the emotion theory of moral concepts 
only demonstrates that a limited number of moral concepts prima facie may have emotion 
structure.  Thus, for example, we may understand moral concept hybridism as generally 
claiming that there is a single concept MORAL that may be made up of at least three and 
perhaps four different types of knowledge, where emotions would be the fourth.  As a 
result, when the concept is called into working memory, all the various bodies of 
knowledge are brought into working memory as well, where they are at least made 
accessible, if not accessed.  On the other hand, strong pluralism posits that one may have 
at least three and perhaps four different concepts of, for instance, the category moral that 
correspond to the relevant viable theories of moral concepts for the concept in question.  
As a result, all of the bodies of knowledge need not necessarily be brought into working 
memory, but only the concept(s) that is relevant to or will be used in the cognitive 
competence at hand will be retrieved from long term memory.   
However, Weiskopf points out that one issue about working memory is that it is 
generally thought to have a limited capacity and cannot hold a large quantity of 
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information, which puts size constraints on the magnitude of our concepts.
33
  Remember 
that concepts are thought to contain default bodies of knowledge rather than all the 
possible facts we may know about x.  This allows for a significant reduction in the 
systematic selection of relevant knowledge when we generally reason about x.  It appears 
that at face value, super-structured hybrid concepts are too large to serve as single units 
of thought even though each part of the concept contains default knowledge.  For, a 
hybrid moral concept brings in all of the different bodies of knowledge into working 
memory.  Given the limited space capacity of working memory, strong pluralism at face 
value is the more conducive organization of the mind since all the bodies of knowledge 
need not simultaneously be brought into working memory.  Here, I use the term ‘at face 
value’ because there does not appear to be much experimental work specifically on 
concept constitution in relation to the capacity of working memory, so there does not 
appear to be a definitive answer as of yet as to how many default components a body of 
knowledge of x has as well as how many total conceptual components can be in play 
                                                     
33 To note, it is traditionally thought that working memory can contain seven elements or chunks 
plus or minus two, where elements are such various things as words and numbers.  G. A. Miller, 
“The Magical number seven, plus or minus two:  Some limits on our capacity for processing 
information,” Psychological Review 63:  (1956), pp. 81-97.  Recently, psychologist have discovered 
that the amount of chunks that working memory can simultaneously maintain depends on 
several variables such as the category of chunks used.  For example, the capacity is seven chunks 
for digits and five for words.  C. Hulme, S. Roodenrys, G. Brown, and R. Mercer, “The role of 
long-term memory mechanisms in memory span,” British Journal of Psychology 86:  (1995), pp. 527-
536. 
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when we reason about x in working memory.
34
  It may perhaps remotely be the case that 
working memory can handle enough components to account for super-structured hybrid 
concepts. 
A second issue Weiskopf mentions is that there is no reason to believe that all the 
various bodies of knowledge are retrieved and used each time a person tokens a concept.  
Although different bodies of knowledge may work together in cognition, it appears that 
there are a relatively well-delimited number of types of bodies of knowledge of x that are 
used in specific acts of cognition.  For example, in the previously and numerously 
discussed prototype studies in the third chapter such as for HIGHLY MORAL PERSON, there 
is no evidence that theories were present and qualifiedly used in working memory during 
these tests even though it was possible for participants to list a theory in the feature-
listing task.  Thus, it seems that strong pluralism is a more accurate description of the 
organization of our various bodies of knowledge as only a certain concept(s) of a 
category, rather than a whole super-structured concept, is brought forth into working 
memory for a particular higher cognitive competence act.  It does not appear and there is 
no reason to believe that all of the bodies of knowledge of a particular moral category are 
in play for acts of moral cognition.  
If the hybridist responds to these objections by claiming that only a part(s) of the 
hybrid concept may be recruited in working memory rather than the concept itself, then 
                                                     
34 Machery, ibid., p. 11.  Loyd Komatsu, “Recent views of conceptual structure,” Psychological 
bulletin 112:  (1992), pp. 520-521.   
 246 
the hybrid view begins to collapse into strong pluralism.  For, it is the strong pluralist 
rather than the hybridist who claims that only a single body of knowledge rather than all 
the bodies of knowledge can be brought into working memory.  A single super-structured 
concept of a category is not always simultaneously recruited into working memory where 
concepts are assembled into complete thoughts as a hybridist traditionally claims.   
While Weiskopf believes that his particular objections begin the collapse of 
hybridism into strong pluralism, we may perhaps complete the collapse by adding a 
further clarification to Weiskopf.
35
  This clarification may also address the staunch 
hybridist who still insists that only parts of a super-structured concept need be recruited 
into working memory, and that therefore, there is still the possibility for hybridism.  It 
also may address one who staunchly maintains weak pluralism, which contains a 
hybridism component.  As concepts are theoretical psychological entities that are defined 
as the units of thought recruited from long term memory into working memory in order to 
play a specified causal role in higher cognition, when having thoughts about, for 
example, the morality of stopping global warming, one’s MORAL concept is actively 
recruited into working memory to combine with other concepts to form the thought IT IS 
MORAL TO PREVENT GLOBAL WARMING.   As discussed in the first chapter concerning 
the definition of concepts and at least dating back to Locke, concepts are understood as 
the individual units or constituents of thought that play a certain functional role in 
thinking and reasoning.  Therefore, the MORAL concept is itself tokened in this instance.  
                                                     
35 Special thanks to Weiskopf for help on this clarification. 
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This conclusion is the result from the clarification that concepts are the theoretical 
individual constituents of thought that are recruited into working memory to form 
complete thoughts.  Given that this is the case, the hybridist is committed to the view that 
since the MORAL concept itself is brought into working memory in order to constitute the 
string of concepts that forms the complete thought and this MORAL concept is super-
structured, all the relevant bodies of knowledge in the super-structured concept must be 
brought in as well.  However, the concept MORAL is so loaded with various bodies of 
knowledge for the hybridist that it appears to lead to problems in that all the knowledge 
may not be able to be loaded into working memory given the generally understood small 
capacity size of working memory.  Furthermore, it appears that all the various bodies of 
knowledge do not always simultaneously play a role in moral cognition.  Thus, it seems 
to be the case that hybrid concepts in-and-of-themselves may be too large to play the 
relevant role in working memory, and the evidence suggests that when reasoning about 
ethics, prototype, exemplars, and theories do not simultaneously all play such a role in 
cases of moral cognition.  If this is correct, this leads to the demise of the hybrid theory 
and the intermediate view, and rather, it supports strong moral concept pluralism. 
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6.  Further Philosophical Implications 
In this final chapter, I assess the further implications any of the previous chapters 
of the dissertation may have in ethics.  The first implication is that the demise of the 
classical view means that many theorists in normative ethical theory and political 
philosophy must alter their approach in constructing their views.  For, many of such 
theorists erroneously presuppose that our moral mental representations have classical 
structure.  As another ramification, since our moral concepts do not have classical 
structure, we should expect there to be counterexamples to our moral concepts, but this 
does not necessarily mean that our concepts are wrong.  Rather, we generally should 
adhere to those views that can best handle the most objections and the most serious 
counters. 
A third implication is that the demise of the classical view and the existence of 
other accounts such as the prototype and exemplar theories provide a strong criticism 
against one of A.J. Ayer’s arguments for emotivism.  Finally, by relying on such things 
as studies in previous chapters that establish the viability of the prototype, exemplar, 
theory, and emotion theories, I argue against philosophers who use conceptual analysis in 
addressing the motivational judgment internalism/externalism and motivational 
Humeanism debates.  I contend that such philosophers are not justified in reaching their 
conclusions on these debates. 
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6.1  The Demise of the Classical View and Theoretical & Applied Ethics
 Stephen Stich, Alvin Goldman, and Mark Johnson have argued against the 
classical view of moral concepts by claiming the viability of the prototype theory along 
with its concomitant typicality effects.
1
  While all three rely on typicality effects found in 
prototype studies to make their arguments against the classical view for moral concepts, 
Stich and Goldman provide no experimental evidence for the viability of the prototype 
theory for moral concepts.  Thus, this conclusion against the classical view is in violation 
of PAC.  Moreover, as we have seen in the third chapter, Johnson also fails to establish 
the viability of the prototype view for moral concepts.  However, recall that I have shown 
in the third chapter that many moral concepts do have prototype structure which allowed 
me to argue against the classical view.   
Although Stich, Goldman, and Johnson fail to discredit the classical theory, they 
do mention further ethical implications the demise of the classical theory may have on 
ethical theory.  These three philosophers argue against normative ethical theories that 
require us to have mental representations with definitional structure.  If an ethical theory 
claims that terms such as ‘justice’ have necessary and sufficient conditions and that we 
may arrive upon knowledge of such a definition, such a theory is fundamentally wrong in 
that our very concept JUSTICE does not have definitional structure.  Given that ethical and 
political philosophies presuppose that we can fully mentally represent their respective 
normative categories, they need to take into account the findings in cognitive science in 
                                                     
1 Johnson, ibid.  Stich, ibid.  Goldman, ibid. 
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order to construct a view that is at least psychologically plausible in the sense that such 
normative theories are required to match the pre-existing structure of our moral concepts.  
If one claims that normative theories can be mentally represented completely as such, 
then there must be a structural match.  Now, some contemporary moral philosophers are 
immune from this criticism in that, for example, Richard Boyd does not posit necessary 
and sufficient conditions to his normative theory.
2
  Boyd claims that there are a 
homeostatic cluster of properties for correct moral categories that are not necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  While Boyd’s view explicitly is one about correct moral categories, 
his theory implicitly maintains that we can mentally represent such categories.  While for 
Boyd, mental concepts such as MORAL GOODNESS do refer to natural moral properties, as 
discussed in the first chapter, I will not dispute or contend for a particular theory of 
reference.  Rather, here, we will merely assume conditionally for the moment that Boyd’s 
theory of reference or content is correct since our primary reason for discussing Boyd in 
these contexts is not about whether his theory of content is correct.  Rather, it is to show 
how if his theory of content is correct and moral concepts represent moral categories, his 
theory of moral categories, unlike many others, implies a corresponding psychologically 
plausible view of moral concepts. 
                                                     
2 Recall from the fourth chapter that a homeostatic cluster of properties are a set of properties that 
are relevant to scientific induction and explanation and that are not necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  Here, the presence of one or some properties is likely to lead to the presence of others 
within the set.  Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 181-228.   
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In what he calls his ‘Homeostatic Consequentialism,’ he believes that moral 
goodness is a natural category that is defined by a cluster of mutually reinforcing 
properties such as the need for friendship, cooperation, and intellectual expression.  What 
properties are human needs is a complex theoretical question that requires empirical 
evidence such as socio-political experimentation.  For instance, we would not have 
understood the role political democracies play in the homeostasis of moral goodness 
without having the appropriate conditions that allowed for the first forms of limited 
democracy.   
While Boyd believes the correct moral category of moral goodness is constituted 
by a cluster of properties concerning human need and the normative theory of 
consequentialism, when we mentally represent this moral category, it appears that we will 
do so using prototype and theory-theory structures.  To note, although the folk may also 
have prototype and theory moral knowledge, such knowledge need not coincide with the 
perhaps more complex forms of prototype and theory knowledge had by the likes of 
Boyd.  The cluster of properties of human need related to such things as friendship, 
cooperation, and intellectual expression will be mentally represented by prototypes, and 
consequentialism will be tokened by theory knowledge.  As we empirically gain a better 
understanding of the cluster of properties, our moral mental representations develop and 
fill out as well.  This kind of psychological concept acquisition is no different than, for 
example, empirically discovering a new natural kind such as a new species of animal and 
mentally representing this natural kind with new and developing prototypes as we learn 
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more about the animal.  As we learn more about the new species, our concept of the new 
species likewise evolves to reflect the new knowledge gained.  As we can see, this 
Homeostatic Consequentialism allows Boyd to escape the present criticism.   
However, Plato (or Plato’s Socrates) appears to be guilty of requiring us to have 
moral concepts with classical structure.  Plato appears to hold that we can fully mentally 
represent the platonic form of the Good; a form that has necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  Through examining and studying the nature of the Good, it is thought that we 
can somehow grasp implicit and largely tacit knowledge of what the Good entails in 
various moral circumstances.  When a definition of the Good has been rejected by way of 
counterexample, we then continue on our quest for uncovering and specifying necessary 
and sufficient conditions by articulating new solutions that may avoid previous pitfalls.   
For example, in the beginning of The Republic, Socrates argues with Cephalus 
and Polemarchus about what the definition of ‘justice’ or ‘doing what is right’ is.  While 
Cephalus and Polemarchus lay out their definitions of ‘doing what is right,’ through the 
Socratic method, Socrates provides counterexamples to their definitions and thus, 
convinces them to alter their definitions as a result of the counters.  This has the strong 
appearance that Socrates is presupposing that we can mentally represent ‘justice’ or 
‘doing what is right’ with classical structure. 
 ‘That’s fair enough, Cephalus,’ I [(Socrates)] said.  ‘But are we really to 
 say that doing right, consists simply and solely in truthfulness and returning 
 anything we have borrowed?  Are those not actions that can be sometimes right 
 and sometimes wrong?  For instance, if one borrowed a weapon from a friend 
 who subsequently went out of his mind and then asked for it back, surely it would 
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 be generally agreed that one ought not to return it, and that it would not be right to 
 do so, nor to consent to tell the strict truth to a madman?’ 
 ‘That is true,’ he [(Cephalus)] replied. 
 ‘Well then,’ I said, ‘telling the truth and returning what we have borrowed 
 is not the definition of doing right.’3 
 
Many normative ethical theories claim that moral categories have necessary and 
sufficient conditions and that we may mentally represent such categories.  For instance, 
Kant appears to presuppose the viability of the classical view by claiming that the 
grounding of all our moral duties is based upon the categorical imperative, where the first 
formulation is a decision procedure to act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.
4
  Being allowed by a 
principle that one could rationally will to hold as a universal law is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for an act to be morally permissible.  Jeremy Bentham appears to lay 
out necessary and sufficient conditions to utilitarianism by claiming that an action is right 
so long as it promotes the overall happiness or pleasure.  Rosalind Hursthouse, a modern 
day virtue ethicist, claims that “[a]n action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.”5  It also seems like 
Thomas Scanlon, a contractualist, argues that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
                                                     
3 Plato, The Republic, 2nd Edition, trans. by Desmond Lee, (London:  Penguin Books), 1974, p. 7. 
4 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ed. by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press), 1997. 
5 Her notion of “acting in character” is to act based on a firm, reliable, and stable disposition that 
leads towards moral excellence.  Even if her theory relied on a definition that in some way 
deferred to prototypes or exemplars, she still in part posits a definitional structure which is not 
psychologically real.  Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 
1999, p. 28. 
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determining if an act is right is if it could be justified to others on grounds that they could 
not reasonably reject.
6
   
Recently David Miller discusses numerous contemporary political philosophers’ 
views, such as those by Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel, concerning the boundaries 
within which the principles of distributive justice apply.
7
  These views presuppose that 
there are necessary and sufficient conditions to such boundaries of justice and that we 
may mentally represent them, and Miller criticizes these views in that they are not 
successful necessary and sufficient conditions.  For instance, Miller labels Dworkin and 
Nagel’s view as the political coercion theory.  This theory claims that the boundaries of 
justice are the boundaries of systems of legitimate political coercion.  A system of 
legitimate political coercion is a system where individuals have certain freedoms 
restricted by laws and are subject to punishment if breaking such coercive laws.  
Moreover, there must be a legitimate justification for such laws, and the justification that 
succeeds is that the overall political system is distributively just.  On this view, being the 
boundaries of a system of legitimate political coercion is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for being the boundaries of distributive justice, where an individual who falls 
outside such boundaries is an individual in which the full extent of the principles of 
distributive justice does not apply. 
                                                     
6 To note, the necessary and sufficient condition of reasonable rejection for Scanlon is stated here 
in a simplified form.  T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1998. 
7 David Miller, “Justice and Boundaries,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 8:  (2009), pp. 291-309.   
 255 
Miller objects to the political coercion view on several accounts.  As one 
objection, he argues that there are non-coercive settings, such as in clubs and churches, in 
which the principles of distributive justice do apply.  For example, principles of equality 
for holding a certain office may come into play in some non-coercive groups.  Hence, the 
boundaries of justice are not defined by the boundaries of systems of legitimate political 
coercion.  Miller writes, “So although questions of distributive justice may become 
especially pressing between people whose relationships to one another involve routinely 
applied coercion, it seems that such relationships are neither strictly necessary nor 
sufficient to bring principles of distributive justice into play.”8  Regardless of whether 
Miller’s objection is right that the principles of justice also apply in non-coercive settings, 
we may specifically criticize the likes of Miller, Dworkin, and Nagel for presupposing 
that that there may be classical structure to our moral concepts.  The primary purpose of 
putting forth this example is to waylay this particular criticism against the above 
philosophers. 
Recall from the third chapter that pervasive typicality effects were found for 
ethical concepts such as GOOD PERSON, JUST, BRAVE, and MORAL.  Moreover, we 
examined prototype concept acquisition studies for RIGHT and WRONG ACTION.  In this 
third chapter, from typicality effects found in prototype studies, inter alia, we argued that 
the classical view is not psychologically real for such moral concepts.  Thus, while this 
ethical ramification or objection at hand fundamentally implicates many if not most 
                                                     
8 Miller, 301. 
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normative ethical theories, philosophers must take alternative routes, such as Boyd, when 
constructing their views.   
The Plato example points to a further ethical implication in that it is an open 
possibility that there will be counterexamples to our moral concepts given a lack of 
classical structure.  This point is not stated by Stich, Goldman, or Johnson.  Especially if 
we are assuming that correct moral categories must psychologically or structurally be 
able to be mentally represented completely as such by human minds, then simply denying 
someone else’s moral conception based on one counterexample is too simplistic a move 
in attempting to refute this person’s conception of, for example, JUST.9   
At this point we will explore some cases of why a lack of classical structure will 
lead to the possibility of there being counterexamples.  First, let us examine a concept 
that is thought to have classical structure:  EVEN NUMBER = A NUMBER DIVISIBLE BY 
TWO WITHOUT REMAINDER.  If I have this concept, in order for me to categorize a 
number as being even, it is necessary and sufficient for the number in question to be a 
number divisible by two without remainder.  Without exception, only numbers that 
satisfy this condition can be classified as even numbers.  There is a strict definition here 
with no room for counterexamples given the classical structure of my concept.   
                                                     
9 This passage for the moment assumes that there are correct moral categories, but in this 
dissertation, I remain agnostic as to whether there are correct moral categories or not.  Now, what 
would be an adequate refutation of someone’s moral conception will be dependent on the exact 
structure of a correct category.  For example, Boyd claims that there are a homeostatic cluster of 
properties for correct moral categories that are not necessary and sufficient conditions.  One way 
to argue against his view would be to have a good number of counterexamples that precisely 
show that the cluster of properties can come apart in various ways.   
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Now, recall how we have seen a glimmer of why the demise of the classical view 
will allow for counterexamples when we examined Wittgenstein’s prototype or family 
resemblance analysis of GAME in the third chapter.  If a concept such as GAME has family 
resemblance rather than classical structure, then there can be counterexamples to parts of 
one’s concept.  For instance, if my GAME concept has prototype structure and is in part 
constituted by INCLUDES TWO OR MORE PEOPLE, then there can be a counterexample to 
this because I understand solitaire to be a game, but it only involves one person.   The 
property of including two or more people may be a statistically frequent feature of games 
for me, but it is not a necessary condition.   
For moral concepts, a lack of classical structure also will inevitably lead to the 
existence of counterexamples to analyses presenting necessary and sufficient conditions 
for those concepts.  For example, my prototype of MORAL ACT may be in part constituted 
by DO NOT HIT OTHERS and DO NOT MAKE OTHERS FEEL BAD.  Although these 
components play a role in influencing me to categorize certain acts, such as peaceful 
protests when people abstain from violence, as being moral acts, such constituents are not 
necessary conditions for me.  For, I categorize acts where one physically defends oneself 
from an intruder in one’s home as being morally permissible even though one strikes and 
harms the intruder.  Moreover, they are not sufficient conditions because even if they are 
jointly satisfied, I still may not classify a particular act as being a moral one.  For 
instance, if a couple did not even attempt to physically defend the lives of their children 
from a violent intruder in their home because they are radical pacifists, I would not 
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categorize this to be a moral act even though the couple did not attempt to strike the 
intruder and make the intruder feel bad.  Rather, I perceive that there is some kind of 
moral failing in this circumstance. 
Continuing with examples, my exemplar concept of MORAL ACT may be in part 
constituted by MY FRIEND NOT LYING TO THE POLICE OFFICER LAST YEAR and OBEYING 
THE LAW LAST NEW YEAR’S EVE.  Recall from the second chapter that exemplars are 
themselves constituted by concepts that are about the generalizable moral attributes of the 
extension of the exemplars.  For instance, MY FRIEND NOT LYING TO THE POLICE 
OFFICER LAST YEAR may be in part made up of TELL THE TRUTH.  OBEYING THE LAW 
LAST NEW YEAR’S EVE may be in part constituted by BE A MODEL CITIZEN.  TELL THE 
TRUTH and BE A MODEL CITIZEN may be generalizable and relevant to other different 
moral scenarios, such as when one takes the stand in a trial.  However, TELL THE TRUTH 
and BE A MODEL CITIZEN are not necessary conditions for me because I would classify a 
person hiding Jewish persons up in his attic and lying to the Gestapo as being moral even 
though he lies to Nazi police officers and disobeys Nazi law by telling them that he is not 
hiding Jewish persons up in his attic.  Furthermore, such components are not sufficient 
because even though particular situations may satisfy these represented conditions, I still 
may not categorize them as being moral acts.  For instance, even though Albert did not lie 
to the officer and he was a model citizen by obeying the law and telling the truth to a 
Nazi officer that he is hiding Jewish persons up in his attic, I still do not classify his act as 
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being moral.  Rather, I deem it to be an immoral act even though he did not lie to the 
officer and he obeyed the Nazi law. 
As stated in the second chapter, the theory-theory for moral concepts claims that 
theories do not represent necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather, they occupy 
defeasible placeholder positions.  Recall from the second chapter that by occupying such 
a position, theory knowledge can be understood as being generalizations that are taken to 
be defeasible based on, for example, the possibility of being defeated by new evidence or 
moral learning in the future.  Hence, they are not consciously or subconsciously taken to 
be a strict definition.  Insofar as this is the case, the theory-theory is very open to the 
possibility of there being counterexamples to generalized theories about what is morally 
right or wrong.
10
 
In expecting counterexamples, we should adhere to those theories or views that 
currently can withstand the objections or are best protected against many to most 
counters, especially against those counters that are potentially the most damaging.  Here, 
I allow for the possibility that one may hold a theory that is best protected from 
counterexamples but not from all of them because it may be possible that some 
individuals may have a defeated theory, but cannot think of an alternate theory at the 
                                                     
10 While the classical theorist also may hold that the represented necessary and sufficient 
conditions can be open to revision due to error, they maintain that there is the possibility for the 
correct definition to be arrived upon, where such a definition is not defeasible.  On the other 
hand, with the theory-theory, theory knowledge is always defeasible.  Also, recall from the 
second chapter that if anything, theory knowledge may represent necessary but not sufficient 
conditions. This is another factor that differentiates the theory-theory from the classical view.   
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present moment that is undefeated.  Rather, although their present theory is defeated from 
certain counterexamples, it is the best theory they can come up with at the present 
moment.   
With all of the above in mind, as examples, if one is a rule-based deontologist, 
then one should construct a list of rules, that are mentally represented by prototypes, that 
can best handle the most objections and the most serious counters.  Concerning the 
prototype view, successful counterexamples are not ones that show that the represented 
prototypical features simply fail to be effective necessary and sufficient conditions 
because such features are not even taken to be definitions in the first place.  Successful 
counterexamples for the prototype theory are also not instances where the features of the 
counterexamples do not carry any weight at all because this is not to be expected.  We 
should expect the qualities of a category to carry weight, where some are more important 
than others.  Therefore, we should expect the features of the successful counterexamples 
to carry weight as well.  This aspect of having weighted features is accurately mirrored in 
the prototype view.  Rather, successful counterexamples for the prototype theory, for 
example, will be a group of important and central cases of good acts that do not match 
most of the prototypes of one’s GOOD ACT concept and that do not match the heavily 
weighted prototypes either.  
Moving on to the exemplar theory, if one is a virtue ethicist who believes that we 
should act as the virtuous agent would act, then one should focus on particular 
individuals, who are mentally represented by exemplars, who can best withstand a 
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thorough scrutiny of character.  Recall that such exemplars themselves will be constituted 
by concepts that refer to things like more generalizable virtues such as honesty and 
benevolence.  In deciding which individuals can best withstand a thorough scrutiny of 
character, one must look for individuals with certain generalizable attributes; attributes 
that can best handle the most relevant objections and the most serious counters.  While 
keeping in mind that theory bodies of knowledge are defeasible, normative ethical views 
likewise should be adopted that presently are thought to withstand the current objections 
or most of the objections, especially the most damaging ones.   
Finally, Goldman notes that Ayer in part argues for emotivism and for the view 
that moral judgments are the expression of our emotions by relying on the fact that we are 
unsuccessful at arriving upon a definition of our moral terms.
11
  Ayer claims that since 
moral philosophers have great difficulty in providing a definition for moral terms, 
descriptivism in ethics should be replaced by emotivism.  However, given that our moral 
concepts do not have classical structure, it should come as no surprise that it is hard to 
come up with a definition for moral terms.  Moreover, given the viability of, for example, 
the prototype and exemplar theories for moral concepts, our concepts may still have 
descriptive content, although not a definitional descriptive content.  In this manner, we 
can see that it does not immediately follow that descriptivism is false and therefore, 
emotivism is true just because our moral concepts do not have classical structure.   
                                                     
11 Goldman, ibid.  A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (London:  Gollancz), 1936. 
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Since Stich, Goldman, and Johnson have not established their conclusions against 
definitionism for moral concepts, they cannot validate their further ethical ramifications.  
However, given that I have demonstrated in this dissertation that definitionism is not 
viable for many moral concepts, we finally may legitimately argue that their further 
ethical implications in ethical theory – concerning the objection against normative ethical 
views that imply that we can have psychologically unreal mental states and the 
contention against Ayer’s particular argument for emotivism – hold.12   
 
6.2  Types of Conceptual Analysis 
We will proceed further in our inquiry of now examining and generally criticizing 
conceptual analysis arguments made for the motivational judgment internalism 
(MJI)/motivational judgment externalism (MJE) and motivational Humeanism debates in 
metaethical moral psychology.  This will demonstrate the import of the previous chapters 
of the dissertation regarding the method of conceptual analysis for these two debates. 
MJI will be understood to claim that there is a necessary connection between 
someone making a moral judgment and this speaker having some degree of motivation, 
whether that degree of motivation is defeasible or overriding.  Some proponents of this 
view are Timmons and Gibbard.
13
  Meanwhile, motivational judgment externalism 
                                                     
12 John Jung Park, “Prototypes, Exemplars, and Theoretical & Applied Ethics,” Neuroethics, 
forthcoming. 
13 Timmons, ibid.  Gibbard, ibid. 
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(MJE), held by the likes of Brink and Shafer-Landau, denies this necessary connection.
14
  
Now, there are numerous other variations of internalist and externalist positions.  For 
example, Michael Smith and Christine Korsgaard argue that when one makes a moral 
judgment, one is necessarily motivated unless one is practically irrational.
 15  Insofar as 
such variations rely on the use of conceptual analysis, what I will later have to say about 
this debate will also apply to them.  However, due to ease of linguistic expression, I will 
only discuss MJI and MJE as originally defined above, and I will not explicitly discuss 
alternate views such as Smith’s and Korsgaard’s, even though their theories are within 
the current purview.   
For the final metaethical issue, motivational Humeans like Blackburn claim that 
beliefs by themselves do not motivate nor do they produce any motivational states.
16
  
Rather, it is necessarily the case that only emotions and other conative states motivate.  
On the other hand, anti-Humeans like Nagel argue that some beliefs by themselves are 
sufficient to motivate, or by themselves, some beliefs can lead to a motivational state.
17
  
Anti-Humeans deny the claim that only emotions and other conative states motivate. 
Notice that both of these issues appear to importantly implicate concepts.  As MJI 
is commonly and generally conceived, it claims that the connection between moral 
judgment and motivation must hold in virtue of the judgment itself, not in virtue of some 
                                                     
14 Brink, Ibid.  Shafer-Landau, ibid. 
15 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, (Maleden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing), 1994.  Christine 
Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy (1986), p. 5-25. 
16 Blackburn, Ruling Passions. 
17 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, (Oxford:  Clarendon Press), 1970. 
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contingent fact or reason.
18
  Following Adina Roskies, let us call this the intrinsicness 
requirement.
19
  We may therefore interpret the intrinsicness requirement for MJI as 
claiming that the moral concept in a judgment is at least in part constituted by a 
motivational state.  If the concept is so constituted, then this satisfies the intrinsicness 
requirement because the motivational state is what at least in part constitutes the moral 
concept, where the moral concept in turn is what constitutes the judgment.  In such a 
circumstance, motivation stems from the judgment itself.  Therefore, in order to see 
whether MJI is right or not, we should examine whether it is necessary that all moral 
concepts contained within sincere moral judgments are at least in part constituted by 
motivational states.  Finally, motivational Humeanism entails that the relevant concepts 
in motivating judgments must be at least in part constitutively linked to some conative 
state, while anti-Humeanism entails that at times the relevant concepts in motivating 
judgments or judgments that lead to motivation are not constitutively linked to some 
conative state.   
Before criticizing the use of conceptual analysis in the MJI/MJE and motivational 
Humeanism debates, first we need to explore the various kinds of conceptual analysis as 
this is a very common method used by philosophers in addressing these two issues.  
However, before classifying the various kinds of conceptual analysis, we will initially 
have to discuss several important distinctions.  First we must invoke the 
                                                     
18 Roskies, ibid.  Thomas Nagel, ibid. 
19 Roskies, ibid.   
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concept/conception distinction from the first chapter.  We may assume that this 
distinction is in play for the remainder of the dissertation.  As we shall see, there are 
various kinds of conceptual analysis, and we will need this distinction in order to 
articulate the differences between some of them.  Recall that a concept is an abstract 
entity that is metaphysical in the sense that it is a correct concept whose components 
represent the correct classificatory descriptions.  Meanwhile, a conception is a mental 
representation in the head of an agent that is epistemic in the sense that its components 
represent the properties we actually think about when we categorize or reason about the 
extension of the conception regardless of whether such properties are correct or incorrect 
classifiers.  Concepts and conceptions will both appear in all capitalized letters. 
Although we have partially discussed it earlier in this chapter with Plato, 
generally speaking, conceptual analysis is picking a concept or conception and attempting 
to uncover or unpack the constituent components of the concept or conception through 
use of non-empirical and non-experimental a priori intuitions that are drawn from thought 
experiments and at times real life cases.
20
  Notice that I have first detailed conceptual 
analysis as being either about uncovering abstract concepts or mental representations.  As 
we shall see, some understand it to be about concepts, but others view it to be about 
conceptions.    
                                                     
20 There is an empirically-oriented way of analyzing a conception.  An analysis of the explanatory 
or theoretical role that a conception plays in science might support one analysis rather than 
another.  However, for our purposes, the metaethicists at hand engage in conceptual analysis in 
an a priori way. 
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Also, philosophers can understand ‘intuition’ in conceptual analysis to mean 
different things.  Different philosophers may attach different psychological or 
epistemological qualities to what an intuition is.  For instance, Hugo Mercier and Dan 
Sperber describe an intuition as produced by “processes that take place inside individuals 
without being controlled by them.”21  On this account, the spontaneous inferences that 
justify an intuition are not consciously accessible to the agent.  Jeff McMahan simply 
describes a conceptual analysis intuition in ethics as a strong spontaneous moral 
judgment.
22
  Colin McGinn claims that they are “one’s considered judgments about 
actual and possible cases.”23  Still, others may understand intuition in the standard 
epistemic sense, such as with G. E. Moore and more recently Robert Audi, where it is a 
non-inferentially justified belief that may be arrived upon through careful and perhaps 
long reflection.
24
  While there are various ways of understanding what an intuition is 
when, for example, from a thought experiment a philosopher says that it is simply 
intuitively obvious that the intuition is correct, my use of the term will be a use that could 
be taken in any of the above senses.  As we proceed, I do not believe that this will be 
detrimental to our final aims.   
                                                     
21 Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, “Intuitive and reflective inferences,” In two minds:  Dual 
processes and beyond, ed. by J. Evans & K. Frankish, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 2009. 
22 Jeff McMahan, “Moral Intuition,” Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. by Hugh LaFollette, 
(Oxford:  Blackwell), 2000. 
23 Colin McGinn, Truth By Analysis, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 2012. 
24 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 5th edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1968.  
Robert Audi, The Good in the Right, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press), 2004. 
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Another distinction will need to be made between what I call the formal versus 
material aspect of conceptual analysis.  This will aid us in our future discussion of 
conceptual analysis.  Here, I will elaborate upon this distinction in terms of the 
conceptual analysis of conceptions, but as we shall later see, this distinction can also be 
thought to hold for the domain of concepts, mutatis mutandis.  Moreover, I take this 
distinction to be pertinent to the use of conceptual analysis specifically in the MJI/MJE 
and motivational Humeanism debates, and this is all we need for our purposes.  I make no 
strong claim here as to whether this distinction holds for conceptual analysis in all other 
various types of fields of inquiry.  At this point, we will now move into the discussion of 
the conceptual analysis of conceptions both in light of the formal/material distinction and 
in terms of a general discussion of what the conceptual analysis of conceptions is. 
The formal aspect is the analysis of the components of the conception in question 
irrespective of whether the propositional content of the components could be realized.  
The MJI/MJE debate is often argued on the a priori grounds of whether the existence of 
the amoralist is conceivable.  Some philosophers have attempted to argue against MJI by 
introducing the notion of the amoralist.  For example, David Brink argues that the MJI 
advocate fails to take the amoralist seriously, where the amoralist may make sincere 
moral demands but still remains unmoved.
25
  In this case, the formal aspect of conceptual 
analysis pertains to the actual analysis of the conception AMORALIST or perhaps MORAL 
                                                     
25 David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press), 1989. 
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JUDGMENT.  By analyzing our intuitions on these conceptions, we can perhaps figure out, 
for example, whether our AMORALIST conception is constituted by POSSIBLY COULD 
EXIST.  We may also discern whether, for instance, our MORAL JUDGMENT conception is 
constituted by NECESSARILY HAVING SOME DEGREE OF MOTIVATION.  However, the 
material aspect is concerned with whether the propositional content of the intuition belief 
in the formal aspect can be said to be true.  While the formal element is, for instance, 
about the a priori analysis of the conception AMORALIST and what constitutes this mental 
conception, where an intuition belief may be AMORALISTS POSSIBLY COULD EXIST, the 
material element takes the propositional content of this intuition belief – namely, 
‘Amoralists possibly could exist’ – and is interested in whether the proposition is true.  
Restated in perhaps more clear terms, the formal element is the analysis of the 
conception’s components on the basis of a priori armchair investigation, and the material 
element is concerned with the separate question of whether the conception is true in all 
possible worlds.  Another way to look at it is that formally, one’s conception MORAL 
JUDGMENT may be constituted by NECESSARILY HAVING SOME DEGREE OF MOTIVATION.  
Here, motivation is merely being purported by the intuition to at least in part constitute 
all speakers’ actual moral judgments.  However, the material element is asking whether it 
is the case in all possible worlds that when all people make sincere moral judgments, all 
such judgments are actually at least in part constituted by motivational mental states, 
where it is truly the case that such judgments actually involve the speaker having the 
relevant motivation.  For example, if Lucy is a real person in some possible world such as 
 269 
the actual world and she forms the judgment STEALING IS WRONG, is it the case that in 
this world her conception WRONG in this judgment is actually at least in part constituted 
by, for instance, a motivational state?  This pertains to the material element.  Notice that 
while the formal aspect in our example is concerned with the conception MORAL 
JUDGMENT and its constituents in the head, the material aspect in our same example is 
rather about the conception WRONG and its constituents.   
In regards to the conceptual analysis of conceptions, David Brink understands 
MJI to be a modal claim:   
Internalism (of any form) has at least three distinguishable components.  The first 
 claim is that moral considerations necessarily motivate or provide reason for 
 action.  The second and third claims come out of the internalist thesis that it is the 
 concept of morality that establishes this.  Since it is the concept of morality that 
 shows that moral considerations necessarily motivate or provide reasons for 
 action, this claim about the motivational power or rationality of morality must be 
 a priori.  Since it is the concept of morality that determines this fact, the 
 rationality or motivational power of moral considerations cannot depend on 
 substantive considerations such as what the content of morality turns out to be, 
 facts about agents, or the content of the correct theory of rationality.
26
 
 
The belief that MJI is a modal claim should not be surprising since MJI and MJE 
explicitly propound material modal conclusions.  MJI advocates say that there is a 
necessary connection between making a judgment and being motivated to some degree, 
while MJE advocates deny the necessary connection.  Moreover, MJI and MJE theorists 
take their respective material modal conclusions to be true.   
                                                     
26 Brink, Ibid., p. 42. 
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For the motivational Humeanism debate, Thomas Nagel argues through a priori 
thought experiments that individuals who have prudential practical reasons for 
performing some action in the future may be motivated in the present by such reasons 
rather than from a present desire to satisfy future interests.  However, he takes the formal 
element of conceptual analysis to not only be a conclusion regarding the constituents of 
his conception and what he conceives, but he also believes it entails material conclusions 
about all possible worlds which includes the actual world and actual human nature.  
Nagel takes the propositional content of his intuition to be true.  For instance, in 
discussing his anti-Humeanism, he states, “[M]y suggestion sheds more light on the 
operation of prudence and on human nature in general.”27  This is consistent with the fact 
that motivational Humeans and anti-Humeans tend to state their claims in material modal 
terms.  Humeans tend to claim that necessarily only conative states motivate, while anti-
Humeans tend to deny this necessary claim.
28
  Humeans and anti-Humeans understand 
their respective claims to be true.   
                                                     
27 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press), 1970, p. 38. 
28 I say ‘tend to’ because admittedly, it is not exactly clear in the literature whether the 
motivational Humeanism debate is a conceptual modal claim or whether it is an empirical issue 
about the actual world.  Notice in the above Nagel example on his anti-Humeanism, he appears 
to make a conceptual modal claim.  However, Shafer-Landau in certain (but not all) cases appears 
to understand it to be an empirical claim, where he attempts to justify anti-Humeanism by 
relying on his own psychological phenomenological experiences of acting.  However, he also 
claims that Humeans believe that “desires are necessary for motivation (p. 122).”  While I discuss 
it as a conceptual modal claim, if one understands it to be an empirical claim about the actual 
world and not a modal claim, then the lack of empirical confirmation and PAC directly can be 
used to criticize most of those who make such a strong claim on this debate since most do not use 
accurate experimental evidence on the debate in question.  Shafer-Landau, ibid. 
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In regards to the conceptual analysis of conceptions for the MJI/MJE and 
motivational Humeanism debates, it is generally thought that there is a link between 
conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and a priori necessity.  For instance, through 
conceptual analysis of conceptions, if we cannot conceptually conceive of someone 
making a moral judgment without being motivated in some way because conceiving 
otherwise would lead to a contradiction, then it is an a priori necessity that there is a 
connection between moral judgment and some degree of motivation.  This a priori 
necessity apparently holds in all possible worlds.  As we can see, conceptual analysts of 
conceptions for the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates believe that there is a 
link between the formal and material aspect, where a priori intuitions not only show us 
what constitutes our formal conceptions and tells us what is and is not conceivable, but 
such intuitions also can entail relevant material conclusions about the truth or falsity of 
the propositional content of the intuition beliefs via the conceivability-metaphysical 
possibility-a priori necessity link.
 29
   
Moving along with further distinctions, I take it that the conceptual analysis of 
conceptions is taken by many to be about the analysis of folk conceptions.  For instance, 
in defending this brand of conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson states: 
                                                     
29 If a philosopher has conception C of phenomenon P, then the philosopher will believe C of P.  
However, that does not show that the philosopher has the meta-view that, because C is her 
conception of P, C is necessarily true (qua truth with a capital T) of P.  For, the philosopher may 
hold a deflationary theory of truth.  Concerning the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism 
debates, most metaethicists involved in conceptual analysis believe that their relevant 
conclusions on such issues are necessarily true and not merely true in the deflationary sense. 
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But how should we identify our ordinary conception?  The only possible answer, I 
 think, is by appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about free action, 
 determinism, belief, or whatever, as revealed by our intuitions about possible 
 cases.  Intuitions about how various cases, including various merely possible 
 cases, are correctly described in terms of free action, determinism, and belief are 
 precisely what reveal our ordinary conceptions of free action, determinism, and 
 belief, or, as it is often put nowadays, our folk theory of them.
30
 
 
Likewise, concerning his use of conceptual analysis on a variety of moral issues 
such as on motivational Humeanism, Smith writes: 
To say that we can analyse moral concepts, like the concept of being right, is to 
 say that we can specify which property the property of being right is by reference 
 to platitudes about rightness:  that is, by reference to descriptions of the inferential 
 and judgmental dispositions of those who have mastery of the term ‘rightness.’31   
 
Usually a telltale sign that a philosopher understands conceptual analysis to be 
about coming to a clear understanding of folk conceptions is when authors offer their 
intuitions by opening with, “We wouldn’t say that…” or something to that effect.  For 
instance, Shafer-Landau’s chapter on MJI is littered with phrases such as “We can 
apparently imagine…”32 and “we can imagine an agent…”33  In relation to the same 
metaethical issue, Brink’s writing is suffused with such passages.  In one selected 
paragraph, we have phrasings such as, “We can imagine someone…”, “We may even 
think that such a person is merely possible…”, “But we do think that such a person is 
                                                     
30 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics:  A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press), 1998, p. 31. 
31 Smith, ibid., p. 39. 
32 My italics.  Shafer-Landau, ibid., p. 151. 
33 My italics.  Shafer-Landau, ibid., p. 150. 
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merely possible…”,  etc.34  Due to such reasons, although they do not explicitly state 
their view on conceptual analysis and it may not be wholly clear on what they view 
conceptual analysis to be, I understand the likes of Shafer-Landau and Brink to maintain 
folk understandings of the conceptual analysis of conceptions.
35
   
However, it must be noted that one may take the conceptual analysis of 
conceptions to be the analysis of expert’s conceptions.  For instance, McGinn claims that 
all of philosophy in the present as well as in history is fundamentally the a priori search 
for essences by examining experts’ psychological conceptions.  When experts examine 
their own conceptions a priori, they gain access to the essential truths and nature of the 
extra-mental real world.
36
  For, philosophy’s inherent goal is to arrive upon conclusions 
of the nature of reality, not just merely the structure of our formal conceptions.  This is 
best done by introspectively trained philosophers who examine only their own 
conceptions.
37
  Given that this may be the case, in the conception domain, we have the 
possible demarcations of folk conceptual analysis of conceptions, which analyzes folk 
                                                     
34 My italics.  Brink, ibid., 48. 
35 Even if they really espouse some other form of conceptual analysis, I eventually will provide 
criticisms against all forms of conceptual analysis.   
36 To note, McGinn explains the connection between mind and world by arguing for a 
teleosemantics view.  In this fashion, our conceptions refer to things in the world so long as our 
conceptions have the function of representing such things, and this provides the link between 
mind and world. 
37 For further philosophers who hold that it is expert’s intuitions that only matter, see T. 
Williamson, “Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105:  (2005), p. 1-23.  S. D. Hales, Relativism and the 
Foundations of Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press), 2006.  K. Ludwig, “The epistemology of 
thought experiments:  First person versus third person approaches,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 31:  (2007), pp. 128-159. 
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conceptions, and expert conceptual analysis of conceptions, which analyzes 
philosopher’s conceptions only.   
Now, we will turn our attention to describing the conceptual analysis of concepts.  
First, we will discuss it in light of the formal and material distinction.  For, this 
distinction can be thought to also hold for the conceptual analysis of concepts.  For 
example, if I attempt to analyze a priori the correct metaphysical concept MORAL 
JUDGMENT, my intuitions may come to the conclusion that this abstract concept is 
constituted by NECESSARILY HAVING SOME DEGREE OF MOTIVATION, where motivation 
is being purported to at least in part constitute all speakers’ moral judgments.  The formal 
element is what the philosopher a priori understands the constituent of the concept to be.  
The material element is then concerned with, for example, the truth of the following 
claim that ‘in all possible worlds, all moral conceptions in sincere moral judgments in all 
moral agents is at least in part constituted by a motivational mental state,’ where it 
actually is the case that some motivational state really at least in part constitutes 
everyone’s sincere moral judgments.  The formal element is the analysis of the concept’s 
components on the basis of a priori armchair investigation, and the material element is 
concerned with the separate question of whether the concept constituents are true in all 
possible worlds.   
Philosophers believe there is a strong link between the formal and material 
elements of the conceptual analysis of concepts.  For, they are analyzing the correct 
metaphysical concept, and any constituents of the concept are taken to be correct or true.  
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Hence, if a philosopher engaged in the conceptual analysis of concepts a priori takes the 
concept MORAL JUDGMENT to be constituted by NECESSARILY HAVING SOME DEGREE OF 
MOTIVATION, then this philosopher believes that it is true that there is a necessary 
connection between making a moral judgment and having some degree of motivation in 
virtue of what the philosopher thinks the correct concept is.  This is consistent with the 
general claims made by philosophers in the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism 
debates because they draw material modal conclusions; conclusions which they 
understand to be true.  Philosophers in these debates that espouse the methodology of the 
conceptual analysis of concepts can still draw their modal conclusions because there is an 
apparent link between the formal and material elements. 
For example, Georges Rey, in a well-known article concerning the 
concept/conception distinction, takes conceptual analysis to be the conceptual analysis of 
concepts, where an a priori conclusion entails that the propositional content of the 
intuition is true.
38
  For Rey, the formal element is the analysis of the abstract concept, 
while the material element is concerned with whether the intuition arrived upon in the 
formal element is true.  In analyzing abstract concepts and their constituents, we then can 
make relevant claims about the truth of the relevant proposition.
39
  For instance, Rey 
                                                     
38 Rey, ibid. 
39 The ontological difference between concepts and conceptions must be noted because the 
constituents of abstract concepts is not directly epistemic in the way that the constituents of 
conceptions are epistemically already in the head.  Conception constituents are what we can a 
priori conceive.  In this respect, the conceptual analysis of conceptions is about how we conceive 
of possible worlds, and therefore, there is a link between such a priori analysis, possibility, a 
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writes, “Concepts, that is, would seem – at least in the first instance – to be about the 
world and how it divides up; not about how we might divide up our methods of 
investigating it.”40  He also states in distinguishing concepts from conceptions: 
The division I draw between these remaining functions corresponds to a crucial, if 
 very battered distinction in philosophy between metaphysics and epistemology, or 
 between issues surrounding how the world is (what exists, what is true) and issues 
 surrounding how we know, believe, infer, how the world is.
41
 
  
I will understand the conceptual analysis of concepts to generally claim that such 
analysis should be done by those professional philosophers who have read the literature 
on the subject matter, are well trained in logical thinking and getting in touch with 
abstract entities, etc.  In a word, since what is at hand is the analysis of abstract entities or 
concepts, similar to advanced mathematics and logic where it mostly is the professional 
mathematician or logician’s job to conduct a priori analysis on concepts, the conceptual 
analysis of concepts will be understood to primarily fall within the domain of those 
trained metaphysicians who understand conceptual analysis to be the analysis of abstract 
                                                     
 
priori necessity, and thus, the material element.  However, since the conceptual analysis of 
concepts is not directly epistemic, it does not appear to deal with conceivability in the same way 
as with the conceptual analysis of conceptions.  Thus, for the conceptual analysis of concepts, 
philosophers’ a priori intuitions supposedly are directly channeled to what the constituents of the 
relevant metaphysically correct concept are.  It appears for the conceptual analysis of concepts 
that there is no conceivability-possibility-necessity link.  Rather, intuitions about concepts 
supposedly are directly linked to what is purportedly true. 
40 Rey, ibid., p. 289. 
41 Rey, ibid., p. 284. 
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concepts.  Here, Rey claims that experts may have access to concepts through their own a 
priori intuitions.    
 
6.3  On the Use of Conceptual Analysis for MJI/MJE & Motivational Humeanism 
It is time now to attempt to criticize the various forms of conceptual analysis in 
light of the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates.  First, we will discuss expert 
and folk conceptual analysis of conceptions.   A criticism we may lay against expert and 
folk conceptual analysis of conceptions is that empirical work is relevant and required to 
assess the claims about the nature of the constituents of the conceptions that are being 
analyzed.  Empirical work is relevant to the formal element.  For, conceptions are mental 
representations in the head, and I have shown throughout this dissertation that, although 
theoretical work is required in order to frame empirical investigation, the examination of 
the nature of one’s moral conceptions is importantly an empirical affair.  Thus, for 
instance, whether one wants to know what constitutes the expert’s AMORALIST 
conception or the folk’s AMORLIST conception, one needs empirical evidence to secure a 
conclusion on this matter.   
One may object to this by stating that philosophers and/or the folk do have clear 
access to their conceptions, so no experimental evidence is required to figure out what 
constitutes their conceptions in the formal aspect.  As the objection goes, we may view 
the entire existence of the relevant areas of metaethics as being a kind of exploration of 
our conceptions.  While there is no evidence from non-theorists and while the conditions 
 278 
have not been precisely controlled, we still can be said to have a lot of evidence about the 
kinds of conceptions people possess.  Nevertheless, especially given reasons that not 
everything about our inner minds and deepest thoughts may be consciously accessible to 
us through introspection and that PAC requires us to have experimental evidence on the 
abstract conception in question to draw constitution claims on the structure and 
knowledge that make up the conception, we need to run empirical studies on the relevant 
conceptions.
42
  Moreover, another reason why we need to run experiments is that I have 
shown in previous chapters that many of our moral conceptions can be constituted by 
prototype, exemplar, theory, or emotion bodies of knowledge.  This allows for possible 
variation in philosophers’ and the folk’s moral conceptions since there is the possibility 
that individuals have different bodies of knowledge for a conception and even if two 
individuals have identical kinds of bodies of knowledge, such as prototypes, there still 
may be great variance in their respective prototypes.
43
  Recall the Smith, et al. study in 
                                                     
42 Those philosophers who espouse an experts-based view may claim that philosophers have a 
more clear access to the nature of their moral conceptions than the folk, so they are immune to 
this objection.  However, we will examine a study below that shows that professional 
philosophers are more susceptible than folk to ordering effects and the concomitant grasping of 
their proper intuition beliefs.  This places a burden of proof on those relevant philosophers to 
empirically justify their claim that philosophers have a more clear and undisturbed access to the 
relevant conceptual constituents. 
43 One may wonder whether in such a case two individuals have different conceptions.  This issue 
of conception individuation will be discussed shortly.  It later will be shown how if philosophers’ 
or folk’s conceptions are interpersonally different (within their own respective domains), then 
there can be no convergence in philosophers’ or folk’s intuitions, respectively.  This is highly 
problematic for conceptual analysis of conceptions because this general view predicts that there 
will be convergence in philosophers’ or folk’s intuitions.  Therefore, for the sake of argument, I 
presuppose here that philosophers’ or folk’s conceptions are not different.  However, even if this 
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the third chapter in which they found that the constituents in people’s GOOD PERSON 
prototype conception substantially varied across seven different cultures.  Also, based on 
the metaethical literature, there appears to be substantial variance amongst philosophers’ 
intuitions on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates.  The relevant 
conceptions such as AMORALIST and MORAL JUDGMENT have the appearances of being 
something like Gallie’s notion of an ‘essentially contested conception.’44  Gallie claimed 
that there are conceptions whose use leads to endless disputes.  Users of the conception 
will give different weights and interpretations to the constituents of the conception, and 
they will provide arguments for their particular understanding while fully knowing that 
others hold incompatible views concerning the extension of the conception.  The 
conceptions relevant to our two metaethical debates at least appear to be candidates for 
being essentially contested conceptions in that the variance in philosophers’ intuitions has 
existed for hundreds upon hundreds of years.  In fact, David Bourget and David Chalmers 
have run a survey asking professional philosophers what their views are on a host of 
philosophical issues.  They found that 35% of the sample population believes in MJI, 
                                                     
 
is the case, it will be shown that there still appears to be no convergence in intuitions, and 
therefore, as presently stated, experiments need to be run on conceptions.  In this respects, one 
may think of this point about variance I make as being conditional on if the relevant conceptions 
are not different. 
44 Walter Bryce Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Vol.56:  (1956), pp.167-198. 
 280 
30% hold MJE, and 35% maintain some other view.
45
  All of the above variance suggests 
that there may be substantial divergence in the constituents of our moral conceptions, 
where conceptual analysis assumes that the opposite is the case, where there will be 
uniformity in philosophers’ or the folk’s conception constituents over time.  Due to this 
conflict and the worry that it produces, this provides further reason to maintain that 
experimental studies need to be run on one’s conceptions and a specified group of 
individuals’ conceptions in order to sufficiently justify a moral conceptual analysis of 
conceptions claim.  Intricate, subtle, and nuanced experimental tests about the 
constitution of our conceptions helps us to gain better access to what our conceptions 
contain.   
Now, it is just such evidence concerning the formal element of the conceptions 
being analyzed that has largely and generally been absent in the MJI/MJE and 
motivational Humeanism literature for those who espouse any of the conceptual analysis 
of conceptions views.  For instance, MJI advocates such as Timmons, Mackie, Hare, and 
Gibbard do not utilize such data.
46
  Externalists such as Brink and Shafer-Landau do not 
use the proper evidence when propounding their claims either.
47
  Motivational Humeans 
such as Blackburn and Smith and anti-Humeans like Nagel, McDowell, Shafer-Landau, 
                                                     
45 David Bourget and David Chalmers, “What do Philosopher’s Believe?”  Philosophical Studies, 
forthcoming. 
46 Mackie’s internalism can be viewed as a kind of error-theory internalism.  Timmons, ibid. John 
Mackie, ibid.  R. M. Hare, ibid.  Allan Gibbard, ibid. 
47 Brink, ibid.  Shafer-Landau, ibid. 
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Dancy, and Scanlon also appear to not provide the requisite support.
48
  Due to this fact, 
their claims are unwarranted and tests need to be run either on expert or folk conceptions.  
Therefore, at best, an agnosticism is warranted on the MJI/MJE and motivational 
Humeanism debates in light of the conceptual analysis of conceptions. 
Shifting now to the conceptual analysis of concepts, as an example case, Plato’s 
Socrates may be interpreted as an instance of one who has engaged (or rather created) the 
MJI/MJE debate by relying on the conceptual analysis of concepts methodology.
49
  In the 
Protagoras, Socrates is attempting to come upon a definition of the Good with Prodicus, 
Protagoras, and Hippias.  It appears that Socrates claims that it is part of the form or the 
concept of the Good that MJI is true.  For instance, Plato’s Socrates says, “Then if the 
pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there is something else better than 
what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he 
could be doing what is better.”50 
I will now examine potential objections against the conceptual analysis of 
concepts that also applies to expert conceptual analysis of conceptions in virtue of the 
fact that both of these views claim that we must rely on the intuitions of the expert 
                                                     
48 It is not completely clear to me as to whether McDowell, Dancy, and Scanlon adhere to a 
conception form of conceptual analysis.  Even though I list them as being such, even if they 
adhere to a concept version of conceptual analysis, I still lay criticisms against such 
methodologies later as well.  Simon Blackburn, ibid.  Smith, ibid.  Nagel, ibid.  McDowell, ibid.  
Shafer-Landau, ibid.  Jonathan Dancy, ibid.  Scanlon, ibid. 
49 For our purposes, it matters not whether Plato’s Socrates is expressing Plato’s own views or 
Socrates’. 
50 Plato, Protagoras, ibid. 
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philosopher.  To note, one way to tell the difference between these two types of 
conceptual analysts is to know if a particular analyst is a Platonist that believes the 
relevant categories are abstracta that we can get in touch with using our a priori 
intuitions.  Such a person is an expert conceptual analyst of concepts.  On the other hand, 
an expert conceptual analyst who does not believe that the relevant categories are abstract 
objects most likely maintains an expert conceptual analysis of conceptions view.  First, 
for those who believe that philosophers are better at drawing correct intuitions on abstract 
concepts or on their own experts’ conceptions as compared to the folk’s intuitions on 
abstract concepts or on folk’s own conceptions, respectively, no evidence has been given 
to demonstrate that this is so.  Rather, philosophers such as McGinn merely just assume 
this to be correct.  However, it appears that the burden of proof is on such adherents to an 
experts-based view of conceptual analysis to actually provide concrete evidence for their 
claim to superiority in a non-question begging way since their positive philosophical 
methodology is so dependent on the notion that experts’ intuitions are better.51  In other 
words, it appears that it is an empirical matter whether philosophers are better at the a 
priori analysis of concepts or their own experts’ conceptions than non-expert competent 
speakers of a language.
52
  Once the correct criterion has been laid down for what the 
                                                     
51 Kristopher Ahlstrom-Vij, “Truth by Analysis:  Games, Names, and Philosophy,” Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews, 2012.06.05. 
52 While this may presuppose that philosophers and the folk do not have different conceptions, 
we will discuss the subject matter of conception individuation shortly.  What we will later find is 
that if philosophers’ and folk’s conceptions are different, then this is problematic for the expert 
conceptual analyst because this will not allow for philosophers’ conceptual analysis to be better 
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correct concept or conception is, tests must be run in order to sufficiently see whether 
philosophers or experts are better at the analysis of the nature of the supposed correct 
concept or conception.  Of course, this assumes that the relevant inquiry will have been 
completed and a definitive conclusion will have been reached.  Assuming that this is the 
case, it behooves philosophers such as McGinn to then run studies to see whether or not 
the folk are overall better or worse at the relevant conceptual analysis of conceptions or 
concepts.  For, even if there already is a general consensus on the correct conclusion from 
experts, it still may turn out that the folk are better and have a stronger consensus on the 
correct conclusion.  The burden falls on the philosopher who makes the positive 
contention that expert’s intuitions are superior to actually prove that expert’s intuitions 
are superior.  Their conclusion must be justified, and such justification requires empirical 
evidence.  For example, if one has in hand the supposed correct prototype for the 
conception AMORALIST, then one may run a prototype feature-listing task, as discussed in 
detail in the second chapter, on the folk and professional philosophers to see what their 
prototype conception of AMORALIST is.  One may then run a similarity score measure on 
how similar the folk and experts’ conceptions are to the purported correct prototype.  
Once this has been done, whichever group has the higher similarity score is the group that 
                                                     
 
than the folk’s conceptual analysis.  Therefore, for the sake of argument, I here presuppose that 
philosophers’ and folk’s conceptions are not different.  However, it will be shown how by not 
being different, philosophers and the folk can still potentially have contradictory intuitions, and 
as stated, empirical studies still need to be run.  In this respects, the present objection may be 
thought of as being conditional on if the relevant conceptions are not different. 
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is better at conceptual analysis.  Given that no such tests have been run to prove that 
expert’s intuitions are better than the folk, one is not justified in concluding that expert’s 
intuitions are superior.  As the aims of this chapter are to explore further philosophical 
implications my pluralistic theory of concepts has in ethics, the objections provided thus 
far give some good reason to believe that metaethical claims in the MJI/MJE and 
motivational Humeanism debates that are based on the a priori conceptual analysis of 
concepts and expert and folk conceptual analysis of conceptions are not justified.  We 
now proceed by further examining possible objections against conceptual analysis for our 
two metaethical debates. 
A potential objection against expert conceptual analysis of conceptions is that 
given that people may have non-identical kinds of knowledge constitute their conceptions 
and even though they may have identical kinds of knowledge, the conceptual constituents 
still may significantly diverge, it may be the case that experts and the folk have different 
moral conceptions from each other, where the expert and folk conceptions are not the 
same.  In claiming that experts’ conceptual analysis of their own conceptions is superior 
to folk’s conceptual analysis of their own folk conceptions, experts assume that experts’ 
and folk’s conceptions are the same or not different such that experts can make such a 
claim to superiority.  If they have individuated or different conceptions, then one cannot 
claim that philosophers are better than the folk at conceptual analysis of conceptions 
because like apples and oranges, their different conceptions and therefore, their 
respective analysis of them cannot be properly compared to one another such that one 
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may say that one’s conception and analysis of one’s conception is better or more accurate 
than the other’s.53  If two people have different conceptions, then this means such an 
above specified comparison is not possible, where intuition beliefs that are made up of 
different conceptions have different truth conditions.  Although later I will explain why I 
do not adopt this potential objection so nothing substantial hangs on our discussion of it, 
this potential objection at hand against expert conceptual analysis of conceptions 
presupposes that it is possible that the philosophers’ and folk’s conceptions may be 
different such that the above comparison cannot be made; a presumption and potential 
objection that we will now further entertain and explore.  To note, within the present 
context, to have “different” or individuated conceptions is a heavily theory-laden notion, 
and we will now further discuss and further elaborate upon the meaning of these exact 
terms of having ‘different or individuated conceptions’ that will apply to the rest of this 
section.  As we shall see, having different conceptions does not necessarily mean that we 
simply have non-identical constituents to our conceptions. 
Now, philosophers may decide to differentiate conceptions in various ways.  How 
philosophers decide to differentiate conceptions is relevant to the present entertained 
objection because one’s theory of conception individuation may determine whether or not 
the present potential objection is correct that the philosophers and the folk have different 
conceptions.  There are two major general theories of conception individuation, where 
                                                     
53 Notice that the door is still open here for some level of interpersonal communication such as 
between two psychologists discussing what constitutes their respective different conceptions by 
discussing psychology tests that have been run on their relevant conceptions. 
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each theory presents a different meaning to ‘conception individuation’ and what it is to 
have different conceptions such that the different conceptions cannot be so compared to 
one another as discussed above.  To note, here I merely describe both theories of when 
conceptions are different, but I do not critically assess them due to reasons to be 
elaborated upon shortly concerning the fact that I take no stand in this dissertation on a 
theory of conception individuation.  For the first view of conception individuation, some 
like Ned Block, Prinz, and Paul Churchland claim that conceptions can be differentiated 
from each other by cognitive content (sense) and reference.
54
  Let us call this specific 
theory of individuation the internalist view.
55
  They claim that if there is some degree of 
internal psychological similarity in the constituents of both our MORAL conceptions and 
our MORAL conceptions co-refer, then our conceptions can be said to be the same 
conceptions and are not different from one another.
56
  On this theory, what it means to 
have two conceptions that are not different from each other is to have two conceptions 
that share the same reference and have some degree of similarity in cognitive content.  
Remember again, even though one may have objections to this internalist view, I do not 
                                                     
54 Ned Block, “Advertisement for a semantics for psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol 
10:  Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. by P. French, T. Uehlin, H. Wettstein, Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 615-678. Ned Block, “Functional Role and Truth 
Conditions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  LXI, 1987, pp. 157-181.  Prinz, Furnishing the 
Mind.  Paul Churchland, Plato’s Camera, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press), 2012. 
55 To note, the internalism/externalism distinction at hand for conception individuation is not 
necessarily meant to mirror the internalism/externalism distinction for theories of content. 
56 What degree of posited similarity that is required in order to have the same conception can 
vary depending on the theorist.  There are various tokens of the internalist view.  However, 
generally speaking, internalists are not always clear on what exact degree of similarity is required 
in order for conceptions to be the same. 
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and need not critically assess whether this theory of individuation is correct for reasons to 
be elaborated upon below.  Obviously, it is important that conceptions co-refer for 
conceptions to not be different because if they do not share the same extension, then the 
conceptions are literally about disparate things.  Moreover, on an internalist theory, if the 
conceptions in question do not have a certain amount of internal similarity, then we can 
be said to have different conceptions despite co-reference.  However, being said to have 
the same conception does not necessarily mean that the constituents of our conceptions 
are exactly identical.  For instance, my DOG conception may be constituted by BARKS, 
WAGS ITS TAIL, PLAYS FETCH, HAS FOUR LEGS, while your DOG conception is made up 
of BARKS, WAGS ITS TAIL, GUARDS THE HOUSE, and HAS FOUR LEGS.  Even though we 
have a non-identical set of constituents to our conceptions, in this circumstance, 
internalists will still maintain that there is enough similarity such that we have 
conceptions that are not different.  Here, one of us may potentially and legitimately claim 
that his or her conception of dogs is more accurate or correct than the other’s.   People 
can have non-identical conceptual constituents from each other, but as internalists claim, 
so long as there is a certain degree of similarity in their constituents and the conceptions 
co-refer, then they can be said to have the same conceptions.
57
   
On the other hand, one may differentiate conceptions only by reference.  Let us 
call this theory of individuation the externalist theory.  On this view, what it means to 
                                                     
57 For internalists and the notion of similarity, there must be a way of pinning down strict identity 
for the constituents, or else they need a non-constituent based notion of similarity that applies to 
the constituents. 
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have two conceptions that are not different is to have two conceptions that share the same 
reference, tout court.  There is no additional requirement as with the internalist view to 
have a certain degree of similarity in cognitive content in order to be said to have the 
same conception.  Moreover, what it means to have two differentiated conceptions on this 
theory is to have two conceptions that do not share the same reference, tout court.  Once 
again, no additional requirement concerning cognitive content is relevant here.  For 
example, one may be an externalist and maintain an informational theory of content.  
Recalling the informational view of content discussed in the first chapter, one has the 
concept C of the property P so long as one stands in the proper reliable causal 
relationship with P.  So long as the tokening of both of our conceptions are reliably 
caused by P, then we have the same conceptions since they co-refer despite the fact that 
what constitutes our conceptions may be radically non-identical.  As we can see, if the 
externalist view is correct and philosophers’ and the folk’s moral conceptions stand in the 
proper reliable causal relationship with the identical relevant property, then they all have 
conceptions that are not different, and the present potential objection at hand will not 
apply.    
Now, as the present potential objection against the expert conceptual analysis of 
conceptions goes, if philosophers and the folk do indeed have different conceptions based 
on either an internalist or externalist theory, then their beliefs concerning the extension of 
the conceptions have different truth conditions.  Since they have different truth 
conditions, like comparing apples and oranges, one cannot claim that professional 
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philosophers are better at the conceptual analysis of moral conceptions as compared to 
the folk when they analyze their own moral conceptions because the philosophers’ moral 
conceptions and the folk’s are not really the same such that such a comparison may be 
made.  With different truth conditions, the philosopher and folk’s respective intuitions 
that may at times be seemingly antithetical, both can be relativistically true.  Due to this 
fact, there is no correct conception for the issue at hand towards which the two different 
conceptions may be compared.  On the other hand, if they are the same conceptions based 
on either an internalist or externalist theory, then something needs to be said by the expert 
conceptual analyst of conceptions that can account for why they are the same.  As we can 
see, the present entertained objection importantly relies on one’s theory of conception 
individuation.  While making this above potential objection against expert conceptual 
analysis of conceptions may be a possibility, in the first chapter, I was able to bracket the 
issue of conception individuation to the side and say that I will not provide a theory of 
conception individuation.  Moreover, as we can see, the issue of conception individuation 
crucially at least relies on the notion of reference and what theory of reference one 
espouses.  However, as also stated in the first chapter, I do not provide or espouse a 
theory of reference for moral conceptions in this dissertation, and I bracketed off any 
future serious discussion of reference or intentionality.  Thus, for the above reasons, I do 
not pursue this potential objection against expert conceptual analysis of conceptions any 
further or any other idea that may include or rely upon propounding a theory of 
conception individuation and arguing for a theory of intentionality. 
 290 
Now, one may wonder if not discussing conception individuation will mean that 
one cannot discuss certain important issues.  For example, one cannot fully discuss 
interpersonal conception individuation, and one also will not be able to fully discuss 
intrapersonal conception individuation across time.  For example, if what constitutes one 
of my conceptions at a particular moment changes diachronically over time, is it the case 
that I have the same conception that is not different across time?
58
  The response to this is 
that this is exactly right that I will not be able to discuss such important issues.  I do not 
discuss such conception individuation here, and therefore, do not discuss the above 
particular issues, but I do not foresee this to be problematic for the specified aims here.  
For, what I am abiding by here is a division of labor clarified by Machery in the first two 
chapters of his book Doing Without Concepts.
59
  For mental representations, there is one 
project concerning what the nature of mental representations is.  It is about what 
constitutes mental representations, or, in other words, it is about what the structure of 
mental representations is.  This project can be thought of as falling under philosophical 
                                                     
58 To note, recall that I discuss in the first chapter that for conception pluralism, Machery gives a 
kind of intrapersonal conception individuation theory for determining whether one may have 
several divergent conceptions of a single category at one particular moment in time.  This view 
can be seen as a synchronic rather than diachronic theory.  Machery’s theory of individuation is 
not meant to be used as a way to determine whether intrapersonal synchronic co-referential 
bodies of knowledge can legitimately be compared to one another such that one body of 
knowledge may potentially be deemed to be more accurate than another.  Rather, the purpose of 
his individuation theory is to determine how conceptions are stored in long term memory and 
recruited into working memory.  Recall that such an individuation theory is not dependent on a 
theory of content but is dependent on what kinds of psychological processes underlie cognition.  
Therefore, there is no problem for Machery to discuss such individuation without having 
espoused a theory of content. 
59 Machery, ibid. 
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psychology or the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science.  On the other hand, there is 
another project concerning mental representations that is about providing a theory of 
representation or content.  This can be thought of as a project in the philosophy of mind.
60
  
Those primarily interested in the philosophy of science may pursue only the former 
project concerning mental representations, such as Machery, without providing a theory 
of content and the relevant theory of individuation.  Moreover, one may pursue only the 
latter project, such as Fred Dretske, without providing an important theory on the nature 
of mental representations.
61
  However, both projects need not be mutually exclusive, and 
one may grandly pursue both of them such as Prinz.
62
  In this dissertation, I have 
specified that I will be pursuing only the former project of examining the nature of moral 
mental representations.  I abide by this former aspect of the division of labor primarily for 
space concerns.  For example, notice that it takes an entire book for Prinz to lay out his 
view on both projects for concrete conceptions in Furnishing the Mind.  Then, since the 
nature of moral conceptions seems to be a more complex issue than concrete conceptions 
given that they may involve emotions, it actually takes Prinz three books to provide his 
overall theory on both projects for moral conceptions.  As we do not have the space to 
pursue such a grand dual project here, I do not provide a theory of reference and 
                                                     
60 This division of labor is analogous to the philosophy of emotions.  One may think that the 
question of what constitutes an emotion is an area in philosophical psychology, while a theory of 
representation for emotions falls within the domain of the philosophy of mind.   
61 Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1981).  
Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation,” in Belief:  Form, Content and Function, ed. By R. Bogdan, 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 17-36. 
62 Prinz, Furnishing the Mind.  Prinz, Gut Reactions.  Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals. 
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conception individuation in this dissertation, and thus, I must leave aside for another time 
important issues that absolutely requires one to propound a theory of content.  This will 
not be problematic so long as I do not discuss any issues or make any claims in this 
dissertation that absolutely require me to provide a theory of content.  My general 
strategy of argument going forward is that when issues of conception individuation arise, 
I will discuss and cover the different major possibilities for conception individuation in 
the relevant circumstances without committing myself to the correctness of any particular 
possibility.  I will argue that in each of the possibilities, philosophers still cannot credibly 
assume that they have justified their intuitions on the MJI/MJE or motivational 
Humeanism debates.   
Another worry about the special authority of philosophers’ intuitions is that we 
should expect to see some convergence in the intuitions of professional philosophers over 
time.  Intuitions from conceptual analysts in thought experiments are taken to be justified 
beliefs.  If our intuitions are arrived upon through a process that provides justification to 
our intuitions that they are true, then ipso facto, we should expect there to be convergence 
from philosophers over time.  However, there appears to be no such convergence in the 
literature, especially when taking into account Bourget and Chalmers’ survey.  Therefore, 
at least a prima facie claim may be made against expert conceptual analysis in this 
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regards.
63
  Even after hundreds upon hundreds of years and at times thousands upon 
thousands of years, a general unanimity is absent in the MJI/MJE and motivation 
Humeanism literature, and it appears no consensus is forthcoming.  Some may respond 
that conceptual analysis is a very difficult task that takes time.  Hence, philosophers need 
more time on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates, and consensus may be 
forthcoming.  However, even if conceptual analysis is a difficult task, the years that have 
already accrued are of such a striking magnitude that we have some justification to doubt 
that any consensus is forthcoming.  Now, I do not understand this particular contention to 
be a definitive objection, but I believe it does raise the burden of proof against those who 
adhere to an experts-based view of conceptual analysis. 
Now, one may wonder whether I am relying on a theory of conception 
individuation in this circumstance as I am discussing philosophers’ interpersonal 
conceptions.  Perhaps I now must be forced to provide a theory of content and conception 
individuation for moral conceptions.  For, if philosophers have different conceptions 
either on an internalist or externalist account, then we cannot really say that there is any 
possibility in the first place for real convergence in their intuitions.  First, if philosophers 
have different conceptions of, for example, AMORALIST, then there is no hope for expert 
conceptual analysis in the MJI/MJE debate because there cannot be any real genuine 
convergence in intuitions since philosophers technically have different conceptions that 
                                                     
63 I say that a prima facie claim may be made because it is always possible that upon running 
experiments on philosophers’ relevant conceptions, we may discover that there actually is 
convergence in intuitions on these two debates. 
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constitute their respective beliefs about amoralists; beliefs which have different truth 
conditions.
64
  Presumably, beliefs that are really convergent must have the same truth 
conditions.  Their beliefs cannot converge if the relevant conceptions that constitute their 
respective beliefs are different and cannot even be possibly compared to one another such 
that one’s conception potentially may be said to be more accurate than the other’s.  
Expert conceptual analysis at least implies convergence across philosophers and thus, 
requires philosophers to have relevant conceptions that are not different.   
On the other hand, if philosophers’ conceptions are the same and are not different, 
then this does not necessarily mean that there must be convergence in intuitions.
65
  For, if 
there is no convergence in intuitions when philosophers’ conceptions are the same and 
are not different, this simply means that what constitutes philosophers’ conceptions do 
not match up in the appropriate way such that they have identical intuitions on a 
particular matter.  What I will now attempt to show is simply that even though 
                                                     
64 There is an ample amount of communication between people who have the same conceptions.  
However, in special cases where people have different conceptions, there may still be a smaller 
degree of communication between individuals with different conceptions given that there will 
most likely be some partial overlap in the constituents of their conceptions.  There can be a 
degree of mutual intelligibility.  However, there still can be no convergence since the intuitions 
have different truth conditions.  To note, even if there is the possibility for convergence when two 
people have different conceptions, the metaethical literature in our two debates still appears to 
show that there is no such convergence. 
65 If one does not believe or think that it is intelligible that the relevant interpersonal conceptions 
within the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates may be different such that there can 
be no comparison between them where one conception can be said to be more accurate than 
another, then one maintains that the relevant conceptions are not different.  However, even if this 
is the case, as we shall see, my prima facie objection about convergence (as well as any other 
relevant objections I make against conceptual analysis) still remains even if the conceptions are 
not different.  
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philosophers have the same relevant conceptions on either an internalist or externalist 
account, they can still have contrary intuitions.  I will first demonstrate this by examining 
the scenario where philosophers’ conceptions are the same based on an internalist theory. 
Assuming that philosophers’ conceptions are not different based on an internalist 
theory, the cognitive content of philosopher’s conceptions have a certain degree of 
internal similarity with each other.  However, this allows for the fact that there may or 
may not be any convergence in intuitions.  For example, two philosophers’ conceptions 
are not different and have a sufficient degree of similarity, but this still allows for the 
case that your conception AMORALIST is constituted by POSSIBLY COULD EXIST but my 
AMORALIST conception is made up of COULD NOT POSSIBLY EXIST.
66
  Stated more 
simply, two philosophers’ conceptions may be sufficiently similar to justify saying they 
are the same on an internalist account, but they differ with respect to the relevant beliefs 
about amoralists.  We could have contrary intuitions on the MJI/MJE debate despite 
having AMORALIST conceptions that are not different because what relevantly constitutes 
our conceptions that drive our relevant intuitive judgments may not match up.  Since our 
conceptions assumedly are not different, this allows for the possibility that one of our 
conceptions can be said to be more accurate than the other’s.  Assuming that 
philosophers’ conceptions are not different, the metaethical literature does prima facie 
                                                     
66 Requiring complete internal identity in order to have conceptions that are not different is an 
implausible view for an internalist because it is unlikely that many people will have complete 
internal identity.  Thus, such a rigid theory of conception individuation will implausibly 
maintain that very few, if any, people will have the same conceptions that are not different. 
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support this point that there is no general convergence in intuitions.  To note, if one 
claims that philosophers then have different conceptions of AMORALIST given the above 
constitution disparities that result in contrary intuitions, then we once again run into the 
aforementioned problem of philosophers having different conceptions such that there can 
be no convergence amongst philosophers.  In summary of this paragraph, I have 
attempted to show that even if philosophers’ conceptions are the same based on an 
internalist account, they can still have contrary intuitions, and there still can be no 
convergence. 
For an externalist theory, let us assume that we both stand in the identical causal 
relation to the relevant property, but we may have some constituents of our AMORALIST 
conceptions in common.  However, it may be the case that we do not have identical 
intuitions on the MJI/MJE debate because your conception is in part constituted by 
POSSIBLY COULD EXIST, but mine is in part constituted by COULD NOT POSSIBLY EXIST.  
Assuming that philosophers’ AMORALIST conceptions are not different, the metaethical 
literature does prima facie support this point that there is no general convergence in 
intuitions.  On the other hand, it could be the case that POSSIBLY COULD EXIST constitutes 
both of our conceptions while we both stand in the identical causal relation to the relevant 
property.  As we can see, if philosophers’ conceptions are not different on an externalist 
account, the issue of convergence in intuitions hinges upon the cognitive content of 
conceptions, and convergence does not solely hinge upon the (presently assumed) point 
that the conceptions are not different.  In this paragraph, I have attempted to demonstrate 
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that even if philosophers’ relevant conceptions are the same based on an externalist 
account, they can still have contrary intuitions, and there still can be no convergence. 
As discussed, if philosophers’ conceptions are different based on either an 
internalist or externalist theory, then there is no convergence in intuitions.  Also, without 
having to adjudicate between whether an internalist or externalist theory is correct, if 
philosophers’ conceptions are not different based on either an internalist or externalist 
account, then whether there is convergence in intuitions or not is dependent on what 
constitutes their conceptions and whether the constituents line up in the appropriate way.  
The metaethical literature appears to show that they do not.  Hence, if philosophers’ 
conceptions are not different, a prima facie objection may be made that there is still no 
convergence.   
Now, while I attempt to avoid providing a theory of content and conception 
individuation, I am perfectly entitled to discuss what constitutes moral conceptions.  This 
is what is of vital importance to my present objection against expert conceptual analysis, 
and it is what allows me to prima facie argue that there still appears to be no convergence 
in intuitions for philosophers even though we assume that their relevant conceptions are 
not different.  Therefore, all in all, whether philosophers’ conceptions are different or not, 
I can still raise my objection against expert conceptual analysis concerning the 
convergence in intuitions from philosophers in our two metaethical debates.  
Furthermore, I can do this while also avoiding the need to take a stand on a theory of 
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conception individuation since I argue that regardless of whether philosophers’ 
conceptions are different or not, there still appears to be no convergence. 
To note, I have provided and will soon further provide objections against 
conceptual analysis in this chapter, some objections of which have an interpersonal 
comparison of individual’s conceptions built into them that may therefore seem to 
implicitly require me to provide a theory of conception individuation.   However, the 
spirit of a number of such objections is that, like in my above objection, they crucially 
rely on what constitutes conceptions.  What is important for such objections is the issue 
of what constitutes the conceptions, which is an issue I am perfectly entitled to speak 
about, and it is not and will not be required that I have a theory of conception 
individuation in hand in order to determine whether the relevant conceptions are different 
or not.  For, regardless of whether the relevant conceptions are different or not, salient 
objections will still await the expert conceptual analyst on either one of these two horns 
of whether the relevant conceptions are different or not.  For many of my objections, I 
take it that I can bypass the issue of conception individuation in like manner as compared 
to my above objection concerning the lack of convergence in philosophers’ intuitions, 
mutatis mutandis.  Furthermore, a similar route that may be taken in providing objections 
against conceptual analysis that still can bypass the issue of conception individuation is to 
first point out that if conceptions are different in a particular subject matter, there will be 
problems for the relevant conceptual analysis on the issue.  Hence, for the sake of 
argument, we may grant the conceptual analyst that the relevant conceptions are the same 
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or not different.  In granting this assumption, we still escape the need to argue for a 
theory of individuation, while then being able to object that there still are problems that 
await the conceptual analyst even if the conceptions are not different.   
 As another objection against expert conceptual analysis, there is the worry that 
intuition beliefs are products of one’s cultural environment, upbringing by family, 
friends, and even heritable personality traits, where philosophers that have such divergent 
personal historical influences may resultantly have contradictory intuitions.
67
  To note, 
this objection may also apply mutatis mutandis to the folk conceptual analysis of 
conceptions as well.  Furthermore, for ease of linguistic expression, when discussing this 
particular objection, I presuppose that philosophers’ conceptions are not different.  
However, the particular objection presented here also can be understood as saying that 
regardless of whether philosophers’ conceptions are interpersonally different or not, their 
intuitions are still mere products of historical contingency, and this is epistemically 
problematic.   
                                                     
67 Concerning conception individuation in this matter, expert conceptual analysis presupposes 
that there will be convergence in philosophers’ intuitions.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
philosophers’ conceptions be the same.  However, if philosophers conceptions are the same on 
either an internalist or externalist account, then what constitutes their respective conceptions do 
not seem to line up in the appropriate way such that they, generally speaking, do not appear to 
have convergence in intuitions.  This apparent non-convergence can in part be causally explained 
by historical contingency.  As will be stated shortly in the text, for ease of linguistic expression, 
when discussing my particular objection here, I presuppose that philosophers’ conceptions are 
not different.  However, the particular objection presented here can be understood as saying that 
regardless of whether philosophers’ conceptions are interpersonally different or not, their 
intuitions may be mere products of historical contingency, and this is epistemically problematic.   
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Now, this objection is suggestive since it appears that philosophers do have 
apparently irreconcilable intuitions for our two metaethical subject matters.  Moreover, it 
is further suggestive since we know from previous chapters that it is possible that many 
of our interpersonal moral conceptions that are the constituents of our a priori intuition 
judgments may themselves have constituents that are substantially non-identical.
68
  
Philosophers, like the folk, are part of the natural world, and setting aside indeterminism 
at the microphysical level, which if relevant will mean that our intuitions are generated 
by a random process, we live in a causal deterministic universe.  Therefore, intuitions 
may be merely a product of historical contingency or historical accident.  It may be the 
case that a priori intuitions are highly susceptible to being determined by epistemically 
pernicious and irrelevant factors without one even realizing it; factors that may be 
responsible for why two people with disparate histories have contradictory intuitions.  If 
this is so, it at least provides a good partial explanation for the opposing intuitions moral 
philosophers apparently have, and it explains the apparent opposing conceptual 
constituents found in various philosophers for their various bodies of knowledge.  This 
naturalistic-based objection has explanatory power.  It is interesting to note that the 
                                                     
68 While the conceptions experiments proving this were largely run on the folk, we may infer that 
these results also apply to moral philosophers on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism 
debates given the apparently irreconcilable contrary intuitions philosophers hold in these debates 
and the Bourget and Chalmers study.  Moreover, insofar as those who partake in the conceptual 
analysis of concepts have intuition beliefs in the head concerning the constituents of concepts, 
their mental representations of the concepts in a way are relevant to the present inquiry.  Hence, 
conceptions conclusions concerning the fact that we may have non-identical bodies of knowledge 
or that we may have contrary conception constituents may still be relevant to the subject matter 
of the conceptual analysis of concepts. 
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famous poet and Oxford professor W. H. Auden, while observing philosophers at Oxford 
wrote: 
Oxbridge philosophers, to be cursory, 
Are products of a middle-class nursery: 
Their arguments are anent 
What Nanny really meant.
69
  
 
In partial support of this overall objection, Eric Schulz et al. experimentally have 
shown that professional philosopher’s intuitions on moral responsibility can be accurately 
predicted based on the possession of the heritable personality trait of extroversion.
70
  
Extroverts are more likely to be compatibilists.
71
  Regardless of one’s training, heritable 
traits that manifest themselves over a wide variety of environments and environmental 
influences, can be irrelevant causal factors to philosophers’ intuitions.  Now, while this 
experiment is not one that directly implicates our two metaethical issues at hand, it does 
provide empirical support for placing some level of doubt that intuitions for our two 
metaethical issues may also be products of some kind of historical contingency that 
directly questions the epistemic legitimacy of said intuitions.  If certain intuitions on 
moral responsibility are based on some kind of historically contingency, then so may 
intuitions on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates. 
                                                     
69 W. H. Auden, Academic Graffiti, (New York:  Random House), 1972, p. 25. 
70 E. Schulz, E. Cokely, and A. Feltz.  “Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and 
moral responsibility:  A test of the expertise defense, Consciousness and Cognition, 20:  (2011), pp. 
1722-1731. 
71 A compatibilist is one who believes determinism is compatible with freedom. 
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Now, by no means do I understand this historical contingency objection to be a 
knock-down argument against the various forms of conceptual analysis that are currently 
under scrutiny.  However, it does provide even a further burden of proof on those who 
believe that only expert’s intuitions should be sought for conceptual analysis to provide 
empirical evidence to support their positive claim.   
Some may object to this historical contingency argument that even scientific 
beliefs held by scientists are then in a sense historically contingent, but this does not 
necessarily impugn the justification of scientific beliefs.  For example, if a biologist who 
believes in evolution was raised alternatively 700 years ago within the confines of the 
Christian doctrine before Darwin, then this person would believe in the antithetical view 
of divine creationism.  Therefore, since a biologist’s belief in evolutionary theory is 
subject to historical contingency – a contingency that potentially could have led to 
alternative contradictory beliefs if one’s historical circumstances had been altered – but 
the biologist’s belief in evolutionary theory still is justified, there also is no 
corresponding problem for ethicists.  However, it seems that there is a disanalogy here 
between scientific or generally empirical-based beliefs generated from the scientific 
method, history, common observation such as in pre-modern psychology, the social 
sciences, and/or empirical testing versus those a priori intuitions coming from the 
armchair moral philosopher.  Since they have different methodologies, where in our 
example, the evolutionary biologist justifies her claim in good part based on a wide body 
of empirical evidence rather than solely from a priori intuitions, the armchair ethicist 
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cannot claim that her intuition-based methodology is properly analogous to a generally 
empirical-based methodology.
72
 
 Fourth, there is a gathering consensus of experimental data on intuitions from 
professional philosophers that their intuitions are not immune from epistemically 
irrelevant and pernicious factors such as ordering effects and framing effects.  If indeed 
philosophers’ intuitions are more superior to the folk, then we should expect them to be 
less susceptible to such factors that influence intuitions.
73
  For example, numerous 
philosophers such as Thomas Grundmann, Frank Hofmann, and Joachim Horvath have 
claimed that unlike the folk, a philosopher’s intuition is protected from unconscious and 
                                                     
72 I say ‘in good part’ in this sentence because there is also abstract theoretical work to be done in 
constructing the theory of evolution. Furthermore, an “empirical-based methodology” may also 
be a methodology that is used in those fields in which empirical evidence is difficult to find.  
Also, it may not be clear whether there is the kind of historical contingency in a priori disciplines 
such as in mathematics, where historical contingency is responsible for contradictory beliefs.  
However, even if math is based on historical contingency, it will be difficult for the armchair 
moral philosopher to make an argument by analogy with math to then say that expert 
metaethical intuitions are also justified despite contingency.  For, there appears to be at least a 
prima facie disanalogy between math versus the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates.  
For, there appears to be generally strong consensus on mathematical issues from experts in math 
as instanced by the uniformity in various arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and 
calculus textbooks.  However, there appears to be no such general consensus from experts when 
examining the literature of our two metaethical issues. 
73 Concerning conception individuation on this particular matter, expert conceptual analysts 
presuppose that philosophers and the folk have conceptions that are not different such that a 
proper comparison can be made between them on their skills of conceptual analysis.  If they are 
different, then the expert conceptual analyst cannot really claim that their abilities at conceptual 
analysis on the relevant conception are superior to the folk.  Moreover, as will be stated shortly, 
the experiments at hand still show that philosophers’ intuitions are susceptible to cognitive 
biases, which places epistemic doubt on such intuitions.  If they are not different, experiments 
suggest that the folk are less susceptible to cognitive biases than philosophers.  For ease of 
linguistic expression, when discussing my particular objection here, I presuppose that 
philosophers’ and folk’s conceptions are not different.   
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unwanted biases.
74
  They have made such a claim without providing the requisite 
experimental proof.  Regardless, several studies have suggested that the above 
philosophers are wrong.
75
  To note, for ease of linguistic expression, when discussing my 
particular objection here, I presuppose that philosophers’ and folk’s conceptions are not 
different.  However, even if philosophers and the folk have different conceptions, the 
objection at hand still can apply, mutatis mutandis.  For, epistemic doubt can still be 
raised against expert conceptual analysis because philosophers with their own different 
conceptions are still significantly subject to epistemically pernicious factors like ordering 
effects.   
For example, in one study, Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman have shown 
that philosophers’ intuitions are susceptible to ordering effects.76  Ordering effects are 
usually unconscious biases, where a participant’s judgment on each item in a group of 
questions may potentially vary depending on what order the items are presented.  At 
twenty-five major research universities, they ran a series of studies on 324 professional 
philosophers, 753 professional academic non-philosophers, and 1,389 non-academics 
                                                     
74 T. Grundmann, “Some hope for intuitions:  A reply to Weinberg,” Philosophical Psychology, 23:  
(2010), pp. 481-509.  F. Hofmann, “Intuitions, concepts, and imagination,” Philosophical Psychology, 
23:  (2010), pp. 529-546.  J. Hovarth, “How (not) to react to experimental philosophy,” Philosophical 
Psychology, 23:  (2010), pp. 447-480.  See also:  J. Wright, “On intuitional stability:  The clear, the 
strong, and the paradigmatic,” Cognition 115:  (2010), pp. 491-503.   
75 Through verbal communication, Stephen Stich has said that he has several experimental 
philosophy papers in the works that demonstrate that philosophers are more susceptible to 
biases than the folk.   
76 Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman, “Expertise in moral reasoning?  Order effects on moral 
judgment in professional philosophers and non-philosophers,” Mind & Language 27:  (2012), pp. 
135-153. 
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with no graduate degree in any field.  They provided participants with a list of moral 
scenarios for making moral judgments.  For example, the first scenario was the lever case 
as discussed in the fourth chapter.  Here, a train is about to run over five people, but you 
may divert the train onto a sidetrack by pulling a lever.  Pulling the lever, however, will 
lead to the death of one person.  The second case was also the previously discussed 
footbridge case.  Recall that for this scenario, a train is about to run over five people, but 
you may push a large person over the footbridge that hovers over the track in order to 
stop the train and save the five.  However, doing so will lead to this large person’s death.  
Later on in the same study, as, for instance, question fourteen and fifteen, our 
experimenters re-asked participants both of these cases but reversed the order in which 
they were presented.  In re-asking the questions, our experimenters slightly varied the 
cases, but kept the morally relevant features the same.  For instance, they would use a 
runaway boat instead of a train that is about to run over five swimmers, but you can push 
a large person in the boat’s path to stop the boat but end up killing the large person.  The 
entire study was littered with several different kinds of pairs of cases like the lever and 
footbridge case, where the pairs of questions were re-asked in slightly altered form later 
in the same test, but in a different order.  Upon running the tests, our experimenters ran 
the data to see whether or not the ordering of the scenarios played a substantial role in 
influencing and biasing the decisions made on the moral scenarios, where participants 
will give different answers on a type of question depending on what order it was 
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presented.  They found that philosophers are more susceptible to ordering effects than 
non-philosophers:  
Both philosophers and non-philosophers showed significant order effects for all 
 three types of scenario.  In our summary measure of order effects across all 
 scenario judgments, philosophers and ethics PhDs trended marginally higher than 
 the comparison groups.  Thus, philosophers showed no greater tendency than non-
 philosophers to use the consistent application of moral principles to reduce order 
 effects on their scenario judgments.
77
   
 
They discovered that ordering effects have a large scale influence on 
philosophers’ intuitions on moral scenarios presumably without their awareness.  
Moreover, non-philosophers were impacted by the influence of ordering effects less than 
philosophers.  Even though this study did not examine the intuitions from the MJI/MJE 
or motivational Humeanism debates, the red flag it raises for the relevant particular moral 
issues is still sufficient for us to have pause for concern on the general statement that 
intuitions from expert moral philosophers are more trustworthy than those from the folk.  
Hence, such a study is still relevant to our interests.  For, it may be the case that there 
may be ordering effects for intuitions on our two moral psychology issues as well.  Such 
a study provides empirical evidential support for this possible fact.  It does create a level 
of doubt.  However, since more studies need to be run on experts’ intuitions to make a 
complete case, I do not take the studies to be conclusive proof that any experts-based 
view of conceptual analysis is fundamentally wrong.  Nevertheless, they do lay down a 
further burden of proof against such philosophers.  Such philosophers need to provide 
                                                     
77 Schwitzgebel and Cushman, p. 148. 
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empirical evidence of such a strength that it supports their positive claim and overrides 
this and the previous burden of proof objections I have given.  I take my objections to 
conjointly produce a substantial burden.  Therefore, we may claim that the balance of the 
scales lies in favor of the fact that the conceptual analysis of concepts and expert 
conceptual analysis of conceptions appear to be undermined.
78
  My above objections 
generally demonstrate that the use of such forms of conceptual analysis does not 
sufficiently justify a priori conclusions on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism 
debates. 
Once again, continuing to assume that philosophers and the folk do not have 
different conceptions, one may raise the objection that even if ordering effects influence 
professional philosophers more than the folk, when hypothetical scenarios are presented 
in isolation and not in any order with other hypotheticals, philosophers’ intuitions are 
more reliable than the folk.  However, this is a claim in which empirical evidence is 
directly relevant and must be presented in order to substantiate such a claim.  Given the 
above Schwitzgebel and Cushman study, the burden of proof assuredly falls on the 
experts-based philosopher to demonstrate his or her point. 
                                                     
78 While I have clarified that the conceptual analysis of concepts is to be considered as an experts-
based view, if one then understands it to be a folk-based theory due to my objections against 
experts-based views, then there are further objections to this move.  For, it is an empirical matter 
as to what the folk intuitions are as to the constituents of concepts.  Relevant tests need to be 
conducted to see if there is any consensus of intuitions by the folk.  Since no such studies have 
been run, we must remain agnostic.  Furthermore, such folk intuitions may be grounded in 
historical contingency. 
 308 
Given the above arguments against conceptual analysis, such as the historical 
contingency argument that applies to all forms of conceptual analysis, I have attempted to 
show that there are serious reservations against even pursing the a priori modal MJI/MJE 
and motivational Humeanism debates.   
 
6.4  Conclusion 
In the preceding five chapters of this dissertation, I have followed in the footsteps 
of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature.  Just as the three books that constitute the 
Treatise synchronically are of the human understanding, emotions, and morals, I likewise 
have examined conceptions or what Hume and Locke called ‘ideas’ that are the building 
blocks of thought and of how we understand the world.  Moreover, I have then examined 
emotions and moral conceptions.  While Hume draws from his first two books to 
conclude in his final book that moral conceptions are constituted by emotions, I similarly 
have drawn on the contemporary conceptions and emotions literature to provide an 
overall theory on the nature of moral conceptions that they can be constituted by 
prototypes, exemplars, theories, or emotions.   
In this final chapter, we have explored any further philosophical implications the 
preceding chapters may have in ethics.  In the beginning of this chapter, I have shown 
that the demise of the classical view has ramifications in normative ethical theory for 
those who presuppose that our moral mental representations can have classical structure.  
Moreover, I have contended that another implication is that there can be counterexamples 
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to people’s conceptions.  The existence of such counters does not necessarily mean that 
one’s conception is false.   
 Finally, I have argued against those philosophers who use conceptual analysis in 
order to address the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates.  By relying on such 
things as studies in previous chapters that establish the viability of the prototype, 
exemplar, theory, and emotion theories, I have contended that such philosophers engaged 
in the conceptual analysis of conceptions are not justified because they need to support 
their claims with experimental data on the conceptions that are relevant to the formal 
aspect.  Finally, I have objected that those philosophers engaged in the expert analysis of 
concepts or conceptions are not sufficiently warranted in believing that philosophers’ a 
priori intuitions on the MJI/MJE and motivational Humeanism debates are justified.   
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